Bamford writes: "Intelligence agencies have long treated perceived threats
in their own ranks in a manner befitting a Kafka story. Now, in the era of
Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, they are ramping up this treatment to
root out whistleblowers."
National Security Agency building. (photo: AP)
To Stop Whistleblowing, US Intelligence Instructing Staff to Spy on
Colleagues
By James Bamford, Foreign Policy
30 March 16
To prevent whistleblowing, U.S. intelligence agencies are instructing staff
to spy on their colleagues.
E lham Khorasani was sitting in her car at a stoplight in Northern Virginia
when she got the call. It was April 16, 2013. "I'm with the FBI," a man on
the line said, "and we're at your home executing a search warrant."
Khorasani was flummoxed. (A pseudonym is being used to protect her privacy.)
The Iran native, a U.S. citizen since the 1990s, had worked as a Farsi and
Dari language analyst at the National Security Agency (NSA) going on eight
years. She had recently been selected for a second tour at Menwith Hill
station, the NSA's mammoth listening post in northern England. Minutes
before the FBI called, she'd left a meeting at the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI).
"When he said, 'FBI,' my mind was going all over the place," Khorasani says,
adding that the most illegal thing she has ever done is get an occasional
parking ticket. Yet the agent gave her no information, only instructing her
to return to her apartment immediately.
Khorasani describes her life after that day as a nightmare. "They suspended
my clearances without giving me any reason," she remembers. She wasn't
allowed at work, and for two years, the NSA made her "call every day like a
criminal, checking in every morning before 8." Khorasani went to the agency
only for interrogations, she says: eight or nine sessions that ran at least
five hours each. She was asked about her family, her travel, and her
contacts.
She claims that the interrogator was particularly interested in grilling her
about Thomas Drake, a former NSA official indicted in 2010 on espionage
charges for leaking details about agency waste and abuse to the Baltimore
Sun. (I was a member of the defense team on the case, which a judge threw
out.) In 2011, Khorasani had met with Drake-whom she contacted via a
Facebook account set up specifically for that purpose-to seek his advice on
handling what she felt had been poor treatment by the agency while on an
overseas posting; she believed that she had been unduly reassigned and had
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint. "He said, 'You've got
the bull's-eyes on you. You're done,'" Khorasani recalls. (In an interview,
Drake confirmed their conversation.)
That meeting, Khorasani now thinks, may be what ultimately finished her
career. Because of her job complaint-she recalls pointedly telling one EEO
official, "You wonder why you have so many whistleblowers," to which he
replied, "Don't say that word"-and her secret contact with Drake, she
guesses the NSA feared she too would start leaking agency information.
Whether her hunch is correct isn't clear. (The FBI declined to comment; the
NSA stated in an email that all "access determinations" are based on
evidence but that federal law restricts the agency's ability to comment
publicly on personnel matters.) Yet Khorasani's story contains echoes of
other experiences. Intelligence agencies have long treated perceived threats
in their own ranks in a manner befitting a Kafka story. Now, in the era of
Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, they are ramping up this treatment to
root out whistleblowers. In doing so, the government is blurring the line
between espionage and truth-telling in the public interest-and showing how
security hysteria may prove as dangerous to America as security slumber.
The NSA has its own version of the scarlet letter. For decades, people under
suspicion of misconduct have been given a red badge to wear instead of a
blue card that usually grants them access to secure facilities.
"Red-badgers," as they're known, live in purgatory and aren't told why.
They're assigned to the motor pool, the gardening department, or some other
mundane venue, under the watchful eye of the very people scrutinizing their
lives-questioning them and searching their offices and homes. I once met a
red-badger working at the NSA's museum; he said he'd been waiting more than
a year for his "security problems" to resolve.
Based on interviews with current and former NSA officials, that probably
never happened: Most red-badgers are ultimately dismissed, often without
explanation, and are warned never to discuss the probe they endured.
What happened to Khorasani wasn't precisely red-badging, which may signal
that it was prompted by a new government inquisition. After the WikiLeaks
scandal, the White House issued an executive order directing agencies to
protect classified information by cracking down on what the ODNI has called
"malicious insiders," a catchall designation that encompasses
whistleblowers. According to an ODNI slide presentation, the insider threat
program covers more than 70 government entities, ranging from the NSA to the
Peace Corps. Overseeing implementation is a task force led by the attorney
general and the director of national intelligence (DNI).
Among the techniques used to track whistleblowers are employing "trained
insider threat professionals," which may mean spies planted among staff, and
requiring personnel to report colleagues' suspicious behavior. According to
a 2013 McClatchy investigation, the program's terms can be downright
Orwellian. The Department of Education, for instance, warns employees to
keep an eye on co-workers going through particular life experiences-"stress,
divorce, financial problems"-because they might turn into "insider
threat[s]."
The program continues to grow. In 2014, DNI James Clapper told Congress of
plans to monitor 24/7 the electronic activity-"behavior on the job as well
as off"-of employees with security clearances, a system known as continuous
evaluation. In April 2015, the Defense Department reported that it was
"directing multiple pilots and concept demonstrations . to conduct
[continuous evaluation] on approximately 100,000 military, civilian and
contractor personnel." Then, in October, it opened its Insider Threat
Management Analysis Center to collect and coordinate potentially "adverse"
information about Defense Department workers.
It's difficult to know how many people the insider threat program has
ensnared, because its overseers aren't saying. Yet critics are already
clamoring about overreach. In January, 22 organizations signed a letter
arguing that the government is using an overly broad definition of "threat"
that "fails to distinguish between those who want to fix problems from those
who wish to do harm to our national security." The Government Accountability
Project has asked pointedly, "Threats to whom?"
Perversely, the program may actually be a threat to intelligence agencies.
On top of stifling whistleblowers, the hunt for "malicious insiders" could
jettison gifted analysts, create insidious distrust among colleagues, and
even discourage prospective talent from taking jobs.
Khorasani knows this all too well. She has had trouble finding employment
since last April, when the NSA forced her to resign. The reasons that
happened "cannot be made available . without damaging the national security
interests of the United States," according to an internal memo signed by NSA
Deputy Director Richard H. Ledgett that Khorasani obtained. She keeps
documents related to her investigation in a box at her apartment.
She never leaves the papers at home for long, however. "If I go somewhere
[on a trip], I have to take that box all the way to Virginia, leave it with
a friend," Khorasani says. "I cannot travel with peace of mind, knowing that
no one is going to walk in here when I'm gone."
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National Security Agency building. (photo: AP)
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/11/watch-thy-neighbor-nsa-security-spying-s
urveillance/http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/11/watch-thy-neighbor-nsa-secur
ity-spying-surveillance/
To Stop Whistleblowing, US Intelligence Instructing Staff to Spy on
Colleagues
By James Bamford, Foreign Policy
30 March 16
To prevent whistleblowing, U.S. intelligence agencies are instructing staff
to spy on their colleagues.
lham Khorasani was sitting in her car at a stoplight in Northern Virginia
when she got the call. It was April 16, 2013. "I'm with the FBI," a man on
the line said, "and we're at your home executing a search warrant."
Khorasani was flummoxed. (A pseudonym is being used to protect her privacy.)
The Iran native, a U.S. citizen since the 1990s, had worked as a Farsi and
Dari language analyst at the National Security Agency (NSA) going on eight
years. She had recently been selected for a second tour at Menwith Hill
station, the NSA's mammoth listening post in northern England. Minutes
before the FBI called, she'd left a meeting at the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI).
"When he said, 'FBI,' my mind was going all over the place," Khorasani says,
adding that the most illegal thing she has ever done is get an occasional
parking ticket. Yet the agent gave her no information, only instructing her
to return to her apartment immediately.
Khorasani describes her life after that day as a nightmare. "They suspended
my clearances without giving me any reason," she remembers. She wasn't
allowed at work, and for two years, the NSA made her "call every day like a
criminal, checking in every morning before 8." Khorasani went to the agency
only for interrogations, she says: eight or nine sessions that ran at least
five hours each. She was asked about her family, her travel, and her
contacts.
She claims that the interrogator was particularly interested in grilling her
about Thomas Drake, a former NSA official indicted in 2010 on espionage
charges for leaking details about agency waste and abuse to the Baltimore
Sun. (I was a member of the defense team on the case, which a judge threw
out.) In 2011, Khorasani had met with Drake-whom she contacted via a
Facebook account set up specifically for that purpose-to seek his advice on
handling what she felt had been poor treatment by the agency while on an
overseas posting; she believed that she had been unduly reassigned and had
filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint. "He said, 'You've got
the bull's-eyes on you. You're done,'" Khorasani recalls. (In an interview,
Drake confirmed their conversation.)
