In a message dated 1/8/2014 5:52:50 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: Moreover, I agree that in many important senses JTB-theory is irrefutable. In its stipulative form it is certainly irrefutable - indeed, I have stressed how in its stipulative form JTB-theory is irrefutably true (albeit true only by virtue of stipulation). I also accept that we cannot refute or falsify JTB-theory scientifically or by observation: that is, we cannot make an observation of anything that would show "knowledge" should not be or cannot be identified with JTB. I also accept there is nothing like a conclusive refutation of JTB-theory. In "Studies in the Way of Words", Grice discusses 'know': the student who knows the answer as to the date of the Battle of Trafalgar. On other occasions, he coined 'disimplicature'. Vis–à–vis the case of 'know', a Griciean could argue along these lines: i. Knowledge as Justified True Belief does sort of provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of 'know', in terms of 'entailments'. ii. There may be 'implicatures' of 'know' that go beyond the _sense_ of 'know'. I think Grice focused on emphatic assertions: "I KNOW that p", merely I merely "believe" it. iii. Importantly, in 'disimplicature' of 'know' one or more of the entailments may be dropped. If to implicate is to mean more than you say, to DISIMPLICATE is to mean _less_. Thus, on occasion, an utterer may 'disimplicate' that 'know' entails that the proposition in the 'that'-clause that follows the verb 'know' is _true_ -- a case in point being the allegations that Newton's was 'false knowledge'. Or something like that. As I say, Grice reconsidered 'know' as 'justified true belief' in the light of Gettier's alleged counterexamples and seems to have thought that requirements of JTB as _too strong_. He opted for a 'causal' view of 'know': A knows that p iff i. A believes that p ii. p iii. ii causes i But in any case, the point made by McEvoy above is valid. A philosophical conceptual analysis is somewhat offered as a 'stipulative' definition that may be regarded as a 'rational reconstruction' of a concept in the vernacular (or 'folk psychology'). And McEvoy's point about 'false knowledge' may thus be defended by a supporter of "K as JTB" as a case of 'disimplicature' on occasion, where an entailment that is otherwise found operative is cancelled or dropped on context (e.g. Newton's alleged 'false knowledge'). The alternative of course is for something OTHER than a philosophical conceptual analysis of 'know' -- alla Popper's critical rationalism. Or not, of course. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html