[blind-democracy] Iranians' View of the Nuclear Deal: Optimistic, With Significant Caveats

  • From: Miriam Vieni <miriamvieni@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: blind-democracy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 15:16:52 -0400


Excerpt: "U.S. media coverage of the Iran deal is, as usual, overwhelmingly
focused on American and Israeli voices, with the hard-liner fanatics in each
country issuing apocalyptic decrees, insisting that the deal is far too
lenient on Iran and provides it with far too many benefits."

Iranians and the nuclear deal. (photo: Carlos Barria/Pool/AP)


Iranians' View of the Nuclear Deal: Optimistic, With Significant Caveats
By Glenn Greenwald and Murtaza Hussein, The Intercept
15 July 15

U .S. media coverage of the Iran deal is, as usual, overwhelmingly focused
on American and Israeli voices, with the hard-liner fanatics in each country
issuing apocalyptic decrees, insisting that the deal is far too lenient on
Iran and provides it with far too many benefits. Though largely excluded
from U.S. media discussions, there is also substantial debate among Iranians
about the virtues of the deal, with most viewing it positively due to the
economic benefits it is expected to provide, but with many holding the view
that it unfairly impinges on Iranian sovereignty in exchange for very few
legitimate concessions.
The optimistic Iranian view is grounded in the expectation that the deal
will usher in a normalization of relations between Iran and the West,
lifting both the sanctions regime and the threat of war. That view was
expressed by the ringing endorsement from National Iranian American Council
President Trita Parsi, who proclaimed that "diplomacy has triumphed and war
is off the table. The United States and Iran have turned the tide on decades
of enmity and instead have secured a nuclear deal that promises a better and
brighter future." He added that "we now know that the U.S. and Iran need not
remain hostile enemies, but can interact with each other to achieve shared
interests."
But much Iranian public opinion, while positive, is more nuanced and
guarded. Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of international
relations at Rutgers University (who was one of the individuals targeted for
NSA spying), has devoted most of his career to advocating for a
normalization of U.S./Iran relations and the lifting of the sanctions
regime. To the extent this deal accomplishes that, he said today in an
interview with The Intercept, he supports it, though if it ends up confined
only to nuclear issues, "then it will be very bad for both countries."
Amirahmadi added that the mood in Tehran is, in general, "very happy."
Ordinary Iranians, he said, "obviously like what has happened" primarily
because "they expect money to arrive, which will help the economy and create
jobs."
But he noted several critical caveats. To begin with, expectations among
ordinary Iranians are very high: they expect substantial economic
improvement, and if that fails to materialize, Amirahmadi sees a likelihood
of serious political instability, which "could go in a terrible direction
for Iran." He pointed out that for many years, the Iranian government has,
with some good reason, blamed the U.S., Europe and their sanctions regime
for the economic suffering of Iranians. "They no longer have that pretext,
which means they have to deliver," he said. He argued that the 1979
revolution was driven primarily by the Shah's devotion to distributing
wealth to a tiny elite at the expense of most Iranians, and that any repeat
of that with this new flow of money would exacerbate wealth inequality even
further and risk serious domestic unrest.
A similar point was made by Alireza Haghighi, a political science PhD from
Tehran University and professor at the University of Toronto. He told The
Intercept that the prime driver of the deal from the Iranian side was
economic mismanagement during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which
weakened the Iranian economy to the point where it could no longer sustain
sanctions. "Had it not been for that," he said, "sanctions could have been
managed and no deal would have been necessary."
As for outright Iranian opposition to the deal, Professor Amirahmadi said
that it was largely confined to "conservatives," by which he means
"fundamental Islamists who are now the only real hard-core nationalists in
the country." But he also said that deal opponents "have some valid points."
For one, Iran (unlike Israel) is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and as such has the absolute right to enrich uranium at any
levels; "there'd be no reason to join the NPT except to get that right, so
the fact that this deal 'lets' Iran do what they already had the right to
do, at lesser levels, is not really a ground for celebration," he said. He
also pointed out that "the money that will flow to Iran under this deal is
not a gift: this is Iran's money that has been frozen and otherwise
blocked." As a result, he said, the hard-liners have a valid objection to
viewing these provisions as real concessions.
Leading Iranian government critics seem to view the deal quite favorably.
Hadi Ghaemi of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran is a
harsh government critic, but told The Intercept this morning that the deal
is likely to alleviate economic suffering among ordinary Iranians.
While he foresees positive outcomes for the country, he said that in the
immediate aftermath, "there may be short-term backlash in the form of
domestic repression or the flaring of minor conflicts with the U.S, because
the state has built its entire identity and official ideology on the idea of
countering American imperialism." Nonetheless, "the center of gravity is
moving towards being pragmatic and engaging once again - the
anti-imperialism and confrontational attitude has lost its pull on the
people, even those who took part in the revolutions, and has lost all
content over the years." He added that "Iran is never going to become a real
ally or friend of the U.S, but inside the country people say that the same
way that China has both economic cooperation and strategic and political
rivalry with America, this is what we should also strive for."
There are some noble exceptions, but the general exclusion of Iranian voices
from establishment U.S. media coverage, whether by intent or otherwise, has
had a very distortive effect on how Iran is perceived, allowing them to be
depicted as primitive, irrational, apocalyptic religious fanatics. While
that caricature arguably applies to the U.S.'s closest allies in the regime,
and to some of the most extremist Iranian (and Israeli and American)
fringes, it is wildly inapplicable to Iran as a whole.
The youth literacy rate in Iran is 98.7 percent, as compared to 82.4 percent
in Iraq, 70.8 percent in Pakistan, and 89.3 percent in Egypt. Enrollment in
tertiary education is only 2% points below that of Germany, U.K., and
France. Iran's Human Development Index is far ahead of most of its
neighbors. As Elahe Izadi explained last year in the Washington Post, "being
a highly educated Iranian woman is actually quite normal. Women outnumber
men in Iranian universities, a trend that started in 2001." Similarly, Reza
Aslan has pointed out that "Iran currently has the highest number of U.S.
college alums serving in any foreign government cabinet in the world." The
country's vice president, Masoumeh Ebtekar, is a woman.
But the silencing of Iranian voices has meant that absurd, ignorant
demonizing caricatures like this are the norm:
American journalists, who pride themselves on "neutrality" and "balance,"
should spend some time considering how much of a platform they give to
Israelis and how little they give to Iranians. Whatever one's views, hearing
from Iranians themselves about their own country - rather than relying on
Israeli and American critics - is a prerequisite to journalistic fairness.
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.

