[lit-ideas] Re: Causality theory of (not)knowing
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 00:02:17 +0100
Omar's post entirely fails to show that legal arguments are not about
matters of substance, and it fails to show they rest *merely* on verbal
definitions, and it fails to show that they rest on verbal definitions at
all - or anymore than scientific arguments do...
*On the first two counts, Omar's post fails to show these things perhaps,
in part, because those claims - or charges - were not made by Omar in the
first place. As to to the third count, I think it has been shown that there
is a strong relation between legal arguments and verbal definitions.
Perhaps to whether that relation is stronger than the relation exhibited in
physics, it is something that I sort of believe but, I acknowledge that I
haven't decisively shown it, so perhaps we will return to it.
*Insofar as legal arguments are about matters of substance, they are not
purely based on mere verbal definitions, and insofar as they are based on
mere verbal definitions they are not about matters of substance. *
*That would be definitionally true but it does not tell us anything
substantive about legal arguments. *
O.K.
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 11:45 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> >Insofar as I am aware, I don't think that physicists typically argue, or
> need to argue, about the meaning of "E" or of "c2.">
>
> It may be admitted that *[scientists] typically don't argue about the
> "meaning"* but that does not mean the "meaning of 'E' or of 'c2'" is not
> expressed verbally and it does not mean these terms cannot be "based on
> verbal definitions". So the fact that *they typically don't argue about
> the "meaning" *does not itself establish the contrast drawn by Omar next,
> as follows:
>
> >In contrast, the laws of human societies are expressed verbally, and
> based on verbal definitions, such as:>
>
> This alleged "contrast" is nowhere established by the foregoing - for Omar
> nowhere shows that the "meaning of 'E' or of 'c2'" is not expressed
> verbally and nowhere shows that these terms cannot be "based on verbal
> definitions".
>
> The fact is that they *can* be expressed verbally and are expressed
> verbally; and it is also a fact that these terms *can* be "based on
> verbal definitions", as per a 'conventionalism' of the sort defended by
> Poincare.
>
> Omar then continues by reciting some legalese as if this shows that legal
> propositions, in putative contrast to scientific propositions, are "based
> on verbal definitions". But the following shows no such thing:
>
>
> - *>Imperfect self-defense
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperfect_self-defense>*: In some
> jurisdictions, a person who acted in self-defense with an honest but
> *unreasonable *belief that deadly force was necessary to do so can
> reduce a murder charge to one of voluntary manslaughter or deliberate
> homicide committed without criminal malice. *Malice* is found if a
> person is killed intentionally and without legal excuse or mitigation.>
>
>
> The truth is that this legalese *can *be interpreted as being "based on
> verbal definitions", *but then so can* "E = mc2". The truth is also that
> both the legalese and the scientific equation *can* be interpreted so
> that they are not merely "based on verbal definitions". How we choose to
> interpret "E = mc2" is not something that can be read off from that
> formula, and the same goes for the legalese.
>
> Now we turn to the question of *substance* and arguing about matters of
> *substance
> *(as opposed to merely verbal disputes). The above legalese may be
> unobjectionable as merely "based on verbal definitions" - for on what
> *substantive* ground can we object to someone's verbal definitions? If we
> say there is a substantive flaw in what someone says, then we are not
> treating what they say as merely analytic/verbal definitions but as having
> *substantive* content. For example, we can hardly object to the above
> comment on "*Malice" *as a matter of verbal definition but we can object
> that this way of treating "*Malice" *would appear to make it merely
> equivalent to unlawful intent.
>
> *Insofar as legal arguments are about matters of substance, they are not
> purely based on mere verbal definitions, and insofar as they are based on
> mere verbal definitions they are not about matters of substance. *
>
> If we accept legal arguments are about matters of substance (and they most
> often are), we are hard pressed to accept they are merely about verbal
> definitions.
>
> Omar's post entirely fails to show that legal arguments are not about
> matters of substance, and it fails to show they rest *merely* on verbal
> definitions, and it fails to show that they rest on verbal definitions at
> all - or anymore than scientific arguments do...
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, 9 March 2015, 19:20, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> I fail to see any interest in the comparison of laws of nature (f is ma
> or e is m times c square) and laws of self defense-
> If, e.g. c were not constant the law is false while if anybody applied
> wrongly, e.g., deadly force the law is not falsified by anything. Hence
> theft, stupidity or corruption do not falsify laws that sought to reduce
> stealing, incompetence idiocies, e.g. in nominations to judicial bench, or
> in fraud and larceny.
> The debate is a misnomer.
