Coming a little late to the game here... but, wouldn't the products
on this page (note: I'm not associated with this site or endorsing
their products - it turned up as a result in a quick search via
Google for TEMPEST) eliminate a good deal of this attack vector?
http://www.advprograms.com/accessories.htm
Reduce or eliminate the emissions from the systems and you've negated
a good portion of the risk.
What's troubling from the Wired article is this - "Generally the most
common method for infecting air-gapped machines is a USB flash drive
or other removable media." Anyone who's ever done the least little
thing with regards to ITSEC would know that once you lose physical
control over a system, you're compromised. In an environment that
requires an air-gap level of security and scrutiny, to allow
removable media (especially USB drives) unfettered borderlines on the
infinitely stupid.
--- A
On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 9:05 AM, Shaun O'Connor
<capricorn8159@xxxxxxxxx <mailto:capricorn8159@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
If people are using air-gapped computers in the mistaken belief
that the system is secure. this article should send a shiver up
their collective spines.
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/airhopper-hack/
--
*_PRIVACY IS A BASIC RIGHT - NOT A CONCESSION _*
