[lit-ideas] Re: According to Wittgenstein elem.props are "sayable"
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2004 17:11:56 +0100 (BST)
--- Richard Henninge <Henninge@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > According to
Wittgenstein elementary propositions are "sayable," this word
> being used (by Robert Paul and Donal McEvoy) in a way I dispute, but which
> does not render the discussion useless. That is, I have a problem with
> saying that propositions are sayable or unsayable (read my lips--I said it
> didn't I--every sort of nonsense can be said--I could even say
> "ü09jßw9iubnmurgm9apmrujrijüwjroöiytj fuaw" if I had a mind to);
But you would have said nothing at all in W's TLP view: you would have made
merely a meaningless noise. To say something, in W's sense, is to say
something that has or makes sense.
Now I too have a problem with this view which I may put as the
'awopbopaloobopabopbamboom' argument: for this expression conveys a lot of
meaning I think, and has a sense. In other words, W is using an overly
restrictive criterion of sense when he declares such expressions as saying
nothing.
But the explanation for this is that W is a combination of positivist and
mystic: the view that "only the propositions of natural science" "can be
said" [6.53] offers a positivistic criterion of meaning akin to the criterion
adopted by the Viet Con.., eh, Vienna Circle.
It is ironic that Popper, the official opposition of the VC, was tarred as a
sort of positivist for most of his career, whereas Wittgenstein, who was much
more doctrinally positivist in his criterion of sense, has had plenty of
philosophers willing to say it is a terrible mistake to tar him as a
positivist at all.
Yet given the restrictive criterion of meaning that underpins W's claims as
to what can be said, we can still ask whether according to this criterion
atomic propositions can be said. This may come to this: are atomic
propositions "propositions of natural science"?
I am suggesting they are not and are unsayable.
> what
> Wittgenstein says is that "that of which we cannot speak, of that we should
> remain silent: "that," then, is unsayable, not the infelicitous utterance
> that dares to say "that."
No: given his restrictive criterion of sense, making noises about what cannot
be said is not to _say_ anything:- despite appearances, the "infelicitous
utterance" does not _say_ anything.
This view has a paradoxical air of course. Popper argues it is false rather
than, as W claims, useful nonsense - but I leave this aside.
> But if we grant that Robert and Donal both understand Wittgenstein to be
> talking about propositions that are sayable or not sayable, their
> difference
> seems clear:
>
> Robert: Witt says many of his propositions (like "God does not reveal
> himself in the world" are not sayable.
> Nonetheless, Witt says "the propositions of natural science" are sayable
> ("can be said").
> Plus, Witt says elementary propositions are sayable.
>
> In a recent response to me, Donal quotes Wittgenstein:
>
> 'The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts
> > the existence of a state of affairs.' [4.21]
>
> Donal, at least here do you deny that Wittgenstein thinks and wants to say
> that elem.props are sayable?
While admitting I may be wrong, yes I do deny it.
>An elem.prop, in his mind, "asserts the
> existence of a state of affairs." If he thought it was unsayable he would
> have said it.
This quotation is at best equivocal, and equivocal evidence is not supporting
evidence at all. For to claim elem.props. "assert the existence of states of
affairs" , is not to claim elem.props. can in fact be said. It is no more to
claim this than it amounts to the claim that elementary "states of affairs"
can *in fact* be described in a way that we are *in fact* able to state using
elem.propns. [see W quotation at end of post]
No: your comment on this equivocal quotation is a classic burden-shifting
move to which the reply is "If he thought elem.props were sayable he would
have clearly said so". He would have made clear they are "propositions of
natural science", for example. He might even have offered an example: since
it must be easy enough to offer examples of "propositions of natural
science".
But the truth is W did not assert the existence of atomic propositions
because they exist in "natural science" [they do not, at least on the
surface], but because their existence is necessary if there is to be what he
thought was a necessary isomorphism between a language that breaks down into
elementary propns and a reality that consists ultimately of atomic 'facts' or
'states of affairs'. That is, W is trying to explain how *it is possible*
that language can get a hold on a non-linguistic reality of "facts" or
"states of affairs":- it is because, he suggests, both share an atomic
structure which at base corresponds in a one-to-one and further indivisible
way.
This correspondence need not necessarily be amenable to analysis by "natural
science" at all. I am defending the view it is not: the elem.props cannot be
expressed as propns. of "natural science".
>(In my corrective definition of unsayable above I noted that
> it is really the "existence of a state of affairs" that is sayable or
> unsayable, not the proposition asserting it, but that does not change the
> fact that Wittgenstein, in a sense, legitimizes some ways of speaking
> [about
> the world].)
The first bit is, I have suggested, wrong: it is the propn. asserting "the
existence of a state of affairs" that cannot be said in W's sense of "said".
The fresh point you raise is an extremely vague claim that is not obviously
to the point at issue: that W "in a sense" [not specified] "legitmises some
ways of speaking" [about the world] is not sufficient to show that elem.props
are sayable. That is, it could be true certain ways of speaking are
legitimate yet the elem.props are not sayable. Nothing follows logically here
one way or the other.
> If Donal is denying Wittgenstein's view, he can propose his own reasons for
> thinking that (I think his view would be) no propositions are sayable.
From where do you get this idea this is my view? Afair I have said no such
thing. To claim elem.props are unsayable is not to claim ALL props are
unsayable.
Clearly W asserts that the "propositions of natural science" can be said: and
I have quoted this repeatedly.
>But
> I
> thought he had a theory about Wittgenstein's views?
>
> So, Donal, do you deny that 4.21 says that one kind of proposition at least
> is "sayable" in your terms, to wit the elem.props?
Yes I do deny it: it says no such thing.
> But even the "natural science props"--"There are 180° total in the interior
> angles of a triangle"
Is this a proposition of "natural science" or a tautology or something else?
It does not look to me like an empirical claim. But leaving the example used
aside...
--do you maintain that they are unsayable in your terms
> or in Wittgenstein's terms or per se?
I am defending the view that, "in W's terms", the propositions of natural
science are sayable but the elem.props are not propositions of natural
science and are not sayable.
However a number of different things must be distinguished that bear on this
rather imprecise expression "in W's terms":-
1. Was W clear that EP were sayable?
2. Was W clear that EP were not sayable?
3. Was W not clear one way or the other?
3. is certainly a possibility: and it raises the question of what we mean by
"clear": was he clear in TLP, or privately clear to others or to himself
etc.? It is also possible to hold to 3. and argue that the correct view of
EP, whether W came to it or not, is that they are unsayable - given they must
be sayable or unsayable, one or other possibility would seem to be correct
even if W could not decide which.
I happen to sympathise with Frege when he wrote of TLP [Monk, p.163] "..from
the very beginning I find myself entangle in doubt as to what you want to
say, and so make no proper headway". It may be reading the TLP will give no
clear answer.
Here is some more extrinsic evidence from Monk's book, from the index re
EPs:-
W is quoted [p.129] "It does not go against our feeling, that _we_ cannot
analyse PROPOSITIONS so far as to mention the elements by name [1]: no, we
feel that the world must consist of elements [2]."
([1] and [2] added by me to break this up).
Now it seems to me [1] can be read as saying that it is humanly impossible
for us to "mention..by name" ie. say an EP; but that [2] this does not
invalidate the contention that EPs exist and so do the atomic facts to which
they correspond if true.
The contention at [2] is not derived from such EPs being propositions of
natural science or sayable: it is shown they must exist by "our feeling", for
their existence is necessary to explain the definiteness of sense that only
arises because they exist and so do the atomic facts to which they correspond
if true.
Anyway, it's a thought.
Donal
London
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