[lit-ideas] Re: Can, logically, there be any such thing as a "performative contradiction"?

From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx
Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2009 14:03:50 -0230
*****************************************************************************

I don't think that The Master ever himself identified the structure of
performative contradiction as being a feature of moral impermissibility or of
any other dimension of morality. He did, however, offer the practical
contradiction as such a feature of some maxims and he thought of the
contradiction in terms of illegitimate self-exemption and self-contradiction.
But neither illegitimate self-exemption nor self-contradiction count as
instances of performative contradiction as understood by Habermas or Apel. (I
would agree with Omar that the notion of a performative contradiction doesn't
sit well with Austin's account.) And this because these 2 features of wrongness
emerge not from the relation between the semantic content of a proposition and
its expression (i.e., use within a speech act) but rather from the relation
between a (subjective) maxim and its form (universalizability). 

Lying-promises made out of self-interest commit a practical contradiction in
that 1) if everybody did it, nobody could do it and 2) the agent relies on
others not to act on his maxim, and act instead on a contrary maxim, in order
that her maxim can attain its own posited end (illegitimat self-exemption).
Free-rider: she succeeds, and is able to succeed only because others pay as
they go.

I give a reading of practical contradictions as performative contradictions in
my reply to Donal. Don't know how successful that was, but it looks good for
now from here.

Walter O
MUN




Quoting omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx:

> 
> It seems to me that here there is a confusion between 'performative
> contradiction' in the Kantian sense and the illocutionary force of
> performatives as used by J.L. Austin. The first seems to be the case where
> the fact the utterance itself is made constitutes evidence that contradicts
> the propositional content of the utterance, e.g. "I cannot speak any
> English." Here the fact that I am able to say this at all contradicts the
> content of what I am saying. I'm not sure that "all truth is relative" is the
> same kind of contradiction as it's not my ability to say this or the act of
> saying it that contradicts the proposition but the content of the proposition
> itself appears to be self-contradictory on logical grounds.
>  
> Performative utterances in Austin's sense, such as "I now pronounce you man
> and wife" are not supposed to have a truth value so it would not be possible
> to speak of contradiction here. They might fail to have the appropriate
> illocutionary force if the suitable conditions for making the performative
> utterance are not. met, e.g. I am not a minister, either a bride or a groom
> is already married etc. This is at least true of Austin's account of
> performatives, though others like Searle may have had different views.
>  
> O.K.
>  
>  
> --- On Sat, 5/30/09, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> 
> From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Can, logically, there be any such thing as a
> "performative contradiction"?
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Saturday, May 30, 2009, 10:22 PM
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --- On Sat, 30/5/09, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> > A
> > performative
> > contradiction is a contradiction not between 2 propositions
> > as in a logical
> > contradiction but rather between (the semantic content of)
> > a proposition and
> > the act of asserting it. Examples: 
> > 
> > 1. "All truth is relative." 
> > 
> > 2. "I speak no English."
> > 
> > 3. N is a universalizable norm (judgement) but the views of
> > Russians from
> > Volgograd are not included in the discourse. 
> 
> 1. and 2. are logically different imo. 
> 
> "2." would, arguably, fit the criterion "a contradiction.....between (the
> semantic content of) a proposition and the act of asserting it". I say
> arguably to acknowledge some possible quibbles: someone who is unable to
> speak might write [and thereby assert it through an act] "I speak no English"
> without contradiction. But a variant of 2. like "I am unable to express or
> assert anything in English" would doubtless be some kind of contradiction.
> 
> "1." is different. One may be re-written as "All truth is relative (including
> the 'truth' of this claim)." This claim may be self-defeating as a
> truth-claim, since it denies its own absolute truth, but it is more
> problematic to conclude that it is any kind of contradiction. 
> 
> For example, there is no obvious contradiction between its semantic content
> and the act of asserting it in the way there is with "2": "1" can, unlike
> "2", be asserted without obviously disproving itself. Or without giving
> grounds for its falsity - instead it gives grounds for its truth being at
> best relative. If we assume that any claim to only relative truth is
> impermissible, then we might say its claim to offer only relative truth must
> be judged false; - but this assumption is question-begging: it assumes rather
> than proves that there is no such thing as relative truth, and thus does not
> clearly show the contrary assumption involves some form of contradiction. 
> 
> But even if we make the assumption that the view that "all claims are at best
> only true relatively speaking" is a contradiction, the contradiction is not
> between the semantic content and the act of asserting but between the
> semantic content and its logical implications. On this view "1" is perhaps a
> contradiction but not for reasons to do with it being a "performative". On
> the view that it is not a logical contradiction to assert that the all claims
> are only relatively true, "1" is not a logically self-contradictory claim -
> though it is somewhat self-defeating.
> 
> This is aside from the point that "1" might be re-written as "All claims
> (with the exception of this one) are only true relatively". In this form "1"
> is even more obviously free of self-contradiction.
> 
> CB's words were/are not a performative contradiction, at least not in the
> exact same sense that "2" may be one. "2" is one in a way similar to "This
> statement contains only three words" may be one. CB's injunction to "Stop
> being so %"$"%"% rude" is, logically, very different: for one, it is a moral
> injunction rather than a statement of fact; for another, sometimes an
> emphasiser like &%%"^&&" might be thought justified and not rude.
> 
> Anyway. It's good to talk. Sometimes.
> 
> Donal
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
> 
> 
> 
>       

------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
[lit-ideas] Re: Can, logically, there be any such thing as a "performative contradiction"?

Other related posts:
