Pay close attention to this one, folks! Jim Harrison MCP(NT4, W2K), A+, Network+, PCG http://isaserver.org/authors/harrison/ Read the books! ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jerry Bryant [MS]" <jbryant@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Newsgroups: microsoft.public.security,microsoft.public.isa,microsoft.public.isaserver,mi crosoft.public.windows.inetexplorer.ie55.browser,microsoft.public.windows.in etexplorer.ie6.browser Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 4:40 PM Subject: Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-027 Title: Unchecked Buffer in Gopher Protocol Handler Can Run Code of Attacker's Choice (Q323889) Date: 11 June 2002 Software: Internet Explorer, Proxy Server, Internet Security and Acceleration Server Impact: Run Code of Attacker's Choice Max Risk: Critical Bulletin: MS02-027 Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-027.asp. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Issue: ====== This is a work-around bulletin that details steps customers can take to protect themselves against a publicly disclosed vulnerability until patches are available. The Gopher protocol is a legacy protocol that provides for the transfer of text-based information across the Internet. Information on Gopher servers is hierarchically presented using a menu system, and multiple Gopher servers can be linked together to form a collective "Gopherspace". There is an unchecked buffer in a piece of code which handles the response from Gopher servers. This code is used independently in IE, ISA, and Proxy Server. A security vulnerability results because it is possible for an attacker to attempt to exploit this flaw by mounting a buffer overrun attack through a specially crafted server response. The attacker could seek to exploit the vulnerability by crafting a web page that contacted a server under the attacker's control. The attacker could then either post this page on a web site or send it as an HTML email. When the page was displayed and the server's response received and processed, the attack would be carried out. A successful attack requires that the attacker be able to send information to the intended target using the Gopher protocol. Anything which inhibited Gopher connectivity could protect against attempts to exploit this vulnerability. In the case of IE, the code would be run in the user's context. As a result, any limitations on the user would apply to the attacker's code as well. Mitigating Factors: ==================== - A successful attack requires that the attacker's server be able to deliver information to the target using the Gopher protocol. Customers who block Gopher at the perimeter would be protected against attempts to exploit this vulnerability across the Internet. - In the case of IE, code would run in the security context of the user. As a result, any limitations on the user's ability would also restrict the actions an attacker's code could take. - A successful attack against ISA and Proxy servers would require that the malicious response be received by the web proxy service. In practical terms, this means that a proxy client would have to submit the initial request through the proxy server. Risk Rating: ============ - Internet systems: Critical - Intranet systems: Critical - Client systems: Critical Patch Availability: =================== - A patch is currently under development to fix this vulnerability. Please read the Security Bulletin at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-027.asp for workaround information while patches are developed. - --------------------------------------------------------------------- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY. -- Regards, Jerry Bryant - MCSE, MCDBA Microsoft IT Communities Get Secure! www.microsoft.com/security This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, and confers no rights.