[lit-ideas] Re: Disimplicatures of "Know"
- From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Lit-Ideas <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 12:04:19 +0900
Omar,
As far as I can make out, your logic is impeccable. The problem is in the
assumptions. For (2) belief and (3) justification, evidence can be produced
and judged, to use the legal formula, as beyond reasonable doubt. But No.1,
that the proposition is, in fact, true is problematic. If truth is supposed
to be the whole truth and nothing but the truth and irrefutable forever,
then, outside the artificial games that mathematicians play, truth is
rarely, if ever, to be found. We take such statements as f=ma, e=mc^2, AIDS
is caused by the HIV virus, and the speed limit in the state of Virginia is
55 miles per hour to be knowledge because all are supported by evidence and
taken to be true for various practical purposes, plotting an orbit to the
moon, building an atomic bomb, testing for HIV infection, avoiding speeding
tickets, etc. But are they "true" in some capital T True without
qualification sense that fresh evidence could never change? It is true, for
example, that 55 miles per hour is the usual speed limit on Virginia
highways. It is also true that the speed limit on Interstate Highways is,
outside of metropolitan areas, 65 miles per hour, and that speed limits may
be lowered to 45, 35, or even 15 miles per hour, depending on local
circumstances. Do these facts make the statement that the speed limit in
the state of Virginia is 55 miles per hour untrue and unworthy of being
considered knowledge? Or do we simply accept the fact that what counts as
knowledge is rarely unqualified and that judgments may change when
circumstances or evidence changes? And, if we accept this form of
"knowledge" as knowledge, where is the criterion of truth independent of
belief and justification?
Seeking enlightenment gradually,
John
On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 9:19 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I am trying to see if JTB 'theory' can be falsified. R.P. says that JTB is
> an account not a theory, but that distinction is hardly clear and besides
> JTB is commonly referred to as theory. I m guessing that maybe R..P. wants
> to say that it is analytic, but it may be that even analytic statements are
> falsifiable in some sense. For example,'bachelor is an unmarried male' is
> on the face of it analytic but it doesn't account for a male baby or an old
> widower whom hardly anyone would refer to as a bachelor. That is, analytic
> statements are true if they are tautological, but if they are not really
> tautological then they are not true. Anyhow, we can formulate the theory,
> or the account at hand as:
>
> iff JTB, then K
>
> From this, we can deduce a positive hypothesis that, where there is
> justified true belief, there is knowledge (since these three conditions re
> jointly sufficient, and we shouldn't need any additional conditions), and
> a negative hypothesis that, if all three conditions are not met, there
> can be no knowledge (since each of these conditions is individually
> necessary.). The logical corollary of the positive hypothesis is that, if
> there is no knowledge, one of the 3 conditions must be missing; the logical
> corollary of the negative hypothesis is that, if there is knowledge, they
> must all be met. Thus, we can go about trying to falsify the theory by
> falsifying the positive hypothesis, or the negative hypothesis, or the
> corollaries. The examples I have recently given had to do some of them with
> trying to falsify the negative hypothesis, and some of them with trying
> to falsify the corollary of the positive hypothesis. (Or so I think)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2014 10:26 PM, "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <
> Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> In a message dated 1/13/2014 3:07:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
> rpaul@xxxxxxxx provides in "Knowing one doesn't know" some context to
> some
> utterances provided by Omar K. to the effect that K iff JTB (Plato's idea
> and Ayer's
> idea of knowledge as justified true belief, contested by Gettier and
> McEvoy):
>
> R. Paul:
>
> One student as to another student with whom she is studying for a
> geography exam:
>
> "I don't know if Stockholm is the capital of Sweden. Isn't it, like,
> Oslo?"
>
> Note that R. Paul intelligently changed that 'that'-clause into an 'if'
> clause. I suppose the same would occur in Latin (or not). I'm not sure
> about
> Ancient Greek (as if it mattered). But J. L. Austin was OBSESSED with
> 'that'-clauses.
>
> The point would be that 'know if' is NOT factive in the way that
> 'know-that' IS factive.