>
> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Omar Kusturica
> *Sent:* 09 March 2015 21:16
> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Causality theory of (not)knowing
>
> Well, for one thing, the laws of physics can be - and primarily are -
> expressed by mathematical formulae. E=mc2 can be rephrased in English
> language roughly as stating that: "the universal proportionality factor
> between equivalent amounts of energy and mass is equal to the speed of
> light <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light>squared" but such a paraphrase
> is used for pedagogical purposes and the like and it is not what the
> physician operates with professionally. Insofar as I am aware, I don't
> think that physicists typically argue, or need to argue, about the meaning
> of "E" or of "c2."
>
> In contrast, the laws of human societies are expressed verbally, and
> based on verbal definitions, such as:
>
> · *Imperfect self-defense
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperfect_self-defense>*: In some
> jurisdictions, a person who acted in self-defense with an honest but
> *unreasonable *belief that deadly force was necessary to do so can reduce
> a murder charge to one of voluntary manslaughter or deliberate homicide
> committed without criminal malice. *Malice* is found if a person is
> killed intentionally and without legal excuse or mitigation.
>
> If there is a way to express this legal definition via a mathematical
> equation I would be delighted to know about it. Until such a mathematical
> formula is supplied, one can hardly help noticing that the concept of
> Imperfect self-defense is defined in terms of other verbal concepts such as
> 'self-defense,' 'honest but unreasonable belief' 'intentionally' etc. whose
> meaning is far from self-evident or indisputable and that stand themselves
> in need of a definition. In fact at least the conceptual meaning of
> 'intentionality' has been frequently disputed among philosophers, without
> any concensus having been reached on it.Thus any practical dispute that
> arises as to the application of these terms can hardly help engaging the
> issue of what they mean in the first place.
>
> As to whether all this is useful, it depends... This is not a group for
> exchanging cooking recipees, and I am not certain that I am obliged to
> demontrate the usefulness of every remark I make, particularly when
> 'usefulness' itself is not defined. How should it be useful, and to whom ?
>
> O.K.
>
> On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 6:55 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> This was posted earlier in another thread but appears to have been
> there blocked (again).
>
> > I don't understand why saying that x is y must be taken to mean that
> it is 'merely' y. If I say that a cat is white, I do not necessarily mean
> that it is 'merely' white and that it cannot be male, large, a feline and
> so on. In a similar way, legal discussions have conceptual dimensions as
> well as other dimensions.>
>
> We need to check whether uttering "This is conceptual" or "There is a
> conceptual element to this" is a useful kind of talk - or whether, to
> borrow W's metaphor, it is just language spinning unconnected to any useful
> mechanism. How do these utterances achieve more insight, or say anything
> more worthwhile, than the utterances "This is linguistic" or "There is a
> linguistic element to this", uttered every time something is expressed in
> language?
>
> We need also to seriously consider whether languages or "concepts" are
> merely instruments or vehicles or whether they have a more important status
> than this?
>
> > I am not sure that a comparison with physical formulae is helpful
> because a different sort of conceptuality is involved.>
>
> Please explain how a "different sort of conceptuality is involved"? I
> mean, that is a massive claim to make and one that requires significant
> 'justification'. [And just because different concepts are involved would
> not mean "a different sort of conceptuality is involved".]
>
> Please explain all this in a way that removes or lessens the suspicion
> that this kind of talk is clearly mere language spinning without connection
> to any worthwhile working mechanism of thought.
>
> Dnl
>
>
> On Monday, 9 March 2015, 17:06, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> A few more remarks on the causality theory of knowledge. As a reminder,
> the theory stipulates that, for me to say"I know that X," the following
> three conditions need to be met:
>
> 1. X is true
> 2. I believe that X
> 3. There is a causal relation between the state of affairs X and my
> belief
>
> At present, I am not taking issue with 1. or 2. - it is only 3. that is
> in dispute. Thus, I am not disputing that, for me to say that "I know that
> the snow is white," the condition 1. needs to be fulfilled, i.e. that the
> snow is white. What is disputed is the causal relation.
>
> When we speak of causality in the physical world, we generally mean
> sufficient conditions. My pushing the door is a sufficient condition for
> the door to open, barring some hindrance on the other side. It is not a
> necessary condition, since the door will open when someone else pushes it
> as well.
>
> In contrast, Venus being hot is clearly not a sufficient condition for
> me to know that it is hot. Instead it turns out to be a logically necessary
> condition - I cannot know it unless it is true - which is covered by 1. But
> calling this a cause is like saying that the cause of the door opening is
> the door, since if it there were no door it wouldn't open. A causal
> relation has to be established in empirical not in logical terms. In
> empirical terms, the cause of my knowledge that Venus is hot is that I read
> it in a book.
>
> On a related note, there is some confusion here between the truth of a
> belief and its ground or justification. For the Gricean theorist they are
> one and the same, hence strictly speaking the only justification that he
> can offer for the belief that the snow is white is to (re) assert that the
> snow is white. But if one were to offer a rational reason for believing x,
> one needs to offer some ground or explanation distinct from x.
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
>
>
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