Dear all,
Well, you know, Lawrence, there are many views on these matters. Fukuyama
is a somewhat controversial figure, and it's interesting, as you note, that
while his early work is being re-read into our present context, he himself
appears only too keen to modify his early positions. The terms we have used
thus far have become a bit deflated as labels for projects or persons, and
the point of the previous post was to try to highlight that fact. When it
comes to Fukuyama's point in The End of History, that Liberal Democracy
"won", as it were, against its main totalitarian antagonists, that is an
argument that made very different sense at that time than it does today. It
is this latter point that Fukuyama is eager to underline in his more recent
writings.
However, let's say we agree that the argument in The End of History is
worth revisiting, but now in the light of our most recent history. What is
our global order today? It is no longer a bipolar division of two
superpowers pitted against each other, one self-declared Socialist
Republic, the other a professed Liberal Democracy. Let's say we have one
weakened centre, around which several contenders are situated. Aren't we in
some ways in a scenario not dissimilar to the one we saw at the Balkans in
the 1990s, where the most weaponised component of a fragmenting order
(Serbia) was at the same time the power that most rapidly declined in
ecomonic terms, while the resurgent economic powers (Slovenia/Croatia)
were either less interested in playing the military game or less militarily
capable?
We don't want the U.S. to decline economically precisely because of such a
scenario would be too volatile. However, the rapid rise of China as well as
other powers on the world stage, not only challenges but in some areas even
overturns the dominance of the U.S., and this shift is no longer a distant
possibility, but a numerically validated ("objective") fact. The present
U.S. policy towards China is only too easliy explained against this
backdrop.
As you will understand we see the relation between "Liberal Democracy" and
Capitalism a bit differently. The question is rather to what extent
capitalism any longer *needs* "Liberal Democracy". Are we increasingly
positioned in an order where "Liberal Democratic" virtues such as human
rights, freedom of speech, civil liberties, etc, are perceived as obstacles
to the optimal performance of the free market system? While China is the
obvious first example here (and developments in Hong Kong are certainly an
interesting case in point here), there are other locations where we could
reasonably expect a similar development (Thailand, VIetnam, etc.).
Interestingly, the chief custodians of this new capitalism are precisely
those former Socialist Republics, some of them still formally goverened by
Central Committees that have no pretence of returning to state planning or
to put any obstacles in the way of a "free market": these are the habours
where a new, aggressive and ruthless global capitalism has taken its most
obtruste foothold.
It is in these times that we await releasement through culture, art, poetry!
Mvh. / Yours sincerely,
Torgeir Fjeld <https://torgeirfjeld.com/>
~~ ereignis <https://ereignis.no/>: taking you to who you are ~~
On Tue, 10 Sep 2019 at 16:47, Lawrence Helm <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Torgeir,
Hmm. You perhaps weren’t around during all the discussions we had here in
regard to the theories of Samuel P. Huntington* and Francis Fukuyama**.
Key, was Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last man. *In
it, he argued that history is at an end because Liberal Democracy has won
out over its two 20th century competitors, Fascism and Communism and
there are no competitors left. He acknowledges that there are some
third-world hold outs, but since they can’t compete with the Liberal
Democracies economically, they must either remain on the fringe of history
or become Liberal Democratic themselves.
The term “end of history” was originated (if I remember correctly) by
Hegel who argued that Capitalism would be the end of history. Marx, a
Hegelian of sorts, subsequently argued that Hegel didn’t go far enough.
Communism would succeed Capitalism. Communism would be the end of
history. Fukuyama gives credit to a philosopher (whose name I can’t
recall) in the beginning of *The End of History and the Last man, *and
argues that Hegel was right after all. Capitalism (redefined slightly
until it become Liberal Democracy) is the true end of history.
Fukuyama does describe the term in words die-hards who place great
emphases on nuances would be uncomfortable with. The somewhat socialistic
Liberal Democracy of the EU is grouped with what we have in the U.S., and
the variations we have elsewhere in the world. I am sometimes
uncomfortable with Fukuyama’s term, but I do see his point. Liberal
Democracies do largely agree with each other in regard to economics, laws
and morals.
