[lit-ideas] Re: CTP [belongs in other thread]
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 13:11:33 -0800 (PST)
Interesting post by Donal. Of course, the notion of analycity raises problems,
as noted by Quine in his famous essay "Two dogmas of empiricism." One of these
is the problem of semantic interpretation; for example, a statement like "All
bachelors are unmarried males" rests on a certain interpretation (or
stipulative definition) of the word 'bachelor' which might exclude, for
example, 'loose' uses of 'bachelor' to refer to married men who live separately
from their wives etc. However, I do not think that these problems are even
seriously raised in the case of perception reports. With a statement like: "Tom
saw a cat on a mat," there is no way that anyone could possibly decide its
truth or falsity on the basis of its semantic meaning alone and independently
of external facts. Even excluding more exotic possibilities like hallucination,
Tom might be lying that he saw a cat, for all we know.
The case is similar with Grice's example "This looks red." (Or something
similar) Again, I might be lying that something looks red when it actually
doesn't. Further, there could be disagreement about this; I might say "This
looks red" and John McCreery might reply "It doesn't look red to me." Again,
there is no way that we could determine the truth or falsity of the statement
on the basis of its linguistic meaning alone. To the extent that I might
possess a subjective certainty that "this looks red to me," such a certainty is
not based on any analysis of meaning but on a phenomenological sense.
With statements of the form: "John saw that there is a cat on the mat" this is
not only not analytic but it actually involves a category mistake of mistaking
sensual perceptions for propositions, I think.
O.K.
On Wednesday, February 12, 2014 11:17 AM, Donal McEvoy
<donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>I see that the black cat is on the red mat.
---- Therefore, the black cat is on the red mat
----- and the black cat's being on the red mat accounts for my seeing the
black cat is on the red mat.
Grice holds this is 'analytic' (after all, it IS an 'analysis' of "I
see
that"); McEvoy seems to hold it's synthetic.>
What makes something ‘analytic’ rather than ‘synthetic’?
Take “All swans are white”: is this ‘analytic’ or
‘synthetic’? We may be inclined to take it as ‘synthetic’, as stating a ‘fact’
about the world: a ‘fact’ that is not true by logical necessity (for it is
surely logically possible that there
could be blue swans?). Nevertheless “All swans are white” could also be
defended as ‘analytic’: if someone defends “All swans are white” (against
evidence of a ‘black swan’) by saying a supposed ‘black swan’ cannot be a swan
because “All swans are white”, they are
not contradicting themselves – but their defence turns “All swans are white”
into an ‘analytic’ claim, based on it being part
of the meaning of “swan” that it is “white”, so that a non-white swan
becomes (by this stipulation as to meaning) a logically impossible structure.
There is nothing to stop anyone defending a CTP in a similar
way: so a CTP becomes ‘analytic’ – true by a kind of stipulation as to what it
means for a perceiver to
perceive an object. But, in this form, a CTP is devoid of synthetic content and
tells us nothing about the world but only about what we must (so we are told)
mean. It is empty philosophising to make
one’s point by this kind of definition of terms or stipulation, because it
tells us nothing more than that we have defined or stipulated in a certain way.
Yet many philosophers seem to be under the illusion that
they are doing something far from empty when they engage in this kind of
‘argument’. Here their confusion is akin to the confusion in someone who
defends “All swans are white” by ‘analytic’ means (i.e. as a conceptual or
definitional truth), yet thinks in so doing they have nevertheless revealed
something of substantive, essential importance as to the colour of swans: they
haven’t at all – given how they defend their claim, all they have shown is that
they will not call a non-white entity
a ‘swan’ (irrespective of all the other respects in which it seems
‘swan-like’).
