[blind-democracy] Re: How Terror in Paris Calls for Revising US Syria Policy

  • From: "abdulah aga" <abdulahhasic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <blind-democracy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 07:26:35 -0600


Hi every one

I have question if some can give to me answer?

How com that USA and allies trying to difidete ISIS all ready 3 or 4 yare and can't do that?

but, how com that USA could occupied Iraq jus for few days?

if we know that Iraq have more soldier and more organization military then ISIS on beginning and even right now.

So my question is maybe USA and other allies don't want to real to destroy ISIS because they are need to some one for on use,

or some from vest make ISIS and jus over media terrifying all of us, and making islamofobia betvine people,

Making Hitler's formula with fight betvian people and than you can hold situation under control.


-----Original Message----- From: Frank Ventura
Sent: Sunday, November 29, 2015 1:53 PM
To: blind-democracy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [blind-democracy] Re: How Terror in Paris Calls for Revising US Syria Policy

Reading some of this is like saying water is wet. Really, I didn't know that? Worldwide terrorism won't subside if we continue to use drones, bombs, and missles to further the plans of the oil obyy.

-----Original Message-----
From: blind-democracy-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:blind-democracy-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Miriam Vieni
Sent: Sunday, November 29, 2015 2:00 PM
To: blind-democracy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [blind-democracy] How Terror in Paris Calls for Revising US Syria Policy


Porter writes: "It's the right time for Obama to rethink the
administration's policy toward both Assad and his jihadist foes."

Barack Obama. (photo: AP)


How Terror in Paris Calls for Revising US Syria Policy
By Gareth Porter, CounterPunch
29 November 15

It's the right time for Obama to rethink the administration's policy toward
both Assad and his jihadist foes.
In the wake of the ISIS terrorist attack on Paris, President Barack Obama
declared that his administration has the right strategy on ISIS and will
"see it through". But the administration is already shifting its policy to
cooperate more closely with the Russians on Syria, and an influential former
senior intelligence official has suggested that the administration needs to
give more weight to the Assad government and army as the main barrier to
ISIS and other jihadist forces in Syria.
Obama's Europeans allies as well as US national security officials have
urged the United State to downgrade the official US aim of achieving the
departure of Bashar al-Assad from Syria in the international negotiations
begun last month and continued last weekend. Such a shift in policy,
however, would make the contradictions between the US interests and those of
the Saudis, who continue to support jihadist forces fighting with al-Qaeda's
Syria branch, al-Nusra Front, increasingly clear.
Russia had proposed to the United States in September that the United States
and Russia share intelligence on ISIS and exchange military delegations to
coordinate on joint steps against ISIS. The initial Obama administration
response was to reject either intelligence sharing or joint planning with
Russia on Syria out of hand. The reasoning was that the Russians were
engaged primarily, if not exclusively, to shore up the Assad regime, which
was unacceptable to Washington. Secretary of State John Kerry declared on 1
October: "What is important is Russia has to not be engaged in any
activities against anybody but ISIL. That's clear. We have made that very
clear."
But that was before Paris. The fallout from that attack has changed the
political vectors pushing and pulling Obama administration policy. The most
obvious shift came two days after the attacks and just hours after Obama
announced new intelligence arrangements with France. CIA director John
Brennan reversed the earlier US decision to reject intelligence sharing with
Russia on Islamic State. Revealing that he had had several conversations
with his Russian counterpart since the beginning of Russia's air offensive
in Syria, Brennan said the ISIS threat "demands" an "unprecedented level of
cooperation" among international intelligence services. Brennan said he and
his Russian counterpart had begun exchanging intelligence focused primarily
on the flow of terrorists from Russia into Iraq and Syria but that now
US-Russian cooperation needed to be "enhanced".
At the G-20 summit in Antalya, Turkey on 15-16 November, Obama acknowledged
for the first time in his meeting with Putin that Russia was indeed
combatting ISIS, according to a White House official. In fact, the Russians
had been hitting ISIS targets regularly during October, including what it
said was a command centre in the ISIS capital, Raqqa. The Obama
administration had refused to acknowledge that fact in October and instead
focused on the Russian targeting of non-ISIS groups. But the White House
press leak about the Obama-Putin conversation did not repeat that complaint.
The issue of whether Assad must go as part of a settlement has been a
fixture of US Syria policy ever since 2011, although it has now been
modified to allow the Syrian president to stay in power for a period of six
months as part of a settlement. But the Paris attacks may well be sparking
new debate within the Obama administration on whether that demand makes
sense. In an interview with CBS News on 15 November, the former deputy
director of the CIA, Michael Morell, suggested that the exclusion of Assad
may need to be revised. "I do think the question of whether President Assad
needs to go or whether he is part of the solution here, we need to look at
it again," Morell said. "Clearly he's part of the problem. But he may also
be part of the solution."
It is not likely that Morell, was acting CIA director twice in 2011 and
again from 2012 to 2013, was merely reflecting a personal view on the
matter. Statements by US intelligence officials since 2012 have emphasised
the importance of the Syrian administration and military as the primary
buttress against both ISIS and al-Qaeda and its jihadist allies seizing
power in the country - a point that the Obama and Kerry chose not to make.
Since the "moderate" forces have all but disappeared in late 2014 and early
2015, and al-Qaeda and it jihadist allies have become the only rivals to
Islamic State, that point became even more critical.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said this week, "I cannot agree with
the logic that Assad is the cause of everything" in Syria. That contrasts
with John Kerry's argument that unless Assad leaves Syria, "this war will
not end."
But Kerry's position is based on the assumption that the major forces
fighting against the regime would end the war and enter into peaceful
competition if Assad could be induced to leave. In reality, of course, those
forces are committed to using force to achieve the destruction of the old
"secular" political order in Syria and establish an extremist conservative
Islamic State.
The issue of whether to continue to demand Assad's departure arises just as
the UN peace negotiations process on Syria - meaning negotiations among the
outside powers intervening in the conflict - begin a new and highly
political phase. British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond has revealed that
the next phase will turn on bargaining among the international sponsors of
anti-Assad groups about who would be allowed to join a new government. Those
decisions, in turn, would depend on which of the groups are deemed by the
foreign sponsors of those very groups to be "terrorists" and which are
deemed acceptable.
As Hammond acknowledges, the Saudis are certainly not going to agree to call
Ahrar al-Sham or other extremist jihadist groups allied with it and al-Nusra
"terrorists". They may have to give up al-Nusra Front, which has expressed
support for the Islamic State terrorist assault on Paris.
Unless Obama is prepared to face a rupture in the US alliance with the Sunni
Gulf Sheikdoms over the issue, the result will be that the very groups
committed to overthrowing the remnants of the old order by force will be
invited by the United States and its Gulf allies to take key positions in
the post-Assad government. It's the right time for Obama to rethink the
administration's policy toward both Assad and his jihadist foes.
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.