Iranians and the nuclear deal. (photo: Carlos Barria/Pool/AP)
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/14/iranian-view-nuclear-deal/http
s://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/14/iranian-view-nuclear-deal/
Iranians' View of the Nuclear Deal: Optimistic, With Significant Caveats
By Glenn Greenwald and Murtaza Hussein, The Intercept
15 July 15
.S. media coverage of the Iran deal is, as usual, overwhelmingly focused on
American and Israeli voices, with the hard-liner fanatics in each country
issuing apocalyptic decrees, insisting that the deal is far too lenient on
Iran and provides it with far too many benefits. Though largely excluded
from U.S. media discussions, there is also substantial debate among Iranians
about the virtues of the deal, with most viewing it positively due to the
economic benefits it is expected to provide, but with many holding the view
that it unfairly impinges on Iranian sovereignty in exchange for very few
legitimate concessions.
The optimistic Iranian view is grounded in the expectation that the deal
will usher in a normalization of relations between Iran and the West,
lifting both the sanctions regime and the threat of war. That view was
expressed by the ringing endorsement from National Iranian American Council
President Trita Parsi, who proclaimed that "diplomacy has triumphed and war
is off the table. The United States and Iran have turned the tide on decades
of enmity and instead have secured a nuclear deal that promises a better and
brighter future." He added that "we now know that the U.S. and Iran need not
remain hostile enemies, but can interact with each other to achieve shared
interests."
But much Iranian public opinion, while positive, is more nuanced and
guarded. Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of international
relations at Rutgers University (who was one of the individuals targeted for
NSA spying), has devoted most of his career to advocating for a
normalization of U.S./Iran relations and the lifting of the sanctions
regime. To the extent this deal accomplishes that, he said today in an
interview with The Intercept, he supports it, though if it ends up confined
only to nuclear issues, "then it will be very bad for both countries."
Amirahmadi added that the mood in Tehran is, in general, "very happy."
Ordinary Iranians, he said, "obviously like what has happened" primarily
because "they expect money to arrive, which will help the economy and create
jobs."
But he noted several critical caveats. To begin with, expectations among
ordinary Iranians are very high: they expect substantial economic
improvement, and if that fails to materialize, Amirahmadi sees a likelihood
of serious political instability, which "could go in a terrible direction
for Iran." He pointed out that for many years, the Iranian government has,
with some good reason, blamed the U.S., Europe and their sanctions regime
for the economic suffering of Iranians. "They no longer have that pretext,
which means they have to deliver," he said. He argued that the 1979
revolution was driven primarily by the Shah's devotion to distributing
wealth to a tiny elite at the expense of most Iranians, and that any repeat
of that with this new flow of money would exacerbate wealth inequality even
further and risk serious domestic unrest.
A similar point was made by Alireza Haghighi, a political science PhD from
Tehran University and professor at the University of Toronto. He told The
Intercept that the prime driver of the deal from the Iranian side was
economic mismanagement during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which
weakened the Iranian economy to the point where it could no longer sustain
sanctions. "Had it not been for that," he said, "sanctions could have been
managed and no deal would have been necessary."
As for outright Iranian opposition to the deal, Professor Amirahmadi said
that it was largely confined to "conservatives," by which he means
"fundamental Islamists who are now the only real hard-core nationalists in
the country." But he also said that deal opponents "have some valid points."
For one, Iran (unlike Israel) is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and as such has the absolute right to enrich uranium at any
levels; "there'd be no reason to join the NPT except to get that right, so
the fact that this deal 'lets' Iran do what they already had the right to
do, at lesser levels, is not really a ground for celebration," he said. He
also pointed out that "the money that will flow to Iran under this deal is
not a gift: this is Iran's money that has been frozen and otherwise
blocked." As a result, he said, the hard-liners have a valid objection to
viewing these provisions as real concessions.
Leading Iranian government critics seem to view the deal quite favorably.
Hadi Ghaemi of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran is a
harsh government critic, but told The Intercept this morning that the deal
is likely to alleviate economic suffering among ordinary Iranians.
While he foresees positive outcomes for the country, he said that in the
immediate aftermath, "there may be short-term backlash in the form of
domestic repression or the flaring of minor conflicts with the U.S, because
the state has built its entire identity and official ideology on the idea of
countering American imperialism." Nonetheless, "the center of gravity is
moving towards being pragmatic and engaging once again - the
anti-imperialism and confrontational attitude has lost its pull on the
people, even those who took part in the revolutions, and has lost all
content over the years." He added that "Iran is never going to become a real
ally or friend of the U.S, but inside the country people say that the same
way that China has both economic cooperation and strategic and political
rivalry with America, this is what we should also strive for."
There are some noble exceptions, but the general exclusion of Iranian voices
from establishment U.S. media coverage, whether by intent or otherwise, has
had a very distortive effect on how Iran is perceived, allowing them to be
depicted as primitive, irrational, apocalyptic religious fanatics. While
that caricature arguably applies to the U.S.'s closest allies in the regime,
and to some of the most extremist Iranian (and Israeli and American)
fringes, it is wildly inapplicable to Iran as a whole.
The youth literacy rate in Iran is 98.7 percent, as compared to 82.4 percent
in Iraq, 70.8 percent in Pakistan, and 89.3 percent in Egypt. Enrollment in
tertiary education is only 2% points below that of Germany, U.K., and
France. Iran's Human Development Index is far ahead of most of its
neighbors. As Elahe Izadi explained last year in the Washington Post, "being
a highly educated Iranian woman is actually quite normal. Women outnumber
men in Iranian universities, a trend that started in 2001." Similarly, Reza
Aslan has pointed out that "Iran currently has the highest number of U.S.
college alums serving in any foreign government cabinet in the world." The
country's vice president, Masoumeh Ebtekar, is a woman.
But the silencing of Iranian voices has meant that absurd, ignorant
demonizing caricatures like this are the norm:
American journalists, who pride themselves on "neutrality" and "balance,"
should spend some time considering how much of a platform they give to
Israelis and how little they give to Iranians. Whatever one's views, hearing
from Iranians themselves about their own country - rather than relying on
Israeli and American critics - is a prerequisite to journalistic fairness.
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http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize


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