My understanding of this from reading the events of the time when it came to Shah of Iran II was that around this time with Mossadeq getting thrown out, the Shah had asked for help or advice from both the British and the Americans and they apparently said that they wanted the Shah to stay in power and so the Sevak were introduced to keep the Shah in power. As, the Shah became more and more insecure then he used the Sevak to crack down more and more. One thing to note about the area of the world was that before Shah I Ahmad Shah Qajar (a young guy who had deposed his apparently deposed his father) was deposed by a British bloodless Coup. Previous to that the support was Russian support to the weak Iranian/Persian rule in the country. They asked from British empire support as it was the power of the day. Reza Shah was installed in 1925 and booted in 1941 and his son was installed in his place. There was an interesting corrolation between the change of Turkey under Kamil Attaturk and that of the country we know of today as Iran under Shah I was they were both doing there own bit of modernising of the country, removing the religious system and the feudal land structure as well as tribal system and placing a more western style of government. This l believe as far as Iran was concerned was the background eventually that led to the down fall of Shah II. Also a factor was was the oil and gas redistribution to the lower levels of society who felt they were not getting their fair share. They also felt very disenfranchised with the redistribution of land and the rapid westernisation of their country. When one considers these underlying issues is it hardly suprising why the Iranians dont trust either the British or the Americans? Jeremy Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 19:55:23 -0700 From: nl1816a@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [cryptome] Re: Fw: "The Battle for Iran," 1953: Re-Release of CIA Internal History Spotlights New Details about anti-Mosaddeq Coup To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://www.alternet.org/print/books/why-you-should-care-government-can-know-everything-about-youWhen the NSA tested Thin Thread, the program immediately identified targets for investigation and encrypted the identities of US callers."And then you know what happened?" Drake asked during the meeting at GAP."What?""They shut it down."There was silence in the room."But why?" asked NGO lawyer X.The three NSA whistleblowers looked at one another. Finally, Drake cocked his head, and a pained expression crossed his face. "Too many careers and contracts were tied to a different program."Given the fact that 9/11 happened less than one year after the NSA shut down Thin Thread, there was nothing more to say. For his part, Binney was extremely disturbed about the NSA's failure to deploy the program. Thin Thread was ready to go months before 9/11, and he planned to apply it in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where it would be most effective: he was (and is) convinced that if the NSA had put Thin Thread online when it was ready, 9/11 would not have happened.Documents Edward Snowden began to disclose in June 2013 tell the whole sorry saga of the NSA and its corporate partners in the years after 9/11. Both what they have and have not done. rethink911.orgpilots for 911 truth On Friday, June 27, 2014 6:44 PM, John Young <jya@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: Footnote to the CIA Battle for Iran re-release. In 2000 NY Times published a longer account of the Mossedeq overthow which was amply redacted, but redacted by a means which could be easily reversed, which we discovered by accident. We removed the redactions and published the report despite NY Times' plea to not do it (we informed the paper beforehand). http://cryptome.org/cia-iran.htm Later the Times redid the redactions by a more secure means and that is the version still offered by the paper. National Security Archive has brief mention of this event but does not name Cryptome, merely says it was done by the "Web," nor point to our version, instead points to the NY Times'. So like the Snowden releases, the USG still considers Ed's disclosures classified and they may not be cited in official documents. Though officials read them avidly to complain about harm to the nation. Kind of like Doug's report on BBC monitoring: layers of access for the privileged, the least access by those who pay for the official secrecy done to protect the foolish but not protect from officials and their craven cohorts. At 06:18 PM 6/27/2014, you wrote: Hi Neal, Tx for the information. ATB Dougie. On 27/06/14 20:21, Neal Lamb wrote: On Friday, June 27, 2014 2:06 PM, National Security Archive <archive@xxxxxxx> wrote: "The Battle for Iran," 1953: Re-Release of CIA Internal History Spotlights New Details about anti-Mosaddeq Coup U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson and Some CIA Officials Initially Disagreed with Certain Premises of Coup Planners Declassified History Implies British Ties to the Operation, Criticizes London's Policies in Period Leading up to the Overthrow National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 476 Posted on June 27, 2014 Edited by Malcolm Byrne For more information contact: 202 / 994-7043 or nsarchiv@xxxxxxx Washington, D.C., June 27, 2014 -- During early planning for the 1953 Iran coup, U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson warned not only that the Shah would not support the United States' chosen replacement for Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq but that the Army would not play its hoped-for leading role without the Shah's active cooperation, according to a newly released version of an internal CIA history of the operation posted today by the National Security Archive. The Archive, based at The George Washington University, obtained the latest release of this history -- "The Battle for Iran," written in the mid-1970s -- in response to a Mandatory Declassification Review request. (Today's posting includes all previously released versions of the document as well, for purposes of comparison.) The document goes on to say that members of the CIA's station in Tehran and certain officials at agency headquarters sided with Henderson against some of the assumptions of American coup planners, who were working under "closely held" conditions in Washington during Spring and Summer 1953. Mainly through interviews with coup participants, scholars have known generally that disagreements existed (and eventually Henderson went along with Mosaddeq's overthrow), but freshly declassified portions of the document posted today provide a few more specifics about the nature of the differences and who held to which views. The history also offers the most explicit declassified references to-date to British participation in the operation. London's role -- undoubtedly the worst-kept secret in Britain's relationship with Iran over the past 60 years -- has never been formally acknowledged by either British or U.S. authorities. "The Battle for Iran" is one of three agency histories of the coup that are known to exist. All three have been posted at various times on the National Security Archive's Web site. Check out today's posting at the National Security Archive's website - http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB476/ Find us on Facebook - http://www.facebook.com/NSArchive Unredacted, the Archive blog - http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/ ________________________________________________________ THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE is an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication royalties and donations from foundations and individuals. _________________________________________________________ PRIVACY NOTICE The National Security Archive does not and will never share the names or e-mail addresses of its subscribers with any other organization. Once a year, we will write you and ask for your financial support. We may also ask you for your ideas for Freedom of Information requests, documentation projects, or other issues that the Archive should take on. We would welcome your input, and any information you care to share with us about your special interests. But we do not sell or rent any information about subscribers to any other party.