Wittgenstein frequently accused others of stealing his ideas; Carnap was
also exposed at one time to that accusation. This is especially ridiculous
given that, in the preface to the Tractatus, we find the following
statement:
How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not
decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in points
of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me
whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by another.
Perhaps he did well that he did not engage in ethics.
O.K.
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 1:57 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In a message dated 8/5/2015 3:07:47 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
Popper's view is important on many levels, not least because it contains a
tacit assertion that no development in our understanding of W1 (i.e. no
development in the 'natural sciences') will provide an answer adequate to
account for morality or aesthetics [the only 'W1 account' of morality and
aesthetics would be a reductive one]. So developments in the natural
sciences
have been vital in overthrowing the Newtonian/Cartesian/Kantian view of a
mechanistic W1, but they are not adequate - and will never be adequate -
to
provide a framework that gives autonomy and value to morals and
aesthetics.
On the other hand, there's constructivism. I.e. we can postulate, alla
perhaps N. Hartmann, that each level gets 'constructed' out of the prior
level
-- so while there may not be 'autonomy', it is the role of the philosopher
(and certainly not the litterateur) to deal with these processes of
'construction'. Some philosophers speak of 'rational reconstruction',
which
relates. The result is a sort of Monism, or rather a Unified Account that
avoids
pluralisms and appeals to 'autonomies', when these only mark a failure by
this or that philosopher to try to 're-construct' (if not 'de-construct',
as
Derrida prefers) what we have out there (Heidegger's Da-sein, 'da' being
German for 'there', pronounced erratically). The keyword in some contexts
for this is "Ideal Observer": the philosopher places himself as a Genitor
or
Ideal Observer and tries to make explicit the mechanisms by which one
level
-- say the psychological level -- gets elaborated into a higher level: in
Prichard's parlance, this may provide an answer as to how, say,
obligation,
'cashes out' in interest, and stuff. Sibley has worked constructively on
aesthetic properties, calling them 'secondary' -- "the look of that toad
is
not nice _to me_" and grounded on a causal theory of perception that
redefines the old Lockean dichotomy between primary and secondary
qualities. On
the other hand, Witters never ventured into ethics or aesthetics, because
his conception of philosophy was VERY limited. That's Cambridge forya --
yet
he was a Full professor of Philosophy there who was allowed to say,
"Dunno"
to any question from any student as to the place of ethics in philosophy
-- grounded on an idea of 'reason', cfr. 'ratio essendi', -- Toulmin, one
such student, tried to supersede his master only to have Witters complain
that he (Toulmin) had stolen his 'unpublished' ideas given in 'public'
seminars to gain fame!
Cheers,
Speranza
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