[lit-ideas] British Rearmament
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "Lit-Ideas" <Lit-Ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2008 12:16:42 -0800
Kagan, op. cit., p. 369. "In November 1935 . . . the Defense Requirements
Committee produced a report recommending a broad program of rearmament: the
Navy should be built up to a Two-Power Standard that would allow it to
defend Britain's interests in the Far East against Japan and the home waters
against Germany; the Air Force was to be expanded vastly; in case of war
with Germany the five regular divisions of the field force should be backed
up by twelve divisions of the territorial army, trained and equipped for
modern warfare, the regulars would be on the Continent within two weeks, the
territorials within four to eight months. . . ."
This proposal was "riddled" by William Douglas Weir who preferred bombers.
"Besides," Kagan writes on page 370" it would be impossible to move forward
with the entire program because of the industrial bottlenecks that would
result, caused chiefly by the shortage of skilled labor. This was and
remains a telling point and presents an important example of how the
policies of the 1920s helped determine the limits within which the men of
the 1930s could work. By disarming all but totally, the British not only
left themselves incapable of meeting current challenges but also mortgaged
the future. When key industries are reduced to a skeleton force or
abolished entirely they also destroy the pool of trained workers without
which future expansion in the face of new necessities is badly, sometime
fatally, delayed. One important lesson to learn from a study of this period
is:
As Long as a nation maintains its military forces and industries so
that they can withstand the strain of rapid expansion and
contraction,
there need again be no agonizing four-year lag, such as the
British endured, during which the British foreign office was
obliged to weigh virtually every diplomatic move on the basis of
whether it would gain or lose time for rearmament. [this is a quote
from Emmerson, J. T. The Rhineland Crisis. 1977]
Neville Chamberlain was Chancellor of the Exchequer at this time. He
supported Weir on all points. Kagan writes, "One of his most powerful
arguments over the years was that finance was the fourth branch of the armed
services. Economic stability was an essential part of the defense program,
economic stability and strength would serve as a deterrent to possible
enemies. By maintaining the strength of its currency and international
credit Britain could buy what military equipment it needed until its own
industry could take on the load. In a long war economic power would be
decisive, so it was necessary to limit the pace of rearmament. But if
Hitler meant Britain harm, could not be appeased, and was not stopped, the
war might be short and disastrous. Chamberlain refused to be moved by such
a possibility. He feared that rearmament at the most rapid pace would
weaken the pound, encourage inflation, hurt British trade, and destabilize
both the economy and the society. 'The aim of keeping armament expenditure
constantly below the inflationary threshold by means of the twofold strategy
of detente and moderate rearmament, thus forced the British to fix defensive
priorities in armament expenditure and military strategy."
Ibid., p. 371: "Against a Continental Army Chamberlain argued that if
Germany attacked the Eastern countries there would be no need of a British
Expeditionary Force in the West. If, on the other hand, the attack came in
the West, a British force might arrive too late to help. 'By this marvelous
logic,' says Telford Taylor [Munich, the Price of Peace, 1979, p. 237], 'the
need for a field force appeared to be entirely eliminated.' Chamberlain
also urged the shift of resources from the Army to the Air Force, and he won
the argument."
Ibid., p. 373: "It was only after Munich, when the strategical balance had
shifted so obviously in Germany's favor . . . when appeasement obviously had
failed, that they returned to a plan for putting an army on the Continent,
now with the full support of the government. The cost of the previous
policy, however, was great. 'Belgium and France had lost confidence in
Britain's support on land while conversely Hitler was strengthened in his
belief that she would remain aloof if he launched a quick, decisive attack
in the West.' [Bond, "Continental Commitment in British Strategy in the
1930s, in The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, Mommsen and
Kettenacker, eds., 1983, p. 203] When war came France and the Low
Countries quickly fell, providing bases close enough to permit the heavy
aerial bombardment of the British Isles that almost drove Britain from the
war."
Comment: I almost skipped writing a note on this section. I was tempted
to go straight on to some interesting matters concerning the Battle of
Britain, but this matter of rearmament is also interesting, albeit in a less
dramatic and more complicated way. One thing that struck me in this section
was the implications for the "defense industry." This is the industry I
was in for 39 years and its power has been vastly over-rated by the
anti-war, pacifistic, conspiracy theorists. It is an industry made up of
competing companies all of which want to make a profit, exactly like the
companies in every other industry. If the government buys weapons from a
particular company then it may prosper. I say "may" because in the U.S.
(while I worked in aerospace) contracts were often cancelled without warning
at great detriment to the company who won the contract by investing a lot of
its own money during the proposal period.
Also, while the U.S. wasn't geared up for war any more than Britain, it did
have some industries which could switch over quickly to a war footing. I
worked in Long Beach for many years near the very hangars that churned out
C-47s in vast numbers. The DC-3 was already a going concern, first flying
in 1935; so it took little more than slapping the C-47 designation on it to
make it a military aircraft. Of course modifications were made for this and
that, but the C-47 remained, essentially, a DC-3. I am less familiar with
other industries. Some companies made Jeeps about as quickly as Douglas
made C-47s. Since arms and ammo arrived in Britain in time for its Battle,
those industries were obviously ready as well.
I sometimes wonder if certain people reject the idea of Free Enterprise and
assume an underlying Socialistic Dictatorship of some sort, a Dictatorship
gone horribly awry because it doesn't make all children learn to spell their
names, provide universal health care, take money from the rich and give it
to the poor, etc. Instead, according to this conspiracy theory, it harbors
all powerful industries like the Defense Industry which manipulates
governments and controls foreign affairs. I have no idea how to bridge the
differing constellations of presuppositions to get into that frame of mind,
or how one might admire Cuba as at least one such person does. Yes, peace
can be achieved if you kill off all your enemies and opposition. Whenever
an unpeaceful fellow pops up with some criticism, kill him off; when you
will have peace. I think I would almost rather live in Memphis than Cuba.
Lawrence Helm
San Jacinto
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