That meeting, Khorasani now thinks, may be what ultimately finished her
career. Because of her job complaint-she recalls pointedly telling one EEO
official, "You wonder why you have so many whistleblowers," to which he
replied, "Don't say that word"-and her secret contact with Drake, she
guesses the NSA feared she too would start leaking agency information.
Whether her hunch is correct isn't clear. (The FBI declined to comment; the
NSA stated in an email that all "access determinations" are based on
evidence but that federal law restricts the agency's ability to comment
publicly on personnel matters.) Yet Khorasani's story contains echoes of
other experiences. Intelligence agencies have long treated perceived threats
in their own ranks in a manner befitting a Kafka story. Now, in the era of
Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, they are ramping up this treatment to
root out whistleblowers. In doing so, the government is blurring the line
between espionage and truth-telling in the public interest-and showing how
security hysteria may prove as dangerous to America as security slumber.
The NSA has its own version of the scarlet letter. For decades, people under
suspicion of misconduct have been given a red badge to wear instead of a
blue card that usually grants them access to secure facilities.
"Red-badgers," as they're known, live in purgatory and aren't told why.
They're assigned to the motor pool, the gardening department, or some other
mundane venue, under the watchful eye of the very people scrutinizing their
lives-questioning them and searching their offices and homes. I once met a
red-badger working at the NSA's museum; he said he'd been waiting more than
a year for his "security problems" to resolve.
Based on interviews with current and former NSA officials, that probably
never happened: Most red-badgers are ultimately dismissed, often without
explanation, and are warned never to discuss the probe they endured.
What happened to Khorasani wasn't precisely red-badging, which may signal
that it was prompted by a new government inquisition. After the WikiLeaks
scandal, the White House issued an executive order directing agencies to
protect classified information by cracking down on what the ODNI has called
"malicious insiders," a catchall designation that encompasses
whistleblowers. According to an ODNI slide presentation, the insider threat
program covers more than 70 government entities, ranging from the NSA to the
Peace Corps. Overseeing implementation is a task force led by the attorney
general and the director of national intelligence (DNI).
Among the techniques used to track whistleblowers are employing "trained
insider threat professionals," which may mean spies planted among staff, and
requiring personnel to report colleagues' suspicious behavior. According to
a 2013 McClatchy investigation, the program's terms can be downright
Orwellian. The Department of Education, for instance, warns employees to
keep an eye on co-workers going through particular life experiences-"stress,
divorce, financial problems"-because they might turn into "insider
threat[s]."
The program continues to grow. In 2014, DNI James Clapper told Congress of
plans to monitor 24/7 the electronic activity-"behavior on the job as well
as off"-of employees with security clearances, a system known as continuous
evaluation. In April 2015, the Defense Department reported that it was
"directing multiple pilots and concept demonstrations . to conduct
[continuous evaluation] on approximately 100,000 military, civilian and
contractor personnel." Then, in October, it opened its Insider Threat
Management Analysis Center to collect and coordinate potentially "adverse"
information about Defense Department workers.
It's difficult to know how many people the insider threat program has
ensnared, because its overseers aren't saying. Yet critics are already
clamoring about overreach. In January, 22 organizations signed a letter
arguing that the government is using an overly broad definition of "threat"
that "fails to distinguish between those who want to fix problems from those
who wish to do harm to our national security." The Government Accountability
Project has asked pointedly, "Threats to whom?"
Perversely, the program may actually be a threat to intelligence agencies.
On top of stifling whistleblowers, the hunt for "malicious insiders" could
jettison gifted analysts, create insidious distrust among colleagues, and
even discourage prospective talent from taking jobs.
Khorasani knows this all too well. She has had trouble finding employment
since last April, when the NSA forced her to resign. The reasons that
happened "cannot be made available . without damaging the national security
interests of the United States," according to an internal memo signed by NSA
Deputy Director Richard H. Ledgett that Khorasani obtained. She keeps
documents related to her investigation in a box at her apartment.
She never leaves the papers at home for long, however. "If I go somewhere
[on a trip], I have to take that box all the way to Virginia, leave it with
a friend," Khorasani says. "I cannot travel with peace of mind, knowing that
no one is going to walk in here when I'm gone."
http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize
http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize
