[lit-ideas] Disposition, Belief, and Knowledge
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2013 10:47:55 -0500 (EST)
We are discussing, with McEvoy, what he calls the disposition of this or
that atom -- and I would add 'mineral' in general. This we do vis-a-vis the
disposition of this or that vegetable ('tree' his example) and animal
(including man). We are dealing with whether we can do without a 'semantic'
argument here.
It would seem that we don't have any trouble ascribing disposition.
Then some dispositions are not necessarily 'beliefs', but are deemed
'knowledge', defined, explicitly or not, as a disposition which serves an
adaptive function in terms of Darwinian selection. This criterion seems to
become
definitional. Or not.
McEvoy brings in the idea of 'information' that should also feature large
in this or that account. Or not, of course. McEvoy's commentary commented
below.
There is a reference to the 'definition' of Knowledge as Justified True
Belief, and the idea is to play with 'knowledge' not necessarily involving
truth at all -- which we have addressed in previous posts (McEvoy's example of
a woman who KNEW -- 'wrongly' a purist may add -- that her husband would
drive his car on a certain day).
"Truth" is admitedly a sort of metaphysical notion, so it does seem as if
by focusing on adaptive strategies with a view to survival and natural
selection alla Darwinian lines may do without it. Or not.
I would think NOT. If a tree _believes_ that it has reached a table of
water (and McCreery's recent link may be interesting to check out here -- and
also McEvoy's reference to a metal allegedly 'remembering' this or that) we
want that 'belief' to be 'true'. A tree may WRONGLY 'believe' that its
roots have reached a table of water. So we may define the 'true' component
here
as being attached to a 'disposition' (such as belief) that becomes
'successful' in the plant's adaptive behaviour.
Oddly, Grice, who loved the notion of 'soul', starts his 'eschatological
remarks' -- from the banal to the bizarre -- in his "Method in Philosophical
Psychology" essay with squarrels (his version of squirrels) hobbling nuts
before them, rather than with plants -- and this emphasis on the 'function'
an ascription of a disposition like a 'belief' (or a 'want' for that
matter) seems akin to his overall project. Or not.
Know and Believe
In a message dated 12/19/2013 2:44:06 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
The idea that my post relies on semantic argument is purely in the eye of
the beholder (not so long ago Walter wrongly suggested an argument of mine
was stipulative, when in truth his own was: is this an occupational disease
of philosophers? It is certainly tiresome after a while.)
----
Well, I guess there IS a difference.
I LOVE a semantic argument.
On the other hand, the polemic between McEvoy and Walter O. seems to rely
on the fact that neither of them likes a 'stipulative argument' (Oddly, I
LOVE a stipulative argument, too).
Since I guess I'm NOT that interested in ascribing 'know' to atoms, I will
go back to McEvoy's earlier commentary:
"To rebut this by stipulation as what 'knowledge' means is facile and
beside the point: and will amount, perhaps unwittingly, to substituting a
verbal
problem for a substantive one."
A "stipulation as to what 'knowledge' means" seems to involve various
levels:
By uttering "know", Speranza means x.
By uttering "know", McEvoy means y.
For Speranza, 'know' =df. x.
For McEvoy, 'know' =df. y.
There are various types of definitions, and stipulative ones (vide
Robinson, "Definition" -- he of Oriel College, Oxford) seem to be _good_ ones.
There are also 'implicit' definitions.
Let us see if we can extract McEvoy's implicit (if not stipulative)
'definition' as to what 'knowledge' means -- This he may still regard as a
'verbal' versus a 'substantive' point.
GEARY's is a substantive point when he says, "I don't care what you call
it" (referring to the mutual relations between Adam and Eve, as when the
writer of the Bible writes, "And Adam knew Eve, and vice versa".
--
McEvoy:
"We can, if we like, call whatever dispositional properties that atoms and
molecules have, their 'knowledge' (or call a subset of these dispositions
'knowledge)'."
This is not as absurd as it seems.
It entails we may go on to say things like:
"This atom KNOWS what he is doing".
McEvoy:
"That is semantics."
"But, if we do, what is our model of their 'knowledge'?"
"Substantively, theirs is not 'knowledge' formed by 'natural selection'
and nor is it 'knowledge' of any purposeful sort or which may be part of an
adaptive strategy in Darwinian terms. So even if we call such physical or
chemical dispositions 'knowledge' we will have to differentiate this from a
tree's 'knowledge', as the correct model of a tree's 'knowledge' is very
different to the correct model of an atom's (so-called)."
Yes, perhaps 'dispose' is a better neutral term.
We may say that some dispositions are adaptive (those McEvoy calls
'knowledge') and that some dispositions are formed by 'natural selection'
(also
called 'knowledge') by McEvoy.
On the other hand, there are dispositions that are admittedly NOT formed
by 'natural selection' or are part of any adaptive strategy in Darwinian
terms.
These dispositions are STILL something and may be entitled to be 'causal
powers'.
"But a model of the atom's 'knowledge' is so threadbare, one wonders what
the agenda is in insisting we refer to an atom having 'knowledge' at all?
In particular, an atom or molecule is not in a feedback loop involving
information such as we might think necessary to any model of knowledge, whereas
a tree is - a tree can detect the moisture in the soil and react to this
information."
Here we seem to have a criterion then:
-- dispositions which are not involved in any feedback loop involving
information.
-- dispositions which ARE involved in such feedback.
This may rely on a more prior definition of 'information'.
McEvoy:
"Atoms do not process information from their environment as organisms do,
never mind react to it - and this gives substantive reason to deny that
atoms have knowledge."
Atoms do seem to react. Even 'in chain'. "Chain reaction" I think it's
called. More generally, inorganic matter seems to react.
There is a whole theory about the origin of life that relies on inorganic
matter being able, on occasion, to react in this or that IMPORTANT way.
This is the 'primordial soup' theory propounded by Oparin.
Oparin proposes that the "spontaneous generation of life" that had been
attacked by Louis Pasteur did in fact occur once.
In other terms, on THAT occasion, inorganic matter KNEW.
Oparin goes on to argue that this knowledge is today almost impossible to
achieve
"because the conditions found on the early Earth had changed, and
preexisting organisms would immediately consume any spontaneously generated
organism."
Oparin argues that the "primeval soup" of organic molecules COULD possibly
be created but only in an oxygenless atmosphere and through the action of
sunlight.
These organic molecules thus created could then combine in ever more
complex ways until they formed what Oparin calls "coacervate droplets" (which I
dub 'knowing agents' -- of sorts).
These droplets, Oparin suggests, could "grow" by fusion with other
droplets, and "reproduce" through fission into "daughter droplets".
This way, we would have a primitive metabolism in which those factors
which promote "cell integrity" survive, and those that do not become extinct.
Most current theories of the origin of life still take Oparin's ideas as a
starting point -- while a few don't, admittedly.
Cheers,
Speranza
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