[interact_list] seeing the end of me: thousands years old empire system of the west

  • From: Akio Fujita <A.Fujita@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: interact_list@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2001 23:47:16 +0100

to dear all,

how can you talk of peace
only i can afford is being desperate and crazy
not seeing an any piece of reality

darkness and silence 
and i'm scratching nothing - to get myself stand and go 
-and someday someone will scrap me

i wish the moment will be less painful than i can imagine and bear

realists, intelligence - 

west has been carrying its empire system for thousands years
and seems it never been changed the way how it sustains itself

be a citizen
be happy

some born in safety zone, it's lucky 
some born in turmoil zone, oh sorry

that's the only truth we can know and 
there aren't anything else we can add in reality

silently i'm going through all those horrible dark hours
silently, desperately and being all alone

empire of tribes - 
if we can tear off tribalism cultures 
there can be hope 
but no one wants to yield, distract themselves from those
hedonism, insensitivity and excuses for collective conformity

can't make it 

no worry i will have a further go

no hope or trust - only suspicion guides me
but i've been doing my best as much as humanely can

and i'm seeing the end of me 

having an absolute idea that now i came to know that there is nothing 
we can do for change

some time left
what am i now

empire, mercenaries, barbarians, rotten/corrupt politicians and 
hippy-happy citizens in the safe (metro)polis 

we are doing romanic-moronic life in the safety zones

nothing has been changed in past 3000 or 4000 years

good night,



Paid to Make Peace:Mercenaries are no altruists, but they can do good.
(Think again: Renouncing Use of Mercenaries can be lethal)

By Sebastian Mallaby

Monday, June 4, 2001; Page A19 

In the late 1980s Mozambique was no-go territory: The rebel Renamo 
movement terrorized the countryside, and aid workers cowered in the 
capital. But Lonrho, a British company, chose that moment to buy a 
large swath of the country and farm cotton on it. Didn't rebels make 
such investment dicey? Yes, but Lonrho had hired a force of 
mercenaries. If you visited Lonrho's Mozambican headquarters, they 
showed you candid snapshots of rebels crumpled on the ground.

It's worth recalling Lonrho, because the dilemma posed by mercenaries 
is growing sharper. These days it's governments that hire them; and 
last week this habit came back to haunt U.S. policymakers when The Post
reported that the private firm engaged to supply police officers to 
Bosnia had sent a few characters who needed police oversight 
themselves. In Sierra Leone and Angola, however, mercenaries have 
performed effectively, raising the question of whether they should be 
used more often in peacemaking operations.

The case for Lonrho's behavior in the 1980s was not all that different 
from the case for government-hired mercenaries today. In an ideal 
world, the state would provide for public safety. But governments never
quite deliver, not even in rich countries, which is why U.S. spending 
on private security firms outstrips the combined budgets of public 
police forces by more than two to one. In poor countries, the state is 
all but helpless. The choice is often mercenary-protected investment or
no investment at all. 

In an ideal world, similarly, strong countries would help war-torn ones
by sending in their soldiers. Last year a contingent of fewer than 
1,000 British troops beat back Sierra Leone's limb-chopping rebels from
the outskirts of the capital and clobbered a particularly murderous 
bunch known as the West Side Boys. But that British deployment was the 
exception. For the most part, rich countries are sick with the Somalia 
syndrome: no troops for Africa, not even for Rwanda, not even to 
prevent genocide. 

So, much as with investment, the choice often comes down to mercenary 
peacekeeping or no peacekeeping. The trouble is that rich governments 
are not as blunt as Lonrho, and refuse to acknowledge this bottom line.
They find the idea of mercenaries embarrassing. They are cautious about
their relationships with firms such as DynCorp, which supplied the 
police for Bosnia. And the result of this squeamishness is that lots of
people die.

Unwilling to commit troops yet unwilling to pronounce the "m" word, 
governments have devised a peacekeeping system that is mercenary in all
but name. Rich countries pay poor-country soldiers to go to dangerous 
places, either under the banner of the United Nations or in the name of
regional super cops such as West Africa's Ecomog. And the pay is pretty
handsome -- enough so that poor countries can use the profits to 
subsidize domestic defense establishments. 

