[lit-ideas] Re: Disimplicatures of "Know"
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 00:06:41 -0800 (PST)
John raises some interesting objections. It appears that, if order to there be
falsifiability, there needs to be also verifiability of some sort. Of course, I
am attempting to (loosely) apply the notion of falsifiability to a theory that
is not scientific but philosophical, so we should not expect to witness
empirical falsification or verification. That is why I was using somewhat
trivial examples where we might be expected to more or less agree on certain
commonsense judgements such as that, if Tom cannot answer an exam question as
to the date of the Battle of Trafalgar, he probably doesn't know it, or that it
is probably true that the Battle was fought in 1805. This procedure depends
somewhat on what we are prepared agree on, but it is not very different from
the dialectical procedure through which JTB was arrived at in the first place.
I suppose that I could use some other terms such as refutability and
confirmability in order to avoid the
empirical connotations of falsification.
Another objection or question that John raises is whether the terms truth,
justification, belief can be defined independently of each other. If not, this
would be at least as much of an objection to the theory as to the attempts to
examine it. If this turns out to be the case, we might have to conclude that
JTB theory is not susceptible of rational examination.
O.K.
On Tuesday, January 14, 2014 4:04 AM, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Omar,
As far as I can make out, your logic is impeccable. The problem is in the
assumptions. For (2) belief and (3) justification, evidence can be produced and
judged, to use the legal formula, as beyond reasonable doubt. But No.1, that
the proposition is, in fact, true is problematic. If truth is supposed to be
the whole truth and nothing but the truth and irrefutable forever, then,
outside the artificial games that mathematicians play, truth is rarely, if
ever, to be found. We take such statements as f=ma, e=mc^2, AIDS is caused by
the HIV virus, and the speed limit in the state of Virginia is 55 miles per
hour to be knowledge because all are supported by evidence and taken to be true
for various practical purposes, plotting an orbit to the moon, building an
atomic bomb, testing for HIV infection, avoiding speeding tickets, etc. But are
they "true" in some capital T True without qualification sense that fresh
evidence could never change? It is true, for
example, that 55 miles per hour is the usual speed limit on Virginia highways.
It is also true that the speed limit on Interstate Highways is, outside of
metropolitan areas, 65 miles per hour, and that speed limits may be lowered to
45, 35, or even 15 miles per hour, depending on local circumstances. Do these
facts make the statement that the speed limit in the state of Virginia is 55
miles per hour untrue and unworthy of being considered knowledge? Or do we
simply accept the fact that what counts as knowledge is rarely unqualified and
that judgments may change when circumstances or evidence changes? And, if we
accept this form of "knowledge" as knowledge, where is the criterion of truth
independent of belief and justification?
Seeking enlightenment gradually,
John
On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 9:19 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I am trying to see if JTB 'theory' can be falsified. R.P. says that JTB is an
account not a theory, but that distinction is hardly clear and besides JTB is
commonly referred to as theory. I m guessing that maybe R..P. wants to say that
it is analytic, but it may be that even analytic statements are falsifiable in
some sense. For example,'bachelor is an unmarried male' is on the face of it
analytic but it doesn't account for a male baby or an old widower whom hardly
anyone would refer to as a bachelor. That is, analytic statements are true if
they are tautological, but if they are not really tautological then they are
not true. Anyhow, we can formulate the theory, or the account at hand as:
>
>
>iff JTB, then K
>
>
>From this, we can deduce a positive hypothesis that, where there is justified
>true belief, there is knowledge (since these three conditions re jointly
>sufficient, and we shouldn't need any additional conditions), and a negative
>hypothesis that, if all three conditions are not met, there can be no
>knowledge (since each of these conditions is individually necessary.). The
>logical corollary of the positive hypothesis is that, if there is no
>knowledge, one of the 3 conditions must be missing; the logical corollary of
>the negative hypothesis is that, if there is knowledge, they must all be met.
>Thus, we can go about trying to falsify the theory by falsifying the positive
>hypothesis, or the negative hypothesis, or the corollaries. The examples I
>have recently given had to do some of them with trying to falsify the negative
>hypothesis, and some of them with trying to falsify the corollary of the
>positive hypothesis. (Or so I think)
>
>
>O.K.
>
>
>
>On Monday, January 13, 2014 10:26 PM, "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx"
><Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>In a message dated 1/13/2014 3:07:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
>rpaul@xxxxxxxx provides in "Knowing one doesn't know" some context to some
>utterances provided by Omar K. to the effect that K iff JTB (Plato's idea and
>Ayer's
>idea of knowledge as justified true belief, contested by Gettier and
>McEvoy):
>
>R. Paul:
>
>One student as to another student with whom she is studying for a
>geography exam:
>
>"I don't know if Stockholm is the capital of Sweden. Isn't it, like, Oslo?"
