[lit-ideas] Re: Because Implicature
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 15:19:51 -0800 (PST)
That's okay, I will attempt to reply, when I am sober. :) O.K.
On Thursday, January 9, 2014 12:00 AM, Julie Krueger <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
I'm so glad.... I'm confused, but not nearly as confused as I was before....
(now off to torture a kid with sentence diagrams).
Julie Campbell
Julie's Music & Language Studio
1215 W. Worley
Columbia, MO 65203
573-881-6889
https://juliesmusicandlanguagestudio.musicteachershelper.com/
http://www.facebook.com/JuliesMusicLanguageStudio
On Wed, Jan 8, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Again apologies: my previous post in this thread belongs in another thread but
would not be sent to that thread.
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>On Wednesday, 8 January 2014, 22:52, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>wrote:
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>I don't wish to close off any debate yet am reluctant to open more
discussion of ad hominem, a term that may be variously understood. But while I
can understand how Walter might interpret 's-o-h' in ad hominem terms or as
veiled ad
hominem, I do not understand how the above passage contains ad hominem of that
sort, no matter how "veiled". The fact is almost any argument can be ad
hominised i.e. interpreted as a form of ad hominem. And some people are perhaps
over-ready to interpret arguments this way. There is perhaps little that can be
done to stop them.
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>But we might note that not all uses of ad hominem argument are invalid. For
>example, it may be regarded as something of an ad hominem to say that many
>Newtonians struggled to
understand Einstein's physics because Einstein's physics involves more
advanced mathematics than they had, whereas those who grasped Einstein's
physics did not struggle to understand Newton's physics for this reason - this
may be taken as an ad hominem that the Newtonians who rejected
Einstein's physics often did so because they lacked sufficiently
advanced mathematics. But it is no less valid for that.
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>That educated people could readily accept that Newton's physics is "false
>knowledge" may be valid as far as it goes: though I accept it is not a
>conclusive argument of any sort.
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>Much of what I say is shorthand for points that could be put in longhand
rather differently: but then I might be criticised for putting in
longhand something that could be just as well put in shorthand. Nevertheless
some of O.K.'s points I do not dispute.
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>For example: "First, it has not been shown - say, by way of quotation or
>citation - that such a consensus of opinion really exists among 'most educated
>people,' or even among most scientists." True. And I did not claim any
>consensus: I wrote "can readily accept" - I did not claim they do readily
>accept. I suspect most educated people, if asked whether knowledge was
>identical with JTB, would not have any definite view: my point was that most
would not find it difficult to accept that Newton's physics was "false
knowledge" and would not find it difficult to see how this might refute a JTB
view of knowledge. This is important because defenders of JTB-theory often tend
to present JTB-theory as if it is the only commonsense position, or is the
consensus position etc. My point casts doubt that they are right in this, even
though I accept that JTB-theory reflects a commonsense position and - depending
on how polling was conducted - might garner many votes (in some philosophy
classes some students might not think there is any real alternative).
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>I also agree that consenus "even if it existed, it would still only be an
>appeal to authority, not proof of anything." For the record: I do not
think putting JTB-theory to a public vote, a vote of the 'educated', or
of scientists, or of philosophers, can decide its truth or falsity.
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>Moreover, I agree that in many important senses JTB-theory is irrefutable. In
>its stipulative form it is certainly irrefutable - indeed, I have stressed
how in its stipulative form JTB-theory is irrefutably true (albeit true only by
virtue of stipulation). I also accept that we cannot refute or falsify
JTB-theory scientifically or by observation: that is, we cannot make an
observation of anything that would show "knowledge" should not be or
cannot be identified with JTB. I also accept there is nothing like a
conclusive refutation of JTB-theory.
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>Nevertheless there are arguments that tend to refute JTB-theory, however
>unscientifically or inconclusively, to the extent that these arguments may be
>said to "refute" it. One of these has been emphasised in my posts: that
>Newton's physics is
"false knowledge" - with the consequence that here we have "knowledge"
that is not JTB because it is not true. Ergo JTB theory is falsified (albeit
not by observation).
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>This argument is inconclusive of course: a JTB-theorist (1) might accept
Newton's physics as false but insist that for that reason it is not
"knowledge", or (2) they might try to argue Newton's physics remains
true within its proper domain, or is "partially true", and by only
accepting it as "knowledge" insofar as it is true they may deny Newton's
physics constitutes any counter-example to JTB-theory. (1) turns JTB
theory into a kind of stipulation. The arguments at (2) we have not
delved into fully but suffice it to say these arguments cannot easily
explain how decisive experiment of Eddington's sort produced results
inconsistent with Newton's physics while that physics remains "true" or
"partially true".
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>There are other arguments that refute or tend to refute JTB-theory, but they
are all inconclusive and unscientific. In understanding my position it
is necessary to see that a theory that may be refuted in one sense may
not be refuted in another sense and may be irrefutable in yet another sense.