This arrangement might be fine if it worked properly. Sadly, it does 
not. In 1995-97 a South African firm called Executive Outcomes was paid
$1.2 million a month for its Sierra Leone operation; it hammered the 
rebels so thoroughly that they ran to the negotiating table, clearing 
the way for an election. Executive Outcomes was then succeeded in 
Sierra Leone by Ecomog, and the rebels resumed their limb-chopping. 
Then came a U.N. peace force, whose current performance is encouraging 
-- but at a cost of $47 million monthly. 

The critics of mercenaries say that paid war makers cannot promote 
peace in the long run. But this is like pretending that weapons 
designed for killing cannot be life-saving, even when the weapons are 
wielded by good guys. The critics charge that mercenaries won't be held
accountable for battlefield atrocities. But Nigerian troops committed 
plenty of unpunished atrocities in the course of Sierra Leone 
peacekeeping. If the United Nations hired a private firm of mercenaries
for peacekeeping, it could write accountability into the contract -- 
and enforce that contract much more readily than it can discipline a 
wayward government.

As it happens, the U.N. did once consider hiring mercenaries. It was in
the wake of the Rwanda genocide, when the killers were hiding among 
refugees in eastern Zaire. Kofi Annan, the U.N. secretary-general who 
was then the man in charge of peacekeeping, wanted to disarm the 
fighters so that humanitarian assistance could flow to the civilians. 
He appealed to governments for help; they spurned him. So he considered
the mercenary option, only to drop it because the U.N.'s member states 
were horrified by the idea.

The consequence of the no-mercenary policy was that refugee aid went to
soldiers, who used it to regroup, provoking the Rwandan invasion that 
started Zaire's march to mayhem, ultimately costing almost 3 million 

Variations on this pattern have occurred repeatedly. After mercenaries 
left Sierra Leone, rebels butchered 5,000 civilians in the capital. If 
mercenaries had been protecting the Balkan safe havens, there might 
never have been the massacre of Srebrenica.

Holly Burkhalter, a Washington human-rights activist, has words for the
common squeamishness about mercenaries. "Watching a Rwanda genocide or 
a Srebrenica unfold without anyone's lifting a finger is what I find 
obscene -- not using paid professionals to put a stop to it." She's 

#The article mentioned in the above one, I think it's not that 

Misconduct, Corruption by U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission 
U.N., Europeans Query Push To Bring In More Officers  


#Seems irrelevant but very 'realistic' perspective - 
how to steer Albanian nationalism can lead to another war -
or can lead to civil society - 

but maybe Jim Hooper's perspective is unrealistic, 
the drive to seek 'self-determination' can be untamable - 

but either way West need to call back entire region to the 
structure of 'formality' - 

i think i'm seeing bankrupcy of western intervention 
in moral/cause and in political options 

i wish i'm totally wrong. 


Balkans on the Back Burner 
By Jackson Diehl
Monday, May 28, 2001; Page A23 

"The whole course of Albanian nationalism is now up for grabs," says 
Jim Hooper, the managing director of the Public International Law and 
Policy Group. "Depending on how the West and particularly the United 
States handle it, it can be a nationalism that buys into democracy and 
buys into regional stability, or it can turn into another destructive 
force in the region."

Relearning the Balkans 
Thursday, May 31, 2001; Page A24 

similar criticism against west's ad hoc interventions

Operation in Yugoslavia Highlights a New Alliance

Frenki's boys/Franko Simatovic...Bosnian ethnic clensing units are
now in Albania? or Kosovo? 

and I really don't understand what this article is trying to imply - 

'"They had this whole region and in one sweep it's gone," said Zanza, a 
30-year-old ethnic Albanian in a cafe below a rebel headquarters in 
Veliki Trnovac, where guerrillas scurried in and out carrying automatic
weapons and ammunition. "Nobody understands how this could happen."'

Akio Fujita

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