seal your self in a lead box in short in reality, one must balance risks with benefits for every transaction and interaction On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 11:47 PM, Jane <third@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Dear Mr. Young! > Could you condense your fairly complicated narrative into something more > manageable and practical? > > Are you suggesting, mayhaps, that we should abandon any system that may > have faults (either intended or accidental, and it's quite apparent that > any human-engineered system will at the very least have accidental faults) ? > > > On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 3:23 PM, John Young <jya@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >> Ubiquitous use of a comsec system is a vulnerability, whether >> PGP or Tor or another popular means. Crypto advocates and >> Tor encourage widespread use as a defense but may be luring >> victims into traps. The more users of a system the more likely >> it will be attacked by officials or by malefactors. And the attacks >> are most often overlooked in the volume, or excused as a price >> of popularity, fixes underway, always underway, keeping coders >> and investors happy as engineers mud-wrestling and financiers >> soused. >> >> Most trusted systems (MTS) are where the money is, as with banks, >> so that's where robbers make their living, and MTS set up budgets >> for loss, PR, lobbying, training staff in cover-ups and workarounds, >> hiring ex-regulators and distinguished industry leaders as advisors, >> board members and faces of the MTS around the planet. >> >> The lucrative boomlet in comsec generated by Snowden Inc's >> marketing gambit promoting encryption and enhanced comsec >> among media mouthpiece megaphones indicates that another >> cycle of dubity of the status quo comsec confidence game is >> to be followed by a repair and rejigger protection racket, >> as evidenced on these mail lists, at conferences, and no doubt >> in halls of semi-classified exchanges everready to share tips >> and tricks to ratchet up demand for security in all its devilish >> manifestations. >> >> Was it not mere months ago when a call was issued to redesign >> and or replace the entire Internet from top to bottom, the whole >> thing, to end the futile comsec tinkering and delusionary marketing, >> no way the Frankenstein could be made secure for human use, >> it had fundamental faults which precluded durable comsec. >> >> Perhaps re-Frankensteining is being done in semi-classified >> halls, hindered by by official and commercial and scholarly >> exploiters of the monster's faults to advance their interests >> in advocating MTS for public use, just keep those research >> and investment funds flowing. >> >> No risk, no security market, so what fool would want an Internet that >> had no faults. No bank would want perfect security to be available >> directly to customers. No military or spy agency would want perfect >> national security available to the citizenry. No government would >> want a threat-free populace. No comsec industry would want ... >> >> Best to aim for pretty good comsec and call it best that can >> be done but cheating happens, thank you Edward Snowden, >> so prepare for disaster "not if, not when, but now." Intel >> committees wokring hand in hand with Snowden Inc. to keep >> the public panicky and needful of secrecy protection of >> the holy grail, national security backed by WMD. >> >> In short, Tor is a confidence game, crypto is a confidence game, >> no better than military, espionage, publicity, entertainment, finance, >> law, insurance, education and religion. Oops those are the primary >> routes to wealth and power concentration and need for WMD >> protection. >> >> What, you say WMD is a confidence game? Getoutahere, that's >> top secret codeword core faith in secretkeeping. Without that >> fundamental Frankensteinian fault nobody would buy security >> against the Doctors of monsters working hard at most secret >> laboratories on earth to devise crypto for assuring WMD comms >> and launch threats are pretty good at persuading the public to >> pay the steep protection fee -- which it should be noted is >> laundered through IRS and NGOs, blessed by FRS and SEC. >> >> Damn 3 lettered agencies of God. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> cryptography mailing list >> cryptography@xxxxxxxxxxxxx >> http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography >> > > > _______________________________________________ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > >