[lit-ideas] Re: Agnotology
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2011 11:35:50 EDT
We are considering the iteration of the "I" operator ("I" stands for
'ignorance' and is defined in terms of the tilde for 'negation' and 'K' or
knowledge -- with agnotology defined as 'the science of ignorance') as in
I(A,p) --> II(A,p)
to correspond with Hintikka's theorem of the
incorrigibility-and-privileged-access theorem of 'knowledge' (that R. Paul
calls "KK")
In a message dated 4/20/2011 12:20:07 P.M., donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx
refers to the gnotological variants:
"Either the "I know(1) I know(2)" is meant so that "know" (1) and (2) are
the self-same mental state, in which case the expression is redundant (and
makes as little sense as 'Please close the door which is the door" etc)"
----- Surely they don't refer to the same state, hence your use of
subscripts. Grice prefers indeed to say
I know-2 it. Meaning I know that I know it.
Similarly, I ignore-2 it.
In other words, for any operator involving a psychological propositional
attitude psi*, there is a subscript that indicates the number of iterations
involved. In this way, Grice can derive morality, for surely, "I ought to do
x" derives from "I want-n to do it" where "n" is the denumerable infinity.
McEvoy goes on:
"or (1) is a further act of knowing in relation to (2), in which case the
inference is questionable - for surely I can believe/know p without being
further of any belief or knowledge as to whether 'I believe I believe'/'know
I know' p. Etc."
But people don't act that way.
"You know you know it."
is usually uttered by teachers (e.g. Plato in "Meno") to motivate students.
("Since the teacher said that I knew that I knew it, I must know it.").
The agnotological reverses may have a harder time in find a 'motivational'
context, but that's HIS problem. ("you ignore you ignore it.").
Finally, McEvoy refers to the denumerable infinity:
"I believe/know I said as much yesterday but remain open-minded as to
whether that means I believe that I believe that I believe that I believe that
I
believe I said as much as yesterday."
His point having been that he ignores whether a mind can hold 'infinitive'
coordinates in subscript-operational processes. I think sublunarily, we
assume the infinity is 'potential'.
In the case of 'willing', you can only justify morality out of that
iteration provided there is no 'negation' in the chain.
"I know I don't have to smoke." "I know I don't want to smoke". "I know I
want to not want to smoke." And so on.
In the case of 'ignorance' it almost goes without saying that for any "p"
that, say, Geary, does not know, we can claim that he also ignores that he
ignores that p.
The Moore-paradoxical (as Palma calls it) ring to
"p, but I ignore it" (cfr. Moore -- "It is raining, but I don't know it")
is thus easily accountable by replacing "I" by Geary -- even if _he_
disagrees.
JL Speranza
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