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>Other comments I do not agree:
>"Next, there is an allusion to 'ancient tradition', as if a theory could
not be correct because it is ancient," No such argument is used in my post.
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>"and an equation between a
well-examined philosophical theory and 'folk psychology.'"
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>My posts are rather more careful than merely equating JTB theory with
'folk psychology' (though I did perhaps once express myself in a way
that, if taken in isolation, might be thought to make some such an
equation): I do suggest JTB theory may be understood as a kind of 'folk
psychology' of knowledge (as indeed some proponents of JTB-theory would
accept); but I also suggest that 'folk psychology' may be understood as neutral
(or uncommitted) as to whether knowledge is to be identified with JTB. Here it
depends in part on what version of 'folk
psychology' one proposes.
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>I should perhaps (again?) make clear that I accept there is "knowledge"
that is true and that is believed, and even "knowledge" that also is
"justified" in a certain sense: I accept there may be "knowledge" that
is simultaneously JTB in this sense. What I am denying is that
"knowledge" is identical with
JTB, so that unless something is true, believed and "justified" it
cannot be "knowledge". On the 'critical rationalist' view, "knowledge" need not
be true, believed or "justified" (though it may be one or other or all of these
things).
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>The real crux of this dispute is not for me stipulation or conceptual
necessity or even 'refutability', but the merits of the JTB model as
against the critical rationalist model - their merits in terms, for
example, of their explanatory depth. The idea that Newton's physics
conclusively refutes JTB-theory is wrong: but the idea that Newton's physics
constitutes a refutation of sorts of JTB-theory may be right - and here
the point might be rephrased by saying that the inability of JTB-theory
to accomodate Newton's physics as "false knowledge" is a reflection of
its lack of explanatory depth. JTB theory seems to fit well enough that "Jack
knows his car is red" or "Jill knows her hair is black" (we might say it
appears true within this kind of domain): but it struggles to account for
scientific knowledge in JTB terms, and it struggles to account for the
"knowledge" we might attribute to living organisms and animals.
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>In this light, we may perhaps see how I might largely agree with O.K.'s
>conclusion:
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>"Personally, I am not convinced of the correctness of the JTB theory, but
>neither am I convinced that it has been refuted here, or even that it
is strictly refutable."
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>Donal
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>On Wednesday, 8 January 2014, 20:53, Mike Geary <gearyservice@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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>"Because" used as a preposition.
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>Old hat where I come from. Why do I say that? Because. Because why?
>Because because. But because because why? Because I do, damnit! Now shut
>the fuck up and get on about you business. Language is whatever the hell gets
>the thought across. A fart as a physiological phenomenon can be used as a
>word if it successfully conveys one's meaning within a communication context
>-- whatever that means. That's the end all and be all of language. So sayeth
>I and sayeth rightly so and justly because.
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>On Sat, Jan 4, 2014 at 9:18 AM, <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
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>From today's World Wide Words:
>>
>>"Words of 2013."
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>>"The American Dialect Society continued its tradition of voting for its
>>Word of the Year at its annual conference, held this year in Minneapolis."
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>>"The winner was a curious choice:
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>>"because X," where
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>>"X" is a noun or noun phrase *without* the intermediate of that would be
>>expected in _standard_ English."
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>>Examples:
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>>“because homework”, “because internet”.
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>>Speranza's examples:
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>>"Because Implicature"
>>"Because Grice".
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>>"In such phrases, most often encountered online, "because" has changed" --
>>as Grice would say -- "from a conjunction to a preposition"
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>>thus complicating what Grice calls its logical form.
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>>"It may suggest [or implicate -- Speranza] the logic behind the reasoning
>>is too poor to survive exposure or the reason is so obvious the speaker [or
>>utterer, as Grice prefers -- Speranza] doesn’t need to elaborate."
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>>""The version found most often is
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>>"because reasons,"
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>>a hand-waving way of saying that the speaker [or utterer -- Speranza] doesn
>>’t want or need to explain."
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>>It may be that the Griceian conversational maxim is alleged to be 'under
>>control': "do not say what you lack adequate reasons for".
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>>""Because X "had also been chosen as "Most Useful Word of the Year" [where
>>the implicature is not Witters's -- 'meaning is use', meaning should be
>>useful -- Speranza], beating "struggle bus", a difficult situation, as in
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>>"I’m riding the struggle bus"."
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>>But cf. Speranza's
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>>"Because Struggle Bus".
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>>"It is likely that journalists will have a struggle bus telling their
>>readers why because X won (try “because language”, guys)."
>>
>>Cheers
>>
>>Speranza
>>
>>World Wide Words is copyright © Michael Quinion 2014.
>>http://www.worldwidewords.org.
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