This confusion has a long history in the story of
philosophy. It is a confusion that seems to lie at the root of much so-called
‘analytic philosophy’: where this claims to be exhibiting substantive,
‘essential’ (conceptual) truths while at
the same time defending these truths merely by kinds of stipulation. (As
prime and typical examples of this kind of confusion, we might mention both
Strawson’s and Ayer’s ‘analytic’ defence of induction). If I am not mistaken,
we have seen this confusion in those who wish to defend JTB-theory as having
something substantive to say about
the essential character of
“knowledge” while defending their position by a kind of stipulation – so that
“false scientific theories” cannot refute their JTB-theory because, if false,
such scientific theories are deemed not to constitute “knowledge” (this
manoeuvre parallels the stratagem of deeming an apparent ‘black swan’ as not
a swan because it is black: a
stratagem that may be used to defend “All swans are white” from refutation by
counter-example but which must simultaneously empty “All swans are white” of
substantive content).
The story of how ‘analytic philosophy’ has managed, time and
again, to get thoroughly confused (and to confuse others) on this issue is also
a long one: but the counter-thesis is simple – a claim cannot be at once true
simply by virtue of the stipulated
meaning of terms and at the same time true because it corresponds to some
substantive facts.
So Grice is free to defend a CTP in ‘analytic’ terms just as
anyone is free to defend “All swans are white” in ‘analytic’ terms: but it is
an illusion that in so doing we are throwing any substantive light on,
respectively, the essential causal role of objects in perception or the
essential
colour of swans.
The only substantive interest a CTP might have is if it is
‘synthetic’. And, as a ‘synthetic’ claim, it is not a claim that must be true
by any kind of logical necessity. For there is no logical contradiction or
logical error in denying any of the following aspects of a CTP: (a) that there
are “objects” external to perception (b) that “objects” external to perception
must play some causal role in their perception. That is: it is logically
possible (a) that there are no “objects” external to perception; (b)
that “objects” external to perception play no causal role in their perception.
That these possibilities are not ruled out by ‘logic’ does
not get us far: for neither are their negations ruled out by ‘logic’. But it is
itself a kind of fundamental logical error to try to defend a position, on
which ‘logic’ does not rule one way or another, as if it is the only logical
position: even if the position we are trying to shore up this way is correct,
to try to shore it up this way tends to further confuse matters.
The position as regards a CTP is really this: commonsense is
correct in taking it that there is an ‘external world’ of “objects” and that
these “objects” play some causal role in our perception of them. But, beyond
this, commonsense tends to go astray:- because commonsense tends to a kind of
naïve or direct realism as to how we perceive these objects and also tends to
naïve views of ‘causation’: after all [and special cases (like hallucinations)
aside], we tend to perceive the ‘external world’ as if something like naïve or
direct realism were true. We perceive it this way because the vast
‘trial-and-error’ processes that underpin the workings our perceptual apparatus
are not transparent in the resultant ‘perception’. There are also strong
psychological, neuro-physiological and even cultural factors that incline us to
something like a naïve or direct realism – at least before we critically
reflect on the detailed ‘trial-and-error’ workings of our perceptual apparatus.
All of this tends to obscure from us the fact that our belief in an ‘external
world’ with causal affects, though correct, is a metaphysical faith:- it cannot
be demonstrated by ‘logic’, nor can it be demonstrated by examining the
character of perception as we experience it in our ‘internal world’ – for that
‘internal world’ is compatible with there being no ‘external world’, and it is
also compatible with there being an ‘external world’ which has no causal affect
on our ‘internal world’.
It is part of commonsense that our ‘commonsense realism’ is
correct: yet it is not part of unreflective commonsense to even identify this
‘commonsense realism’ as such – it is rather a part of our outlook that we tend
to take for granted. (Philosophy may jolt us from taking it for granted by
raising alternative possibilities e.g. that there is no ‘external world’).
Given that commonsense realism is generally
part of unreflective commonsense, it is perhaps not surprising that it is not
part of commonsense to reflect carefully on the status of commonsense realism –
and so it is not perhaps surprising that it is not part of commonsense to
consider the status of ‘commonsense realism’ as being a form of ‘metaphysics’
(rather
than some kind of demonstrable, proven or testable knowledge). Given how deeply
we tend to take commonsense realism for granted, it may be something of a jolt
in
commonsense terms to realise that this ‘realism’ is a part of our metaphysical
framework.
