[cryptome] Re: Security and the Rise of Snakeoil

  • From: In Harms Way <11414150173@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 23:41:09 +0300

Security and the Rise of Snakeoil
Published: 04 June 2014


The original of this essay was written by stf
<https://www.ctrlc.hu/%7Estef/blog/posts/szekuriti.html> in Hungarian. I
decided to go ahead and translate it into English because I liked it.

There are more and more people who are starting to realise what sort of
trap they ended up in by using the internet. While they desperately want
to do something about it, they might not have the knowledge or resources
to actually make the first step, like leaving Facebook or Gmail behind.
Yet, people desperately want to do something, even if that means the
online equivalent of not carrying mineral water onto airplanes. Every
week we see a new NSA-proof, military grade encrypted, web-based chat
application, or people with nice CVs who finally figured out how to do
secure email in the browser. Self-acclaimed experts teach their peers at
cryptoparties how to defend themselves against adversaries from the last
decade. This article is for the latter. This game might get dangerous,
and should be handled with care.

 1. security is a conscious, multi-layered, economic process
 2. certain adversaries are more motivated, and control more resources
    than others
 3. defenders can only lose. they have to be prepared, and minimise the
    value and surface of an attack
 4. know your adversaries, the resources at their disposal, and act
    accordingly
 5. there are environmental/side-channel/indirect attacks
 6. there are non-technical aspects
 7. many mitigation techniques are overly expensive and inconvenient


The more you know your device, the more you are in control over it. You
should notice when it misbehaves or acts without your intent. As a
corollary, when you know nothing about your device, you're naked and
exposed. Therefore, mitigation measures need to form a conscious
structure, and have to be continuously re-evaluated.

Security is an economic process, and thus the mass majority of the
non-targeted attacks can be mitigated when the you raise your cost of
defence marginally above the average of the potential victims. In
non-targetted attacks, the attacker still plays by the rules of
economics: minimise costs, and maximise profit. As of 2014, the most
economically viable targets are Windows and Adobe users, while estimates
suggest that OS X users will make a juicy cut once OS X market share
hits ~20% [citation needed]. As a consequence, diversity is an effective
mitigation, as a custom -- competent and expensive -- system will
require a custom -- and expensive -- attack. Lastly, it makes little
sense to overspend on security. A classic example is spending $150 on a
lock for a $50 bike.

A good way to raise the cost of an attack is defence-in-depth: when plan
A falls, plan B will still cause a headache for the attacker (and so it
goes). Interestingly, security-by-obscurity in this case can
significantly raise the costs, but only when supported by conscious,
in-depth countermeasures.

Since this is an economic system, the defender can only fail when met
with a resourceful enough adversary. In other words, all defence will
fail in face of a motivated and rich attacker.

While an attacker can measure his effectiveness easily, a defender can
only not fail at best. Even without an obvious failure, she can't be
certain that there hadn't been a breach that went unnoticed. Sony is a
good example of how amateur defenders can only fail against
professionals. Minimising the amount of data we store for longer periods
(e.g. half a year or more) will reduce the value of an attack, while,
say, consciously controlling an online presence will reduce the attack
surface on our persona.

These are general best practices, and we need to know our adversary: who
they are, what they are capable of, what sort of resources they have at
disposal. A simplified model of adversaries might be the following:
citizen, criminal, corporation, country.

A citizen is of course any average user. A criminal would be any
organised and less organised actor. A corporation can be Google or
Facebook, but it could be just the company you work for if your internet
traffic is monitored, so this is probably the broadest category of all.
Last, but not least, we have countries, or rather, nation-states, in
which case the adversary is probably a foreign intelligence agency,
although certain politicians in opposition, political activists,
journalists, or whistleblowers might warrant the attention of a domestic
adversary.

We also have to mention environmental or indirect attacks. An adversary
might not solely attack the target, but can use (or rather, abuse) the
surrounding environment, too. The defender has to think about her
communication partners, if any of them may have an adversary model that
is different from, or higher level than hers. The social network of a
target (Facebook image tagging) contributes to the attack surface as
well as any other environmental factor, since a well-motivated attacker
will try to find and exploit the weakest link to the target. When that
cheapest path is through a less-prepared peer, that just makes things a
whole lot quicker and an economic adversary more effective.

