Opinion
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Mismanaging the Conflict in Jerusalem
By NATHAN THRALL
October 18, 2015
JERUSALEM - THE streets of Jewish West Jerusalem are eerie and still.
Silence hangs over the city, punctured occasionally by a siren's wail. Buses
are half empty, as is the light rail that runs alongside the walls of the
Old City.
Heavily armed security forces, joined by army reinforcements, patrol
checkpoints, bus stops and deserted sidewalks. Young men in plain clothes
carry assault rifles. The evening news broadcasts images of stabbings and
shootings. Among the few shops doing good business are those selling weapons
and pepper spray.
In the city's occupied East, residents are frightened, too. Massive cement
cubes block exits from their neighborhoods. Lengthy lines at new checkpoints
keep many from their jobs. Men under 40 who were barred from Al Aqsa Mosque
on Friday prayed instead behind police barricades in the surrounding
decrepit streets.
Last week, an Israeli minister called for the destruction of all Palestiniy,
get
Yet the Jewish public's mood is shifting, as it did during the second
intifada. It was during the worst month of those four horrific years, in
March 2002, that pollsters found peak Israeli support for the territorial
concessions proposed by President Bill Clinton in December 2000, including a
Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem with sovereignty over the Al Aqsa
compound. Last week, about two-thirds of Jewish Israelis surveyed in a poll
said they wished to separate from the Palestinian neighborhoods of East
Jerusalem, excluding the Old City.
Contrary to claims that Israel's occupation is growing only further
entrenched, the decades since Israel conquered East Jerusalem, the West Bank
and Gaza have been characterized by a slow process of Israeli separation,
often reluctant and driven by violence. To date, the unrest has not
approached the scale that led successive prime ministers to partial
withdrawals: Yitzhak Rabin's bestowing limited autonomy on Palestinians in
parts of Gaza and the West Bank at the end of the first intifada; Benjamin
Netanyahu's pulling out of most of Hebron after the deadly 1996 riots over
Israeli excavations beneath the Al Aqsa compound; and Ariel Sharon's
announcing a withdrawal from Gaza during the second intifada.
It was at that time that Mr. Sharon erected the wall and fence separating
Israel from the West Bank. Palestinians, like most of the international
community, view the wall as an illegal seizure of 8.5 percent of the West
Bank, but by the same token, it is now nearly impossible to imagine that any
of the 91.5 percent of territory on the Palestinian side of the barrier
would go to Israel in a future partition.
It is a deeply regrettable fact that, during the past quarter-century,
violence has been the most consistent factor in Israeli territorial
withdrawal. That may partly explain why growing numbers of Palestinians
support an uprising and demand the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas,
who abhors attacks on Israelis and has presided over nearly a decade of
almost total quiet in the West Bank without any gains to show for it.
Last month, a survey of Palestinians found support for an armed intifada at
57 percent (and at 71 percent among 18- to 22-year-old men). Support was
highest in Hebron and Jerusalem. Two-thirds of those surveyed wanted Mr.
Abbas to resign.
Mr. Kerry is scheduled to have meetings with Mr. Abbas and with Mr.
Netanyahu in an effort to achieve their shared goal of restoring calm and
returning to the status quo. Violence is politically threatening to both
leaders, especially to Mr. Abbas, and both will continue to work to suppress
any escalation.
Yet if they succeed only in ending the unrest, they will have merely
restored the stasis that gave rise to it. This is what Israelis call
"managing the conflict." There is certainly no guarantee that if the two
leaders fail to stop the flow of Palestinian and Israeli blood, things will
eventually get better.
But what does seem guaranteed is that most Palestinians will continue to
believe that if the occupation is cost-free, there will be little incentive
to end it. Mr. Abbas and Mr. Netanyahu have taught them that.
Nathan Thrall is a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group.