(N.B. As ‘metaphysics’, the arguments – though inconclusive
– still favour commonsense realism as against its negation).
Grice is wrongheaded in seeking an ‘analytic’ basis for this
commonsense realism in a CTP, because our commonsense realism is of a
substantive,
synthetic character. His approach tends
to blind us to the fact that we should recognise there are limits to the
validity of a commonsense approach, which may be correct in its commonsense
realism but which tends to lead us astray in understanding the status of this
commonsense realism (because of a naïve and mistaken ‘commonsense theory of
knowledge’). Grice’s approach tends to the error of thinking this commonsense
realism is validated by the meanings of our words: but this is wrong, because,
first, commonsense realism has a substantive, synthetic and not merely
‘analytic’ character; and, second, commonsense realism is not so much built
into the meanings of our words as built into the very framework we hold prior
to our using any words and indeed hold prior to having any ‘experience’ formed
by input from an ‘external world’; and, third, even if this commonsense realism
is reflected in the sense of the language we use to describe acts of perception,
that would not validate it – no more than my referring to an “object”, in a way
that the sense of “object” is that it belongs to an ‘external world’, validates
that there is an ‘external world’.
Dnl
Ldn
On Sunday, 9 February 2014, 20:02, David Ritchie <profdritchie@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Five of the chickens--Pecorino was busy with something--exited their coop this
morning and gathered in the ice-sealed snow beneath the wire chair that has
become their new congressional meeting place. By a slim margin, they voted to
appoint a sub-committee to look into the pros and cons of atheism. Both sides
in the debate blamed the weather.
The week began with hints of what was to follow. With the first few flakes
coming down, the chickens
sauntered over to my office door and knocked. I slid the door open.
"This stuff, falling from the sky, I don't know if you've noticed..." offered
Captain Mimo.
"It's white," said Cheddar.
"Snow," I said, defining the drift.
"Whatever you call it... we don't like it."
I assumed the role of devil's advocate, "I thought you liked white water."
"Not this particular kind," said Rocky.
"If you've any of the other kind?" Cheddar asked
"No," I said, "I'm afraid we're all out." And here was my error; I pointed to
the sky, "This is all we've got." Note the "we," implying responsibility.
From such small errors great changes can come. This was not evident at the
time.
"That's a shame only you see we find it a bit..."
"Cold?" I suggested.
"Yes that is indeed what we find." Wensleydale was certain.
"We find that too," I said.
"I had no idea gods felt the cold," said
Wensleydale.
"Oh most definitely; that's why we have mansions."
Rocky cleared her throat, "I don't like to mention it but we were wondering..."
Pecorino had already taken a couple of steps forward. I blocked the way with
my foot.
"Whether you could come inside?"
"If it's not too much trouble?" said Appenzeller.
"Actually I do have a problem with that," I responded.
"The poo?" I nodded. "Damn."
"We thought that might be the issue."
It's important in a negotiation to show empathy. "Not much you can do about
that is there?"
"Two hour digestive cycle," Wensleydale lamented.
"It is quick," said Cheddar. "Oooh, there I go again."
"I think the snow's tapering off," Appenzeller opined, ignoring the evidence.
"We'll be on our way then."
"Nice mansion," said Pecorino.
Back in their own accommodation, they de-briefed.
"I think that went very well," said Cheddar.
"What do you
think?"
"Of what?"
"Our current situation."
"I don't like it. It's too quiet."
"Very quiet."
"Ominous."
"Maybe it's the dawn of another ice age."
"That's was my view."
"I thought it first."
"I think we can agree it's cold."
"That was my thought."
"Wind's getting up."
"What do you think, girls?"
"Bed time!"
They all jumped onto their perch and huddled together and puffed themselves out.
"The thing about cold is you're not sure where your feathers end and another's
begin."
"Budge over."
Later in the week, they were back, once again knocking on my window.
Mimo was lead spokesperson, "We were thinking of staging a coup but decided
it's not quite the weather for it."