(Un)fortunately the attacks and mitigation techniques can be
non-technical, and may have other aspects, such as economical,
educational, social, or judicial. Many in position to change things are
motivated not to. For example, the net neutrality and data protection
acts are likely to become sabotaged in the European Council. It seems
like there won't be any outcome from the surveillance scandal. The act
about data retention was invalidated by the European High Court, but
European member-states are yet to act. However, there are other judicial
aspects -- citizens have to act within the boundaries of the law, while
this does not apply to every actor. Some of these actors will try and
undermine new legislation, or broaden their authority through existing
legal structures. A few ideas that could improve the current situation:

 1. general immunity for hackers who publicly expose security holes
 2. motivating the attacks of own infrastructures rather than pursuing it
 3. education about security, attacks, and vulnerabilities
 4. non-free software vendors' liability for handling vulnerabilities
    should be enforced
 5. deterrent financial liability for misuse of personal information
 6. public disclosure of, and diligent post-mortem analysis for every
    incident
 7. new legislation for data protection, net neutrality. end data
    exchange and data collection treaties and legislation
 8. free up the frequency bands that become unused after the digital
    dividend for unlicensed use


Defence is difficult: many mitigation techniques are ceremonial and
complicated even for the trained defender, and so she'll perform it
rarely, or eventually stop the practice altogether. In many respects,
these ceremonies are like brushing teeth: we're not doing it because we
enjoy it so much, but rather because of the belief in a future reward
such as not having to go to the dentist's, or improving our chances for
reproduction. A principled approach and attention to detail are
essential, just like with any implementation, see "goto fail", or
"heartbleed". Correct code is usually not trivial, and the correct use
of tools is often hard due to external constraints.

Naturally, the it would be best if this whole process could be
simplified, but it is also the goal of the adversary to make it as hard
as possible.

A'tuin is the turtle in Terry Pratchett's Discworld, on whose back 4
elephants hold the discworld on their backs. And what is below A'tuin,
you ask? It's turtles all the way down. A'tuin is the perfect symbol for
the endless layers of attack surfaces, that you discover if just start
scratching: A'tuin -> organisational -> physical -> psychological ->
browser -> OS -> HW -> network -> network OS -> network HW -> TEMPEST
emissions -> other side-channels -> A'tuin.

We also need to stop and talk about browsers for a minute, because
people tend to create and spread all sorts of snakeoil based on the
them. The reasons for using the browser as a distribution medium is none
other than to externalise the costs of having to support installation on
multiple systems, while introducing a huge attack surface. The age when
a browser's primary goal was actually browsing websites are long gone.
Browsers of today are for pushing ads into people's faces, and make them
pay for various services. A good example for this is Mozilla, who wanted
to push ads into the start screen of Firefox, and all they managed to
get done since the Snowden revelations is making tabs shinier and
putting DRM into the browser. There are 6 easy rules to identify 99% of
snakeoil:

 1. not free software
 2. runs in a browser
 3. runs on a smartphone
 4. the user doesn't generate, or exclusively own the private encryption
    keys
 5. there is no threat model
 6. uses terminology like "cyber", "military-grade", or other marketing
    mantra


As a conclusion, some food for thought, in the form of 3 questions:

 1. how often do you update your systems?
 2. how strong are your email passwords? do you reuse them for other
    pages, too?
 3. how many of your peers use GMail, Facebook, Skype, and do you keep
    in touch with them through these?


To try estimating the footprint you leave online, check out and think
about your results on MyShadow <https://myshadow.org>. And then welcome
to the ride on A'tuin. ;)

You may tell "but you're so wrong" by sending an email to me at rhapsodhy.hu
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
3.0 Unported License <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>

-- 
We have nothing to hide, but something to protect: 
LIBERTY, PRIVACY & FREEDOM
- and the people, whose human rights these are.

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