McEvoy was referring to 'fact' -- and I think I prefer 'state of affairs'.
'Fact', like 'state of affair', is unisemous, as it were, not polysemous.
But there's something about a Griceian state of affairs that may sound
appealing.
"Fact" derives from Latin 'facio' as 'deed' derives from 'do'. "State of
affairs" seems more neutral.
In a message dated 3/14/2016 3:03:03 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "It depends what sense of sense is being
used: but
in at least one sense of sense, the fact there may be a typology of
different types of 'fact' is at least suggestive that they are 'facts' in
different types of senses (even if there is another sense of 'fact' where they
are
all, in the same sense, 'facts')."
Indeed, or in fact, yes. I think this has led philosophers to replace
'fact' by 'state of affairs'. Or at least some Griceian ones.
Griceian philosophers connect sentences in the indicative mode with states
of affairs. A Gricean, punning on 'trouble-maker' would go on to say that
a state of affairs is the truth-maker here.
There are similarities between states of affairs and alethic psychological
attitudes. A belief, say, may be said to be are true. A state of affairs
obtains or does not.
‘State of affairs’ is a Griceian term that has been appropriated for a
specific Griceian philosophical purpose.
In natural language we refer states of affairs in a variety of ways.
Most of our designators for states of affairs are derived from assertoric
sentences.
A state of affairs, unlike, say, a 'fact', is something that can obtain OR
NOT.
The suggests an initial conception of the concept of a "states of affairs".
(SoA1) A states of affairs is the bearer of probabilities.
A state of affairs is probable or improbable; it has a degree of
probability.
(SoA1) leads to (SoA2):
(SoA2) A states of affairs can exist without obtaining (see Reinach,
Plantinga, Pollock).
This suggests (SoA3):
(SoA3) A states of affairs directly involves particulars and properties.
As Pollock has it, a state of affairs is ‘about’ objects but not in terms
of some mode of representation.
A states of affairs, in some sense, contains objects as direct
constituents.
Hence, the state of affairs of Mont Blanc's being more than 4000 meters
high contains (in some sense) Mont Blanc, the mountain with all its
snowfields (see Russell 1904).
A states of affairs is a metaphysical possibility.
(SoA4) A states of affairs is the bearer of metaphysical possibility and
necessity (see Künne and Forbes).
What kinds of states of affairs are there?
Are there only simple states of affairs that involve only particulars and
properties (relations)?
Or are there complex states of affairs involving other states of affairs?
This question has been discussed on the basis of the assumption that
assertoric sentences describe states of affairs.
Does every such sentence describe exactly one state of affairs?
Wittgenstein (1921, 4.26) argues that only an elementary proposition
describes a state of affairs.
An elementary proposition in Wittgenstein's sense is a concatenation of
simple proper names that refer to simple objects.
Such a proposition is a picture of a state of affairs.
The names in the elementary proposition are arranged in a way that can be
mapped onto an arrangement of the object named.
This arrangement of objects is the state of affairs pictured by the
elementary proposition.
Molecular propositions are concatenations of elementary propositions.
Molecular propositions don't picture states of affairs.
Molecular propositions agree/disagree with the possible state of affairs
pictured by the elementary propositions that are their constituents.
For illustration take a simple example. If ‘p’ and ‘q’ are elementary
propositions, the molecular proposition ‘p & q’ -- say,
i. Snow is white and grass is green.
is true if, and only, if ‘p’ pictures an obtaining state of affairs and ‘q
’ does the same.
An assertion of ‘p & q’ states that these truth-possibilities of the
elementary propositions are fulfilled, but it does NOT describe a conjunctive
state of affairs.
Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism is an extreme position: only elementary
propositions describe a state of affairs.
At the other extreme of the spectrum are views that take each complex
sentence to describe a complex state of affairs (see Pollock).
In order to decide between these views we need to know more about the
theoretical roles state of affairs are supposed to play.
As we noted, beliefs are one thing, states of affairs another.
Beliefs and states of affairs differ in their individuation and existence
conditions.
The content of a belief is what matters.
If one can believe that p without eo ipso believing that q (and vice
versa), the contents that p and that q are different.
Furthermore, the belief that the flying horse Pegasus may exist, even if
Pegasus does not exist (for defense and elaboration see Sainsbury).
This is different for a state of affairs.
If a state of affairs is a logical complex that contains objects and
properties as constituents, it cannot exist if its constituents do not exist.
Hence, a states of affairs that contains contingently existing particulars
is itself a contingent existent(Plantinga discusses problems that arise
for this view, David responds to Plantinga's argument.)
Forbes has argued that a state of affairs is needed as the fundamental
bearer of modal properties like being possible or necessary.
A possible state of affairs x includes another state of affairs y if, and
only if, it is not possible that x obtains and y fails to obtain; x
excludes y if, and only if, it is not possible that both x and y obtain.
A state of affairs is transient if, and only if, it obtains at one time
and not another.
For example, the state of affairs of Socrates's not drinking hemlock
obtains at some times, but not at others.
Transient states of affairs are only possible or actual relative to a
time.
For example, before 399 BC it was possible that Socrates does not drink
hemlock, but this is no longer possible after 399 BC.
A state of affairs is nontransient if, and only, if it is such that
necessarily if it obtains at one time it obtains at all times.
For example, the state of affairs of Socrates's being hungry on the 15th of
April 400 BC at 16.15 is nontransient.
Necessarily, the state of affairs that triangle A is equilateral obtains
if the state of affairs that triangle A is equiangular and vice versa.
If the state of affairs p is a possible world, so is p & (q ∨ ¬q) for an
arbitrarily chosen possible state of affairs q.
p and p & (q ∨ ¬q) are necessarily equivalent, but, according to our
individuation method, different states of affairs.
Hence, there are many different maximal states of affairs that correspond
to the same possible world and, in particular, to the actual world.
If one is unwilling to make a distinction between encoding and
exemplifying, but one wants to maintain the identification of possible worlds
with
maximal possible state of affairs, one either has to accept that necessarily
equivalent states of affairs are the same or one must identify possible
worlds with sets of necessarily equivalent possible state of affairs.
States of affairs are too coarse-grained to be the contents of
propositional attitudes. I can believe that Hesperus is a planet, without
believing
that Phosphorus is a planet (and vice versa). Hence, the contents of the
attitudes differ.
But the state of affairs of Hesperus's being a planet is just the state of
affairs of Phosphorus's being a planet.
Propositional attitudes are, at best, mediated relations to states of
affairs.
For example, a belief represents a state of affairs if, and only if, the
believer assents to a thought that describes a state of affairs.
Barcan Marcus has challenged this view.
She argued that belief is ‘a relation between a subject or agent and a
state of affairs that is not necessarily actual but that has actual objects as
its constituents’ (Barcan Marcus 1990).
Her object-centered account of belief identifies belief with a
differential disposition to a state of affairs.
x believes that S just in case, under certain agent-centered circumstances
including x's desires and needs as well as external circumstances, x is
disposed to act as if S, that actual or non-actual state of affairs, obtains.
(Barcan Marcus 1990)
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
References
Armstrong, D.M., A World of STATES OF AFFAIRS. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kuenne, W., The intentionality of thinking: the difference between STATE
OF AFFAIRS and Propositional Matter. In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Speech Act and
Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology.
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Reicher, M. STATES OF AFFAIRS. Frankfurt A.M.: Ontos Verlag.
Taylor, B., STATES OF AFFAIRS. In G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.) Truth
and Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vallicella, W.F., Three Conceptions of STATE OF AFFAIRS. Noûs 34.
Wetzel, T., Possible STATES OF AFFAIRS. Philosophical Studies 91.
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