>
> R. Paul's second scenario:
>
> "I don't know *if* [emphasis Speranza's] Stockholm is the capital of
> Sweden any more, still: things are happening so fast in the Scandinavian
> Revolution."
>
> Cfr.
>
> I wouldn't think Stockholm IS the capital of Sweden anymore: things are
> happenign so fast in the Scandinavian Revolution.
>
> I wouldn't think I KNOW anymore _that_ Stockholm is the capital of Sweden
> anymore.
>
> ---
>
> R. Paul's examples concerning the Battle of Trafalgar (Grice's example
> concerns the more crucial, to my view, battle of Waterloo, even to the
> effect
> that it may be 'what every French school boy' knows'):
>
> SON: When was the Battle of Trafalgar fought, dad?
>
> FATHER: 1805.
>
> SON: Do you KNOW that?
>
> FATHER: Well, I don't quite *know* THAT [emphasis Speranza's] the Battle
> of Trafalgar took place in 1805. As far as I know, and now that you ask,
> it
> might well have been 1807 or 1806. To be quite honest with you, I've
> forgotten all that stuff. Go ask your mother. She _might_ know, but then
> of
> course she might NOT.
>
> SON: ??
>
> Variant on R. Paul's other example:
>
> "I don't know that the Battle of Trafalgar took place in 1805 FOR SURE
> [emphasis Speranza's], but that's what I remember [being told -- addition
> Speranza's] from my English History course.
>
> Omar K. wants us to discuss the oddity of first-person claims to
> ignorance
> (as one may call them) as counterexamples to K iff JTB, and this is what
> one should do! Or not.
>
> I just bring this to the record to contrast:
>
> 'know that' which MAY BE factive (for all that the Kiparskys care)
>
> and
>
> 'know whether' or 'know if', which seems non-factive.
>
> Additions of 'know that' "for sure" bring in the topic discussed I think
> by
> M. A. E. Dummett to the effect that historical knowlede (so-called) is
> hardly intuitionistic. I wonder why Grice, of all prepositions, had to
> focused
> on the Battle of Waterloo being fought on.
>
> Note that Grice speaks, more casually, of the student (or pupil as he
> might
> prefer) knowing THE DATE.
>
> Grice:
>
> "An examination candidate at an oral
> knows the date of the battle of Waterloo."
>
> June 18 1815
>
> In propositional terms:
>
> "The examination candidate knows that the Battle of Waterloo was fought
> on
> June 18, 1815."
>
> Grice goes on:
>
> "He may know this WITHOUT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE."
>
> "He may even answer after hesitation (showing in the end that he knows
> the
> answer [that the battle of Waterloo was fought on June 18, 1816])."
>
> ----
>
> I'm surprised the teacher does not want to know the TIME within the date,
> too.
>
> I learn from Wikipedia:
>
> "The 80 guns of Napoleon's grande batterie drew up in the centre. These
> opened fire at 11:50, according to Lord Hill (commander of the
> Anglo-allied II
> Corps), while other sources put the time between noon and 13:30."
>
> I.e. _as far as Lord Hill remembered_.
>
> R. Paul notes:
>
> "I don't know that the Battle of Trafalgar took place in 1805 [for sure,
> but that's what I remember (a perfectly good use of 'remember,' with no
> epistemological import) from my English History course]."
>
> It may well be that 'remember' DOES have interesting epistemological
> usages, though, and that Proust, "Remembrance of Things Past" (versus
> "Admonitions of the Future") is a treatise on history.
>
> Grice notes "the oddity" of (in William James Lecture, I) things like:
>
> "The hotel clerk asked me what my name was, and fortunately I knew the
> answer".
>
> Grice quotes from the essay by Benjamin, in _Mind_, where Benjamin speaks
> of a "sense" (Grice contests this) of 'remember' such that, from the
> demonstration that one has not forgotten, it would follow that one
> remembers that
> p. Benjamin's example: "I've remembered my name again").
>
> And this may be relevant. Or not.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
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--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www.wordworks.jp/
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