There was a great controversy in the U.S. regarding “Neo-Conservatism” a
while back. The Neo-Conservatives credited Fukuyama as their great
inspiration. Since Liberal Democracy had “almost” achieved world-wide
dominion, it would be good (the NC’s argued) to help it along a bit. Some
Neoconservatives were behind Bush’s invasion of Iraq. Fukuyama was
appalled. He wrote a book denouncing the Neo-Conservatives and argued that
his ideas were not intended to be activistic in any way. He also started a
publication called *The American Interest, *which was supposed to advance
views contrary to those of the Neo-Conservatives, but it has faded (in my
opinion) into something not unlike some other political publication I used
to read. I should cancel my subscription but Fukuyama does occasionally
publish an article I read.
He recently wrote an article in which he seemed to concede that his
original argument had been a bit diminished by subsequent history, but he
drew attention to the last part of his book in which he described
Nietzsche’s “Last Man” which went something like this: If history is at
an end, and every nation is Liberal Democratic and all are involved in the
same economic system, there will be no reason for any more wars. Wars will
be at an end. But when that happens, there is a danger that men will
become like “the last man” that Nietzsche described, “men with no chests,”
and then there may arise charismatic leaders who, disgusted with these
“last men” will start wars based on the vagaries of their own wills.
Fukuyama was seeing a bit of that in the world, but I don’t recall what he
had in mind.
Lawrence
*Huntington, who wrote *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order* was one of Fukuyama’s professors. Fukuyama has presented
arguments that counter those of his mentor. Many today think that
Huntington was closer to the truth than Fukuyama.
**Andreas Ramos argued vehemently that I had misunderstood *The End of
History and the Last Man; *so I subsequently reread it, and quoted
copiously to show that I had not misunderstood Fukuyama. Coincidentally at
that time, Ramos left Lit-Ideas for bigger and better things.
*From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Torgeir Fjeld
*Sent:* Tuesday, September 10, 2019 2:12 AM
*To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Subject:* [lit-ideas] Democracies, kinds of
Dear all,
Thank you, Lawrence, for the interesting explanation of secession
potentialities in the U.S. context. We agree that Europe is a different cup
of tea in this regard; however, as events are unfolding we do well to hold
our judgement, at least until after Halloween!
You then go on to write:
As an overlay to all these matters is the current fact that “liberal
democracy” is the prevalent economic and cultural force in the modern
world. Liberal Democrats largely agree with each other on matters of
economics, laws, and morals.
If you don't mind, it seems that you're a bit ambiguous as to the sense of
"liberal" here. Let's say we have (ala Speranza),
liberal1: a type of constitutional democracy (or, in the case of the U.K.,
a parliamentary democracy governed by precedence) based on the pillars of
division of government into three branches, freedom of speech, etc. These
are the famous French 18th Century virtues!
liberal2: a person who subscribes to the values he or she sees as
furthered in present-day movements and political parties self-consciously
adhering to the ideas of liberal1; OR, more specifically, someone who
prefers any of the following values: freedom of civil society, minimal
state, free market economy, union busting, union building, etc. Clearly
these are potentially self-contradictory and incoherent value statements.
We loosely use "liberal" as a way to characterise political positions.
Some use it to characterise themselves. It may be positive or negative.
Often we use it positively in some senses, and then negatively in others,
so that the same person may evaluate a "liberal constitution" as something
grand, while a "liberal sexuality" may be considered less appropriate.
Finally, there are those who accept the "liberal revolution" of France as
a democratic innovation, so that political authority today largely derives
is foundation from some kind of reference to the voting system. Even so, we
may not find it contradictory to remain skeptical when we observe the
flattening-out of all social values entailed by the triumph of
neo-liberalism, as it surged from Reagonomics to the Clintons.
We are now in a different age.
Mvh. / Yours sincerely,
Torgeir Fjeld <https://torgeirfjeld.com/>
~~ ereignis <https://ereignis.no/>: taking you to who you are ~~