>
>Note that R. Paul intelligently changed that 'that'-clause into an 'if'
>clause. I suppose the same would occur in Latin (or not). I'm not sure about
>Ancient Greek (as if it mattered). But J. L. Austin was OBSESSED with
>'that'-clauses.
>
>The point would be that 'know if' is NOT factive in the way that
>'know-that' IS factive.
>
>R. Paul's second scenario:
>
>"I don't know *if* [emphasis Speranza's] Stockholm is the
capital of
>Sweden any more, still: things are happening so fast in the Scandinavian
>Revolution."
>
>Cfr.
>
>I wouldn't think Stockholm IS the capital of Sweden anymore: things are
>happenign so fast in the Scandinavian
Revolution.
>
>I wouldn't think I KNOW anymore _that_ Stockholm is the capital of Sweden
>anymore.
>
>---
>
>R. Paul's examples concerning the Battle of Trafalgar (Grice's example
>concerns the more crucial, to my view, battle of Waterloo, even to the effect
>that it may be 'what every French school boy' knows'):
>
>SON: When was the Battle of Trafalgar fought, dad?
>
>FATHER: 1805.
>
>SON: Do you KNOW that?
>
>FATHER: Well, I don't quite *know* THAT [emphasis Speranza's] the Battle
>of Trafalgar took place in 1805. As far as I know, and now that you ask, it
>might well have been 1807 or 1806. To be quite honest with you, I've
>forgotten all that stuff. Go ask your mother. She _might_ know, but then of
>course she might NOT.
>
>SON: ??
>
>Variant on R. Paul's other example:
>
>"I don't know that the Battle of Trafalgar took place in 1805
FOR SURE
>[emphasis Speranza's], but that's what I remember [being told -- addition
>Speranza's] from my English History course.
>
>Omar K. wants us to discuss the oddity of first-person claims to ignorance
>(as one may call them) as counterexamples to K iff JTB, and this is what
>one should do! Or not.
>
>I just bring this to the record to contrast:
>
>'know that' which MAY BE factive (for all that the Kiparskys care)
>
>and
>
>'know whether' or 'know if', which seems non-factive.
>
>Additions of 'know that' "for sure" bring in the topic discussed I think by
>M. A. E. Dummett to the effect that historical knowlede (so-called) is
>hardly
intuitionistic. I wonder why Grice, of all prepositions, had to focused
>on the Battle of Waterloo being fought on.
>
>Note that Grice speaks, more casually, of the student (or pupil as he might
>prefer) knowing THE
DATE.
>
>Grice:
>
>"An examination candidate at an oral
>knows the date of the battle of Waterloo."
>
>June 18 1815
>
>In propositional terms:
>
>"The examination candidate knows that the Battle of Waterloo was fought on
>June 18, 1815."
>
>Grice goes on:
>
>"He may know this WITHOUT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE."
>
>"He may even answer after hesitation (showing in the end that he knows the
>answer [that the battle of Waterloo was fought on June 18, 1816])."
>
>----
>
>I'm surprised the teacher does not want to know the TIME within the date,
>too.
>
>I learn from Wikipedia:
>
>"The 80 guns of Napoleon's grande batterie drew up in the centre. These
>opened fire at 11:50, according to Lord Hill (commander of the Anglo-allied II
>Corps), while other sources put the time between noon and 13:30."
>
>I.e. _as far as Lord Hill remembered_.
>
>R.
Paul notes:
>
>"I don't know that the Battle of Trafalgar took place in 1805 [for sure,
>but that's what I remember (a perfectly good use of 'remember,' with no
>epistemological import) from my English History course]."
>
>It may well be that 'remember' DOES have interesting epistemological
>usages, though, and that Proust, "Remembrance of Things Past" (versus
>"Admonitions of the Future") is a treatise on history.
>
>Grice notes "the oddity" of (in William James Lecture, I) things like:
>
>"The hotel clerk asked me what my name was, and fortunately I knew the
>answer".
>
>Grice quotes from the essay by Benjamin, in _Mind_, where Benjamin speaks
>of a "sense" (Grice
contests this) of 'remember' such that, from the
>demonstration that one has not forgotten, it would follow that one remembers
>that
>p. Benjamin's example: "I've remembered my name
again").
>
>And this may be relevant. Or not.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Speranza
>
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--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
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