Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>: > Walter Okshevsky wrote: > > "I think K. believes that if we have an obligation to P, then we can P." To which Phil Replied: > We are justified in believing this only if there is a harmony between > the causality of the world and the dictates of the moral law. We can't > know this. >If we can't know that such a harmony exists, two fundamental > questions must be answered: > > 1. Why does the obligation to P entail any conclusions about what is > possible in nature? > 2. What ensures that any action in nature satisfies the obligation? > W: I'm desperately trying to keep the discussion secular and humanist, as K. himself did. How's this?: For Kant, I have a (perfect) duty to not commit suicide and not make lying-promises to promote my self-interests. Re 2 above: respectively, the fact that I'm still alive and have never attempted to take my life, and the fact that I have not made a lying-promise yesterday even though if I had I'd have more BP/Amoco stock today. Re 1 above: (Very complicated but I think I'm on the right track. Help much appreciated.) What is possible in nature is defined by transcendental subjectivity. No theoretical knowledge of nature is possible independent of the a-priori contributions made by the subject's faculties of intuition and understanding. Similarly, no moral knowledge is possible that is not transcendentally structured by freedom and practical reason. The moral universe is as such projected by (the project of) transcendental subjectivity. What is understood to be an obligation is understood to be necessary for an agent to perform. But nothing can be necessary for a subject to perform that cannot possibly be performed. An impossible obligation is as self-contradictory as contradictory obligations in a moral universe. But the moral universe is not "nature" as understood in some empiricist, theist or other non-transcendental way. The form of law that is common to both "the starry heavens above" and "the moral order within" possesses transcendental status. Neither of these realms refer to a "nature" that exists as if external and adventitious to transcendental subjectivity such that we could intelligibly ask "How do we get to obligation from nature?" or conversely. Walter C. Okshevsky Memorial U ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html