[lit-ideas] Re: Causality theory of (not)knowing
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2015 20:16:00 +0100
Well, for one thing, the laws of physics can be - and primarily are -
expressed by mathematical formulae. E=mc2 can be rephrased in English
language roughly as stating that: "the universal proportionality factor
between equivalent amounts of energy and mass is equal to the speed of light
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light>squared" but such a paraphrase is used
for pedagogical purposes and the like and it is not what the physician
operates with professionally. Insofar as I am aware, I don't think that
physicists typically argue, or need to argue, about the meaning of "E" or
of "c2."
In contrast, the laws of human societies are expressed verbally, and based
on verbal definitions, such as:
- *Imperfect self-defense
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperfect_self-defense>*: In some
jurisdictions, a person who acted in self-defense with an honest but
*unreasonable *belief that deadly force was necessary to do so can
reduce a murder charge to one of voluntary manslaughter or deliberate
homicide committed without criminal malice. *Malice* is found if a
person is killed intentionally and without legal excuse or mitigation.
If there is a way to express this legal definition via a mathematical
equation I would be delighted to know about it. Until such a mathematical
formula is supplied, one can hardly help noticing that the concept of
Imperfect self-defense is defined in terms of other verbal concepts such as
'self-defense,' 'honest but unreasonable belief' 'intentionally' etc. whose
meaning is far from self-evident or indisputable and that stand themselves
in need of a definition. In fact at least the conceptual meaning of
'intentionality' has been frequently disputed among philosophers, without
any concensus having been reached on it.Thus any practical dispute that
arises as to the application of these terms can hardly help engaging the
issue of what they mean in the first place.
As to whether all this is useful, it depends... This is not a group for
exchanging cooking recipees, and I am not certain that I am obliged to
demontrate the usefulness of every remark I make, particularly when
'usefulness' itself is not defined. How should it be useful, and to whom ?
O.K.
On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 6:55 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> This was posted earlier in another thread but appears to have been there
> blocked (again).
>
> > I don't understand why saying that x is y must be taken to mean that it
> is 'merely' y. If I say that a cat is white, I do not necessarily mean that
> it is 'merely' white and that it cannot be male, large, a feline and so on.
> In a similar way, legal discussions have conceptual dimensions as well as
> other dimensions.>
>
> We need to check whether uttering "This is conceptual" or "There is a
> conceptual element to this" is a useful kind of talk - or whether, to
> borrow W's metaphor, it is just language spinning unconnected to any useful
> mechanism. How do these utterances achieve more insight, or say anything
> more worthwhile, than the utterances "This is linguistic" or "There is a
> linguistic element to this", uttered every time something is expressed in
> language?
>
> We need also to seriously consider whether languages or "concepts" are
> merely instruments or vehicles or whether they have a more important status
> than this?
>
> > I am not sure that a comparison with physical formulae is helpful
> because a different sort of conceptuality is involved.>
>
> Please explain how a "different sort of conceptuality is involved"? I
> mean, that is a massive claim to make and one that requires significant
> 'justification'. [And just because different concepts are involved would
> not mean "a different sort of conceptuality is involved".]
>
> Please explain all this in a way that removes or lessens the suspicion
> that this kind of talk is clearly mere language spinning without connection
> to any worthwhile working mechanism of thought.
>
> Dnl
>
>
>
> On Monday, 9 March 2015, 17:06, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
> A few more remarks on the causality theory of knowledge. As a reminder,
> the theory stipulates that, for me to say"I know that X," the following
> three conditions need to be met:
>
> 1. X is true
> 2. I believe that X
> 3. There is a causal relation between the state of affairs X and my belief
>
> At present, I am not taking issue with 1. or 2. - it is only 3. that is in
> dispute. Thus, I am not disputing that, for me to say that "I know that the
> snow is white," the condition 1. needs to be fulfilled, i.e. that the snow
> is white. What is disputed is the causal relation.
>
> When we speak of causality in the physical world, we generally mean
> sufficient conditions. My pushing the door is a sufficient condition for
> the door to open, barring some hindrance on the other side. It is not a
> necessary condition, since the door will open when someone else pushes it
> as well.
>
> In contrast, Venus being hot is clearly not a sufficient condition for me
> to know that it is hot. Instead it turns out to be a logically necessary
> condition - I cannot know it unless it is true - which is covered by 1. But
> calling this a cause is like saying that the cause of the door opening is
> the door, since if it there were no door it wouldn't open. A causal
> relation has to be established in empirical not in logical terms. In
> empirical terms, the cause of my knowledge that Venus is hot is that I read
> it in a book.
>
> On a related note, there is some confusion here between the truth of a
> belief and its ground or justification. For the Gricean theorist they are
> one and the same, hence strictly speaking the only justification that he
> can offer for the belief that the snow is white is to (re) assert that the
> snow is white. But if one were to offer a rational reason for believing x,
> one needs to offer some ground or explanation distinct from x.
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
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