[lit-ideas] Re: "A Proposition Is A Fact" (Tractatus)

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2009 08:57:26 EDT

In a message dated 4/22/2009 7:51:54 A.M.  Eastern Daylight Time, 
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
I'm not sure the  relevance of this. My problem is that while the utterance 
or assertion of a  proposition may itself be a fact (of utterance or 
assertion) that would not make  the propositional content _true_ or such that 
it 
corresponds with the facts -  and in this sense it would not make the 
proposition, viewed not as a linguistic  act but in terms of its content, "a 
fact".

----

Well, this  requires what Grice calls 'metaphysical argument' but the rest 
of the  philosophers call 'transcendental argument'. I am an empiricist alla 
Descartes,  so I live in solipsismo metodologico.

But some people say that the  _point_ of having a belief is that it's a 
belief _de re_. 

I think the  cat is on the mat.

While it is true that I may be wrong, since it's not a  cat, but a toy cat 
and it's not a mat but a Persian antique, these people argue  that at least 
ONE of our beliefs has to be true (Davidson).

So I suppose  you can surprise me by wanting to stick to _that_ belief.

Now, for  ordinary false beliefs, we distinguish the content versus the 
'pseudo-fact'. "I  believe WASPs carry a lot of interbreed", "I believe all 
African Americans  descend from slaves". Since there is falsity in each, it 
cannot be a fact, or a  pseudo-fact. It's a _content_. 

Ditto,

Meinong spent his birthday  thinking of the square circle.

-----

i.e. that it existed, or was  conceivable.

----

For some people, like me, Myro, and Peacocke,  propositions get constructed 
ONLY for the purpose of having something to think  about. It's their role 
qua objects of propositional or psychological attitudes  that justifies their 
role in the scheme of things. We don't need  facts.

It's like the Duchess of Devonshire, who, like McEvoy lives in the  
Midlands, would say, "People find theirselves with automobiles but nowhere to 
go  
with". So the justification of the stately-home scheme is the justification 
of  people to have a place to drive their cars to. Ditto for  propositions.

Kramer has been saying, elsewhere, that this is the  fifth-axiom. While we 
can very well be satisfied, as logicians, and  philosophers, I say, with 
contents and propositions; some rougher types prefer  _facts_, the fifth axiom.

Facts bore me.

Every time someone  presents something as a matter of fact, I doze. I'm not 
interested in facts.  There's nothing you can do with them. You cannot 
transgiverse them with a clean  conscience, etc. 

Facts are limiting. It's what it's called  luck-egalitarianism. Geary was 
born in Memphis. That's a fact. Is it  _necessary_? No. Surely it limits him. 
Peter was born _pink_. Is that a fact?  Surely it limits him. Dawkins was 
born almost paralytic? Is this a limitation on  him? Sure. Had he born with 
the body of an athlete he would be doing the  bars.

----

I never found _one_ interesting fact.

Now a  'fact' is not a 'fict'. When Borges wrote his little book, the 
editor said, "Now  you need a title". "Fictions" he said. "Artifices". They 
were 
not facts, they  were ficts.

Cheers,

JL  

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