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Vol. 81/No. 42 November 13, 2017
Rail bosses, gov’t responsible in 2013 Lac-Mégantic disaster
BY MICHEL PRAIRIE
AND JOHN STEELE
MONTREAL — The government’s frame-up trial against rail workers Tom
Harding and Richard Labrie, seeking to hold them responsible for the
2013 Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway train derailment that killed
47 people in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, is running into some trouble. Under
cross-examination, witnesses have admitted the rail bosses ordered
Harding and other engineers to stop using simple practices that would
have prevented the derailment.
Harding, the engineer on the train, is the main target in the government
frame-up. The government and rail bosses accuse him of not setting a
sufficient number of hand brakes on the parked train, which allowed it
to roll into Lac-Mégantic and explode.
Michael Horan, former Montreal, Maine and Atlantic’s assistant director
of transportation, admitted on the stand that he received a 2012 email
from railroad management directing him to tell Harding to stop using the
train’s automatic braking system to secure the train at the Nantes
stopover near Lac-Mégantic.
These brakes, activated by a hand switch inside the locomotive, are a
backup system that uses air pressure to lock the wheels on the entire
train.
In March 2016, the Toronto Globe and Mail published an exposé on the
disaster, reporting that the use of the automatic brakes would have held
Harding’s 72-tanker train from rolling down into Lac-Mégantic while
Harding slept in a hotel there.
Forbidden by management from setting the automatic brake system, Harding
left the engine running to keep the locomotive brakes on and prevent
movement of the train. He was the only person on the crew and had
reached his 12-hour limit of service for the day. He had to get some
sleep before starting up again in the morning.
But during the night a small fire broke out on the engine, and volunteer
firefighters unfamiliar with the train turned off the engine when they
put the fire out. It was later determined the fire was caused by
Montreal, Maine and Atlantic officials’ decision to cut back on
maintenance to cut costs.
The railroad called Harding to tell him about the fire and he offered to
go back to the train, but was told to get his sleep, that everything was
under control.
Without power, the locomotive air brakes bled out and the hand brakes
Harding set on seven tanker cars couldn’t hold the train.
The Globe and Mail explained that the company policy of forbidding
engineers from engaging the automatic back-up air brakes was designed to
save time and therefore money at the morning start up, since it could
have taken up to an hour to re-pressurize the system.
Profits over rail safety
The reason there was only one crew member on the train was a special
dispensation to Montreal, Maine and Atlantic by Transport Canada, the
federal government rail oversight agency. Horan told the court that in
2003, in order to cut costs, the rail bosses asked Transport Canada for
approval to reduce crew size to one.
Horan, who was in charge of safety and training for all Quebec MMA
employees, said the agency approved the request in 2009. The only safety
precaution imposed by the government to make up for slashing the crew
size was the company had to install a side-view mirror on the locomotive
engineer’s side of the train.
He told the court that no significant changes were made to the company’s
rules and practices when they reduced the size of the crews.
In response to questions from Thomas Walsh, one of Harding’s attorneys,
Horan admitted workers didn’t like the crew reduction.
In their coverage of the trial, some of the media pointed to the bosses’
imposition of the one-person “crew” as an important factor in the
disaster. It could “weigh heavily in the trial,” the Quebec City daily
Le Soleil wrote in an editorial on the eve of the trial. The paper’s
editors have called the trial an “injustice.”
Locomotive engineer Francois Daigle, one of three along with Harding who
regularly ran the Nantes route, was another prosecution witness. He
revealed a new example of Montreal, Maine and Atlantic negligence,
testifying that the train that Harding took that night was in fact
nearly 3,000 tons over its allowed weight limit. Daigle said rail bosses
wouldn’t allow him to refuse to run a train he knew was over the maximum
weight and it was common practice for the company’s top management to
play loose with established railway regulations.
Harding and Labrie, both members of United Steelworkers Local 1976,
could potentially face life in prison if convicted. The trial, which
began Oct. 2, is expected to last into December. Jean Demaitre, a former
low-level official of the now bankrupt and dissolved railroad, faces the
same charges.
Messages in support of Harding and Labrie should be sent to USW Local
1976 / Section locale 1976, 2360 De Lasalle, Suite 202, Montreal, QC
Canada H1V 2L1. Copies should be sent to Thomas Walsh, 165 Rue
Wellington N., Suite 310, Sherbrooke, QC Canada J1H 5B9. E-mail:
thomaspwalsh@xxxxxxxxxxx.
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