Thanks for what must have a tremendous amount of research. Great job Willow.
Karl
Sent from my iPad
On Jun 3, 2022, at 4:24 PM, R Bryan Waller <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
A very interesting perspective Willow.It helps answer the insanity of the
whole exercise.Bryan
Sent from my iPad
On Jun 2, 2022, at 9:00 PM, Willow Arune <walittleboots9@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Way back I high school I got in trouble editing a UN Club newsletter. I
believed - then and now - that one should understand both sides in any
dispute to make a rational judgement. Publishing the USSR view of the Congo
Civil War was not something that could be tolerated, even when the view of
the West was also published. In all events, what most of us have heard or
read about the Ukraine War is from the NATO view. The following looks at
things from the Russian viewpoint. Please note - before you get angry at
me, I do not in any way support the Russian attack. The destruction of
cities and murder of civilians is barbaric. But to say it all is caused by
an insane Putin is hardly the full story...
Davaeed Phoenix...
The most immediate issue is that Russia is invading Ukraine. But, of course,
that is not the beginning of the story. I am very sympathetic to the
Ukrainian people in this war, but I will try my best to give a balanced
perspective, though the information at my disposal is admittedly limited. I
do not expect any reader of this text to believe that Russian aggression was
justified. My aim is simply to provide pushback against the idea that Putin
is entirely deranged and divorced from reality. As a way of background, let
me highlight the following:
• When the Cold War ended a generation ago, the West expected
Russia to permanently accept matters as they were settled then. Russia
became a laughingstock, seen as a backwater only respectable for its
possession of nuclear weapons. It was called “Nigeria with Snow” or “Burkina
Faso with nuclear weapons.” What security interests and concerns it might
have were deemed to be utterly irrelevant. Nations that had been part of the
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s more coercive answer to NATO, rushed to join
the EU and/or NATO. It was a moment of weakness for Russia, and there was
nothing they could do but protest. Here, it is important to add something.
No one forced these nations to join the Western orbit. They did so both
because they believed it to be in their economic interest and because they
understandably wanted protection from the country that had coerced them into
an economic system and military alliance with scant popular support for
decades.
• That said, to someone who subscribed to a diplomatic worldview
based on the balance of power rather than national self-determination, the
end result was that the West, with its economic system, political values,
and military alliance, was expanding at Russia’s expense. It is not
necessary to agree with this worldview in order to understand why someone
who holds it might feel aggrieved at various changes in the status quo,
especially if those changes are perceived to have arisen from underhanded
tactics.
• The current line in both the EU and the US is that NATO is a
defensive alliance and that Russia needs only be concerned about it if it
intends to attack one of its neighbors without provocation. From the Russian
perspective, NATO appears rather like an instrument of American
aggrandizement whose main goal is to provide a patina of multilateralism to
American imperialism. Russia would point out the Libyan and Kosovo
interventions as acts of American imperialism camouflaged by the idea that
it was NATO rather than the US that was intervening, even though NATO would
never have become involved if the US hadn’t desired it.
• Another thing that needs to be understood is that many people
in Russia view Ukraine’s current borders as having been unfairly obtained at
their country’s expense, a case of an unwise generosity that was later
repaid with only ungratefulness. It is not in dispute that there have been
people for centuries living around the Dnieper River speaking a Slavic
language distinct from both Polish and Russian. But before the Russian
Revolution, there had never been an independent Ukrainian nation. The roots
of modern Ukrainian nationalism go back only to the 19th century. This
doesn’t mean that we need to accept the notion that Ukrainian identity is
artificial and therefore not real. After all, an analogous process gave us
modern Italian and German identities. You could even make the case that
French identity such as it exists now didn’t exit 250 years ago. Human
beings have been around a lot longer than nation states. That said, because
the nation of Ukraine as it exists is such a recent phenomenon, there is
room for reasonable people, including within Ukraine, to disagree about what
its borders should encompass. For a primer on the different regions of
Ukraine, along with their cultural and political outlooks, see here:
Understanding the Other Ukraine: Identity and Allegiance in Russophone
UkraineIn the traditionally Russophone regions of Ukraine, political
conflict arises whenever the legitimacy of Russian culture is challenged.
