> A better example: 'Is duress a defence to murder?' Lot of what underlies the > English House of Lords ruling, in RvHowe, is - I suggest - not really talked > about in the judgment. > And, a personal favourite, HuntervChiefConstableofWestMidlands - a truly > hilarious and frightening case where the courts seek to stop the Birmingham > Six from suing the police for violent assault during their detention before > trial, since their success would be "an appalling vista" in the words of Lord > Denning i.e. not least because it would mean that an English jury in a civil > case found the assaults probable while such allegations had been dismissed by > the trial judge (who was now a Law Lord) on the basis that he was sure they > were untrue, and thus the admissions they made under interrogation were > admissible in law to convict them. [They were released some years later, as > you may know]. There are plenty of hilarious and frightening cases in law; but we seem to have left the original topic far behind. Robert Paul (out on bail) ---------- Donal (replying):- Hope to address some of your other points later, but meantime while I think I understand why you might think these cases leave the "original topic" far behind (you do not define the topic v. precisely - I'pose it is the role of 'ordinary language' as a barometer of meaning in legal contexts), they are pertinent in at least two ways. 1) They show a clear limitation in the 'ordinary language' approach. In Howe both the terms 'duress' and 'murder' are terms of ordinary language. Why does the House of Lords not resolve the question by considering their ordinary language meanings and then considering whether, given them, duress is a defence [or not]? There are many reasons; but chief among them is that this would be a poor way to address the specific problem that the law faces here - and it is addressing this properly that the HLs is concerned with: ie. that their ruling be the best solution to the specific problem raised. I might add that in ordinary language a person who acts only under duress does not act voluntarily in the sense that makes them morally responsible: if I sign a contract because it is either my signature or my brains on the paper, then while my signing is a voluntary physical movement [my arm is not simply blown by the wind] it is not a voluntary act in the sense of one that I am morally responsible for. Why? Because the ordinary attitude would surely be that it is not reasonable to expect people not to comply with such a threat, and therefore not reasonable for the law to hold them to the normal consequences of such an act. Equally in ordinary language 'murder' is an intentional and voluntary act. Putting this together, we might say that 'ordinary language' favours the view that duress should be a defence. _But this is really of no weight to the HL's because of the character of the specific problem here as they see it_. And they see that there is a real difference between allowing duress as a defence in almost every other area, including crime short of murder, and allowing it as a defence for murder: the specific problem is not the same as all those others and therefore it does not follow from the generality of duress as a defence that it should be allowed as a defence to murder. Indeed, the question is really one of high policy - should the state withdraw its threat because a person acts under the threat of a criminal or terrorist? Put this way, the answer is no. One of the 'hidden' aspects of the case is that if the answer were 'yes' it would create an escape route for any terrorist/criminal [ie. 'they made me do it'] and this would be a disaster both as a matter of 'policy' and for public confidence in the law [such as it is]. So ordinary language be damned, really; when it comes down to it, the character of the specific problem is what governs the solution here. Similarly in Hunter the term 'abuse of' and 'process' [here as in legal process] are ordinary terms. We may speak of someone's act being 'an abuse' of the 'process'/'system'. But the HL's do not appeal to ordinary language - which is, despite what you say, too nebulous to be an adequate basis for deciding the case _given what is at stake_ ie. the specific legal problem or situation and its ramifications. That OrdLang is clearly inadequate here does not take us far from the topic at all. 2) Which is implicit in the above:- they are good examples of cases where the 'reasoning/terms of the judgment' do not fully or even adequately reveal the underlying reasons that motivate the decision reached. It must be borne in mind that 'legal reasons/terms of the judgment' do not seek to be a fully-argued case for the decision showing it is better than any other given every consideration:- after all, the court is not seeking to persuade so much as making a decision. What it offers is at best adequate support for its decision given various factors: the existing legal framework, public confidence, the consequences of the decision on the system etc. 3) Putting 1) and 2) together: I am saying these cases are not mere exceptions to the rule that OrdLang is useful a tool; rather OL is useful a tool only given problems of a specific character. Also that when courts resort to appeals to OL in reaching a decision we should not perhaps take this too seriously, particularly given the nebulous, ambiguous, multi-faceted character of OL: rather OL is a convenient tool to give 'adequate support' to the decision reached without engaging in a wide-ranging justification for that decision as being preferable to any other alternative. Donal Donal ___________________________________________________________ Support the World Aids Awareness campaign this month with Yahoo! For Good http://uk.promotions.yahoo.com/forgood/ ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html