"Weather for it," said Cheddar.
"What was the aim of the coup?" I asked. "What wrongs would you like
redressed?"
"No dressing involved," said Rocky, looking rather shocked.
"No, no," said
Mimo, "we've got feathers see?" She pointed with her head.
"Not very observant," said Pecorino.
"Must be distracted by something," said Appenzeller.
Wensleydale went right to the nub of the matter. "Got a lot on his mind, this
god. You can see it in his eyes. Probably having withdrawal symptoms from
forgoing the smite."
While I stood there in the open doorway, the congressional delegation
considered this.
"He doesn't smite does he?"
"No. No evidence of the urge to smite."
"One might call him benevolent."
Pecorino had a memory of the mansion's interior. "Bit of a stretch, that. I
mean he leaves us out here in the cold when he's got that nice looking mansion.
Benevolence would imply a more just approach."
"Warm as toast, in there, I shouldn't wonder."
"Toast!"
"Toast!"
I'd had enough. "I'm still here you know, and my question stands."
"Tell it to
sit."
"No point standing when you can sit," said Wensleydale, demonstrating.
"Especially in this cold."
"East wind."
"Frozen food."
"And water."
I asked, "Are those your issues?"
"No we feel they're yours, actually."
"...fall within your bailiwick..."
"...and we'd like something done about them..."
"...done about..."
"...or, fair warning, when it warms up a little, we'll stage a coup..."
"...or revolution..."
"...coup or revolution..."
"...one or the other."
"But surely," I pointed out, "when the weather is warmer your need for a coup
will have passed?"
"Boxes clever this one."
"He's got a point."
They withdrew, for consultations.
Of course I did worry about them and so I tacked a carpet to the front of their
coop. That's where the openings are and it faces east. It blocked the worst of
the wind. The next morning a delegation appeared on the deck. "What have you
done
now?"
"It's for the wind," I explained.
"It may well suit your wind," said Rocky, "but it doesn't suit us."
"Solidarity ladies," said Mimo.
"Time to sit," said Wensleydale.
"What do we want?"
"Light."
"When do we want it?"
"Now."
They tired of this and returned to the coop. Possibly to advance coup
planning. But the fervor died. Snow will do that. Later I went to take them
warm water and interrupted the following exchange.
"I beg your pardon, you've got some of that white stuff on you."
"You too."
"Look, there's more; I'll just pick it off shall I?"
"Another bit."
"Bit?"
"Biiits."
"Not that kind."
"Tastes quite good though, this particular white water."
"Whaaat?"
After a very cold night in which the wind was slow to die but eventually let us
sleep, the chickens woke when I pulled back the carpet in front of their door.
This was
not their usual, "Whaaaat?" More than a hint of shell shock in it. I opened
the inner door and showed them food and water. Three of them peered around and
considered whether it was worth jumping to the ground. The other three were
apparently busy composing will and testament.
"What have you done now?" Rocky demanded. She was angry. "That white stuff's
everywhere on the perimeter. We can't get out."
"Careless I call it," said Mimo, "careless."
"I'm trying my best," I offered. "The roof doesn't cover the entire structure.
And as for the outside world..."
Cheddar jumped down to continue her with her tasting notes. "It's still very
white, but not at all like the other white water. There's a hint of wait,
wait... I've got it, a hint of cold!."
Eyes were rolled.
I said, "There's another storm coming. Have some cheese."
"Cheese?"
"It's new. I think you'll like
it."
Rocky got the first bits thrown. The others eventually muscled their way to
some.
"It's good," they exclaimed, mouths and throats stuffed.
I brushed my hands together. "All I've got," I said, leaving. Wensleydale
followed me out.
"We wish to air grievances."
"It's too cold to air anything," I said, "go back to your nice warm straw."
"We shall overcome," Wensleydale sang, and sat down.
The others pecked around, not interested in joining her.
"I can't change Nature," I said.
"But you can exert influence," said Wensleydale.
"Only over your domain," I said.
David Ritchie,
Portland, Oregon
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