[lit-ideas] Re: Causality theory of (not)knowing

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 22:45:02 +0000 (UTC)

>Insofar as I am aware, I don't think that physicists typically argue, or need 
>to argue, about the meaning of "E" or of "c2.">
It may be admitted that [scientists] typically don't argue about the "meaning" 
but that does not mean the "meaning of 'E' or of 'c2'" is not expressed 
verbally and it does not mean these terms cannot be "based on verbal 
definitions". So the fact that they typically don't argue about the "meaning" 
does not itself establish the contrast drawn by Omar next, as follows:

>In contrast, the laws of human societies are expressed verbally, and based on 
>verbal definitions, such as:> 
This alleged "contrast" is nowhere established by the foregoing - for Omar 
nowhere shows that the "meaning of 'E' or of 'c2'" is not expressed verbally 
and nowhere shows that these terms cannot be "based on verbal definitions". 

The fact is that they can be expressed verbally and are expressed verbally; and 
it is also a fact that these terms can be "based on verbal definitions", as per 
a 'conventionalism' of the sort defended by Poincare.
Omar then continues by reciting some legalese as if this shows that legal 
propositions, in putative contrast to scientific propositions, are "based on 
verbal definitions". But the following shows no such thing:

   
   - >Imperfect self-defense: In some jurisdictions, a person who acted in 
self-defense with an honest but unreasonable belief that deadly force was 
necessary to do so can reduce a murder charge to one of voluntary manslaughter 
or deliberate homicide committed without criminal malice. Malice is found if a 
person is killed intentionally and without legal excuse or mitigation.>

The truth is that this legalese can be interpreted as being "based on verbal 
definitions", but then so can "E = mc2". The truth is also that both the 
legalese and the scientific equation can be interpreted so that they are not 
merely "based on verbal definitions". How we choose to interpret "E = mc2" is 
not something that can be read off from that formula, and the same goes for the 
legalese.
Now we turn to the question of substance and arguing about matters of substance 
(as opposed to merely verbal disputes). The above legalese may be 
unobjectionable as merely "based on verbal definitions" - for on what 
substantive ground can we object to someone's verbal definitions? If we say 
there is a substantive flaw in what someone says, then we are not treating what 
they say as merely analytic/verbal definitions but as having substantive 
content. For example, we can hardly object to the above comment on "Malice" as 
a matter of verbal definition but we can object that this way of treating 
"Malice" would appear to make it merely equivalent to unlawful intent. 

Insofar as legal arguments are about matters of substance, they are not purely 
based on mere verbal definitions, and insofar as they are based on mere verbal 
definitions they are not about matters of substance. 

If we accept legal arguments are about matters of substance (and they most 
often are), we are hard pressed to accept they are merely about verbal 
definitions.
Omar's post entirely fails to show that legal arguments are not about matters 
of substance, and it fails to show they rest merely on verbal definitions, and 
it fails to show that they rest on verbal definitions at all - or anymore than 
scientific arguments do...

DnlLdn


 

     On Monday, 9 March 2015, 19:20, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
   

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{margin-bottom:0cm;}#yiv4412638391 ul {margin-bottom:0cm;}#yiv4412638391 I fail 
to see any interest in the comparison of laws of nature (f is ma or e is m 
times c square) and laws of self defense- If, e.g. c were not constant the law 
is false while if anybody applied wrongly, e.g., deadly force the law is not 
falsified by anything. Hence theft, stupidity or corruption do not falsify laws 
that sought to reduce stealing, incompetence idiocies, e.g. in nominations to 
judicial bench, or in fraud and larceny. The debate is a misnomer.    From: 
lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf 
Of Omar Kusturica
Sent: 09 March 2015 21:16
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Causality theory of (not)knowing     Well, for one 
thing, the laws of physics can be - and primarily are - expressed by 
mathematical formulae. E=mc2 can be rephrased in English language roughly as 
stating that: "the universal proportionality factor between equivalent amounts 
of energy and mass is equal to the speed of lightsquared" but such a paraphrase 
is used for pedagogical purposes and the like and it is not what the physician 
operates with professionally. Insofar as I am aware, I don't think that 
physicists typically argue, or need to argue, about the meaning of "E" or of 
"c2."    In contrast, the laws of human societies are expressed verbally, and 
based on verbal definitions, such as:     ·        Imperfect self-defense: In 
some jurisdictions, a person who acted in self-defense with an honest but 
unreasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to do so can reduce a 
murder charge to one of voluntary manslaughter or deliberate homicide committed 
without criminal malice. Malice is found if a person is killed intentionally 
and without legal excuse or mitigation.    If there is a way to express this 
legal definition via a mathematical equation I would be delighted to know about 
it.   Until such a mathematical formula is supplied, one can hardly help 
noticing that the concept of Imperfect self-defense is defined in terms of 
other verbal concepts such as 'self-defense,' 'honest but unreasonable belief' 
'intentionally' etc. whose meaning is far from self-evident or indisputable and 
that stand themselves in need of a definition. In fact at least the conceptual 
meaning of 'intentionality' has been frequently disputed among philosophers, 
without any concensus having been reached on it.Thus any practical dispute that 
arises as to the application of these terms can hardly help engaging the issue 
of what they mean in the first place.    As to whether all this is useful, it 
depends... This is not a group for exchanging cooking recipees, and I am not 
certain that I am obliged to demontrate the usefulness of every remark I make, 
particularly when 'usefulness' itself is not defined. How should it be useful, 
and to whom ?    O.K.    On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 6:55 PM, Donal McEvoy 
<donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: This was posted earlier in another thread 
but appears to have been there blocked (again).    > I don't understand why 
saying that x is y must be taken to mean that it is 'merely' y. If I say that a 
cat is white, I do not necessarily mean that it is 'merely' white and that it 
cannot be male, large, a feline and so on. In a similar way, legal discussions 
have conceptual dimensions as well as other dimensions.>    We need to check 
whether uttering "This is conceptual" or "There is a conceptual element to 
this" is a useful kind of talk - or whether, to borrow W's metaphor, it is just 
language spinning unconnected to any useful mechanism. How do these utterances 
achieve more insight, or say anything more worthwhile, than the utterances 
"This is linguistic" or "There is a linguistic element to this", uttered every 
time something is expressed in language?    We need also to seriously consider 
whether languages or "concepts" are merely instruments or vehicles or whether 
they have a more important status than this?    > I am not sure that a 
comparison with physical formulae is helpful because a different sort of 
conceptuality is involved.>    Please explain how a "different sort of 
conceptuality is involved"? I mean, that is a massive claim to make and one 
that requires significant 'justification'. [And just because different concepts 
are involved would not mean "a different sort of conceptuality is involved".]   
 Please explain all this in a way that removes or lessens the suspicion that 
this kind of talk is clearly mere language spinning without connection to any 
worthwhile working mechanism of thought.    Dnl       On Monday, 9 March 2015, 
17:06, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:    A few more remarks on the 
causality theory of knowledge. As a reminder, the theory stipulates that, for 
me to say"I know that X," the following three conditions need to be met:    1. 
X is true 2. I believe that X 3. There is a causal relation between the state 
of affairs X and my belief    At present, I am not taking issue with 1. or 2. - 
it is only 3. that is in dispute. Thus, I am not disputing that, for me to say 
that "I know that the snow is white," the condition 1. needs to be fulfilled, 
i.e. that the snow is white. What is disputed is the causal relation.    When 
we speak of causality in the physical world, we generally mean sufficient 
conditions. My pushing the door is a sufficient condition for the door to open, 
barring some hindrance on the other side. It is not a necessary condition, 
since the door will open when someone else pushes it as well.    In contrast, 
Venus being hot is clearly not a sufficient condition for me to know that it is 
hot. Instead it turns out to be a logically necessary condition - I cannot know 
it unless it is true - which is covered by 1. But calling this a cause is like 
saying that the cause of the door opening is the door, since if it there were 
no door it wouldn't open. A causal relation has to be established in empirical 
not in logical terms. In empirical terms, the cause of my knowledge that Venus 
is hot is that I read it in a book.     On a related note, there is some 
confusion here between the truth of a belief and its ground or justification. 
For the Gricean theorist they are one and the same, hence strictly speaking the 
only justification that he can offer for the belief that the snow is white is 
to (re) assert that the snow is white. But if one were to offer a rational 
reason for believing x, one needs to offer some ground or explanation distinct 
from x.    O.K.       

   

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