I thought it might be too good to be true...Tx for the info...:-).
On 09/03/2016 20:56, Michael Best wrote:
Good job digging that up, and it does seem to support what you said before. I think you're referring to *As concluded in : “it is effectively impossible to sanitize storage locations by simply overwriting them, no matter how many overwrite passes are made or what data patterns are written.”*
Which is a quote from P. Gutmann, “Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory,” Proceedings of the Sixth USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 22-25, 1996. It's available at http://www.softpres.org/cache/SecureDeletionOfDataFromMagneticAndSolidStateMemory.pdf
The full quote from that paper is:
Data which is overwritten an arbitrarily large number of times can still be recovered ***provided that the new data isn't written to the same location as the original data (for magnetic media), or that the recovery attempt is carried out fairly soon after the new data was written (for RAM). For this reason*** it is effectively impossible to sanitise storage locations by simple overwriting them, no matter how many overwrite passes are made or what data patterns are written.
Emphasis added. Most modern tools account for this, and Mac even has built in tools to overwrite the unused portion of disk seven times to securely erase them and includes an option in the trash bin to securely erase by overwriting those parts of the disk. A lot's changed from 1996.
On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 3:03 PM, douglas rankine <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
see url: https://cryptome.org/2014/05/sse-protocol.pdf
Dear Michael Best & Colleagues,
Some time ago, I mentioned a paper that I had read which said that
a hard disk could not have all the information erased and that
with the proper forensic software, it would be possible to strip
back each layer of magnetic information right to when the disk was
first made. I think I may have found that research paper, and its
contents might just be poignant to the current case USG v
Apple...or it might not... :-). My understanding is that the
storage hardware on the device will most likely be of the solid
state type, which is not as secure in being wiped, as a moving
hard disk. I have found that paper which I give the url above. The relevant paragraph is on Page 1 at A.
Now, please understand, I am not a techie...and I may be getting
the conclusions about the ability to access original information
on a hard disk all wrong.
Or, I might be right, but Apple has progressed in its software
technical ability to destroy all the information on the phones
storage system. But, if I am not, then the present case between
USG v Apple to get Apple to produce a hack which will give access
to the information on Farooks iphone may be irrelevant. This is
because of my surmise that the Apple erasure software may not
erase the information on the storage medium on the phone to a
point where it cannot be regained, at all. If my surmise is
correct, then there is no need for the FBI to bother about
cracking the password within 10 times...They can make as many
attempts as they like...eventually, they will crack the password
and then get access to the information.
That is my theory...but as I say, I don't really know the ins and
outs of the technical stuff, or how all this forensic software
works, or even how sensitive it is to picking up on those magnetic
layers of digitised information. And there is a lot of techie
stuff and mathematics here which I don't understand, far less the
molecular and nano stuff.
My surmise was triggered by the report of GCHQ actually making the
Gaurdian physically destroy not only the hard disk, but the
motherboard and other hardware components in the computer which
contained the Snowden documents...to their satisfaction. I
wondered why they did this, rather than use forensic erasure
equipment to wipe it, or even just take away the relevant bits of
the computers and securely dispose of them...Perhaps it was a
publicity stunt after all...
Anyway, perhaps you guys on here can take a look at it and I'd be
grateful if you would tell me where I have gone wrong...Maybe it
is just some group out to make some money...
I hope this helps.
Veritas aequitas liberabit vos
Veri universum vici
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