[lit-ideas] Re: Back to Popper (and further back to Hume)
- From: John Wager <john.wager1@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 09 Dec 2006 07:46:12 -0600
Donal McEvoy wrote:
. . . .I am suggesting these and other phenomena do not vindicate the existence
of
induction, can be accounted for without recourse to inductive reasoning, and
that the concept of ‘probability’, in all contexts where it is used validly,
is irredeemably non-inductive.
Another way of saying that "probability" is a mathematical relationship
between already-observed events. In 100%
of the times a box was opened, neither a white swan nor a black swan was
encountered. In one of three boxes, a
white swan was found in a box. The "probability" based on past
experience does not establish any future relationship
between boxes and swans, but DOES accurately describe one's experiences
to date. I don't think that this is a stretch
of the meaning of the terms "probability" and "experience."
We need to clearly distinguish ‘logical probability’ from probability in some
other sense (including the sense of ‘inductive probability’). Say, we have
two unbiased dice where there is a 1/6 chance of throwing any number, A, in
any particular throw: the odds of throwing A in two consecutive throws is the
‘probability of A’ x ‘probability of A’ i.e. 1/6 x 1/6.
Unfortunately, we don't live in a world where we can "throw" purely
mathematical dice. We don't live in a world where
we can "talk" to other people either, or "write" to them over the
Internet. We don't live in a world where the empirical
meanings of words is a given constant, either. If "probability" is
essentially inductive, so is every other kind of "event"
including throwing (as in dice), speaking, writing, and even thinking
with words. We have as little (or as much) evidence
for predicting swan boxes as we do for predicting the effects of
"throwing" or "speaking" or "writing." As human actions
extending into the future, they are just as subject to your critique of
induction as the original swan example. If I cannot
know anything about the third box, I cannot know anything about the
effects of "throwing" a die to the table; it might just
blossom into a swan. If I cannot know anything about the third box, I
also cannot know anything about whether the
other people to whom I address these words will continue to be able to
read, or that the words will continue to mean
the same things to them as they now do to me. Any attempt to "prove" to
another person that probability is flawed,
results in a reduction ad absurdam of the proof. Any argument addressed
to another person is itself as much based on
inductive reasoning as any prediction of box contents.
Any reply to this message is at least tacit agreement that we must forge
ahead despite qualms about the logical status
of induction, because we have no alternative to induction as we continue
to write and speak to each other.
The logical consequence of taking the argument against induction
seriously would be to cease from all attempts
to engage others in argument, remaining silent. Any words addressed to
others are just as flawed as any attempts to
predict the contents of the third box.
--
-------------------------------------------------
"Never attribute to malice that which can be
explained by incompetence and ignorance."
-------------------------------------------------
John Wager john.wager1@xxxxxxxxxxx
Lisle, IL, USA
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