https://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/13/understanding-the-other-ukraine-identity-and-allegiance-in-russophone-ukraine/
• What you will note in looking at the above is that most of the
territories outside of Central Ukraine—roughly the area encompassing the
historically seemingly ill-named Left-Bank Ukraine
and Right-Bank Ukraine—were added while Ukraine was under the
control/domination of Russia. Much as I oppose wars to redraw national
boundaries, it is not hard to understand why a Russian nationalist might
feel that these territories rightfully belonged to Russia. As long as
Ukraine remained firmly within the Russian orbit, this issue of which
territories belonged in which nation-state was largely academic for Russian
nationalists. But with the arrival at the helm of Ukrainian leaders choosing
the EU and NATO over Russia, the issue of territory again became salient.
So, this is Putin’s baseline, as I understand it. And this is a good
starting point to understand the events that have unfolded since 2013.
1 In 2013, Ukraine has at its helm Viktor Yanukovych, who has at
this point been in power for 3 years and pursued a pro-Russia policy. The
country finds itself wooed by both Russia and the EU:
a Russia is proposing a customs union to draw the country into
closer economic cooperation with itself, Belarus and Kazahkstan.[1] To agree
to this would be to move firmer into the Russian camp and away from the EU.
b The EU is proposing a free-trade and political association
agreement.[2] This would commit the country to reforms that would gradually
orient its laws and economy towards the EU in exchange for economic
assistance.
2 Yanukovych rejects the EU proposal. The country is divided, but
in and around Kyiv, the pro-EU position is more popular. This leads to a
wave of protests and civil unrest starting in early December 2013. Two
months later, the protests have become more and more violent. There are
clashes with the police in which almost 100 people are killed in Kyiv over
the course of February 2014.[3] I will pause here to mention that some of
the protestors were inspired by or affiliated with Pravy Sektor, a far-right
Ukrainian nationalist party with a paramilitary wing.[4][5] Pravy Sektor is
not very popular—they have no seats in the Ukrainian parliament—but they
have been involved in fighting pro-Russian groups in the Donbas. This is the
source of Putin’s claim that he is fighting to denazify Ukraine. [Note: he
ignores the mixed loyalties of the Ukraine at the start of Operation
Barbarossa WCA]
3 Before the end of February 2014, in a procedure that violated
the provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution, the Ukrainian parliament
deposed Yanukovych.[6]
a The 1996 Constitution, to which the country had returned in
2010, was still in effect, Yanukovych having not yet signed a measure that
would have returned Ukraine to its 2004 Constitution.
b The constitution gave the parliament to right to initiate
impeachment proceedings if the president “commits treason or other crime.”
c The process was supposed to be reviewed by the Ukrainian
Constitutional Court and three quarters of the members of the parliament.
The majority that voted to depose Yanukovych was 10 votes shy of this
threshold.
4 In spite of the irregularities in these proceedings, the EU was
quick to bless the change in government, which quickly ratified its economic
cooperation agreement. Meanwhile, Putin saw the whole thing as a
Western-backed coup. He warned that all options, including the military,
were on the table.
5 It is one month after these events that Putin made his move in
Crimea, organizing a referendum that was seen as illegal and illegitimate by
the West. But although the procedure couldn’t be called free or fair, there
is little doubt that the residents of the area preferred to be attached to
Russia rather than to a pro-Western Ukraine.
6 A month after this, in April 2014, separatists backed and armed
by Russia started a war in the Donbas, a region in Eastern Ukraine home to
coal reserves and heavy industry, and the source of steel and raw materials
for the Russian military. This war has been going on since then, punctuated
by peace agreements that have been violated almost as soon as they have been
signed.
7 In November 2014, the separatist eastern regions held elections
and elected their own presidents. One month later the Ukrainian Parliament
voted to start the process to apply for NATO membership. It is taken for
granted by many in the West that this would never happen. Such an assumption
was not made in Moscow.
8 In June 2020, NATO recognizes Ukraine as an Enhanced
Opportunities Partner.[7] This step, without admitting Ukraine as a member,
nevertheless deepens military cooperation. Supposedly, “Ukraine’s status as
an Enhanced Opportunities Partner does not prejudge any decisions on NATO
membership,” but Zelensky, who is president by this time, desires just that.
And from the Russian perspective, it appears that this is where things have
been inexorably going since 2014.
9 In April 2021, Russia starts massing troops on its border with
Ukraine.[8] Zelensky publicly comes out in favor of joining NATO, which he
sees as “the only way to end the war in Donbas.”[9]
10 In September 2021, Ukraine holds joint military exercises with
NATO.[10]
11 In December 2021, Russia holds more military exercises along
the Ukrainian border. Putin proposes an agreement with NATO that would
guarantee among other things:[11]
a That Ukraine would never be granted NATO membership.
b That NATO not deploy troops in countries who joined the
alliance after May 1997.
c The establishment of a hotline between NATO and Russia to
defuse tension.
d The creation of a NATO-Russia Council, similarly to what NATO
itself had proposed before.
e The banning of the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in
locations where they could reach each adversary’s territory.
There were some genuine basis for negotiation and agreement in the above,
but some things on which NATO would not budge, which Russia knew. The manner
in which they were presented, and the subsequent tenor of the negotiations
made Western leaders wonder whether Putin was really serious about
negotiating, or whether he was seeking to use the rejections of some of his
proposals—some would say demands—as a pretext for a war that might enable
him to forcibly keep Ukraine in the Russian orbit.
We will probably not truly know for a few decaces when exactly Putin decided
to launch his invasion. But I hope I have shown, even with my necessarily
incomplete narrative, that he didn’t just wake up one day and decide that he
was going to invade Ukraine because he was mentally ill or bored or trying
to become a cartoon villain.
It is possible to believe that:
1 Ukrainians have the right to chart their own destinies and join
economic and military alliances of their choosing,
2 Western governments are selective and often hypocritical in
their adherence to the principles of self-determination,
3 The West ought to render a more realistic accounting of its
military capabilities and willingness to fight, and not mindlessly expand an
alliance system to include countries that citizens of the US, Germany,
France, and the UK are not truly willing to shed their blood for, while at
the same time recognizing that there is some logic guiding the actions of
one’s adversaries.
I believe that whatever legitimate grievances Russia may have had over the
events that have transpired since 2014, it lost any moral high-ground it
had—assuming it had any—the minute it launched an attack on a country that
had not attacked it and was not on the verge of attacking it.
It also appears that Putin badly miscalculated. Even if he emerges
victorious from this conflict with Ukraine, his country will have been
exposed as much more economically and militarily vulnerable than previously
believed. The war might leave him more territory, but he will paradoxically
be in a weaker situation than if he had never started it.
But I maintain that what animates him is not madness but a different
historical and ideological perspective.
Thank you for reading.
Footnotes
[1] Russia Squeezes Kyiv Over EU Hopes
[2] European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement - Wikipedia
[3] Ukraine's bloodiest day: dozens dead as Kiev protesters regain territory
from police
[4] Ukrainian far-right group claims to be co-ordinating violence in Kiev
[5] Right Sector - Wikipedia
[6] Was Yanukovych's Ouster Constitutional?
[7] NATO recognises Ukraine as Enhanced Opportunities Partner
[8] The Russian and Ukrainian Spring 2021 War Scare
[9] NATO membership only way to end war in Donbas: Ukraine
[10] Ukraine holds military drills with U.S. forces, NATO allies
[11] Russia’s draft agreements with NATO and the United States: Intended for
rejection?
My own note...
Although I did buy into the story that Putin started the war as the first
step in regaining the lost Romanoff/Soviet empires I now acknowledge that
this, if true, was only a minor factor in going to war, if any.
--
Willow
I learn a little every day, most of which I forget the day after...