Barack Obama. (photo: AP)
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/11/27/how-terror-in-paris-calls-for-revisin
g-us-syria-policy/http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/11/27/how-terror-in-paris
-calls-for-revising-us-syria-policy/
How Terror in Paris Calls for Revising US Syria Policy
By Gareth Porter, CounterPunch
29 November 15
t's the right time for Obama to rethink the administration's policy toward
both Assad and his jihadist foes.
In the wake of the ISIS terrorist attack on Paris, President Barack Obama
declared that his administration has the right strategy on ISIS and will
"see it through". But the administration is already shifting its policy to
cooperate more closely with the Russians on Syria, and an influential former
senior intelligence official has suggested that the administration needs to
give more weight to the Assad government and army as the main barrier to
ISIS and other jihadist forces in Syria.
Obama's Europeans allies as well as US national security officials have
urged the United State to downgrade the official US aim of achieving the
departure of Bashar al-Assad from Syria in the international negotiations
begun last month and continued last weekend. Such a shift in policy,
however, would make the contradictions between the US interests and those of
the Saudis, who continue to support jihadist forces fighting with al-Qaeda's
Syria branch, al-Nusra Front, increasingly clear.
Russia had proposed to the United States in September that the United States
and Russia share intelligence on ISIS and exchange military delegations to
coordinate on joint steps against ISIS. The initial Obama administration
response was to reject either intelligence sharing or joint planning with
Russia on Syria out of hand. The reasoning was that the Russians were
engaged primarily, if not exclusively, to shore up the Assad regime, which
was unacceptable to Washington. Secretary of State John Kerry declared on 1
October: "What is important is Russia has to not be engaged in any
activities against anybody but ISIL. That's clear. We have made that very
clear."
But that was before Paris. The fallout from that attack has changed the
political vectors pushing and pulling Obama administration policy. The most
obvious shift came two days after the attacks and just hours after Obama
announced new intelligence arrangements with France. CIA director John
Brennan reversed the earlier US decision to reject intelligence sharing with
Russia on Islamic State. Revealing that he had had several conversations
with his Russian counterpart since the beginning of Russia's air offensive
in Syria, Brennan said the ISIS threat "demands" an "unprecedented level of
cooperation" among international intelligence services. Brennan said he and
his Russian counterpart had begun exchanging intelligence focused primarily
on the flow of terrorists from Russia into Iraq and Syria but that now
US-Russian cooperation needed to be "enhanced".
At the G-20 summit in Antalya, Turkey on 15-16 November, Obama acknowledged
for the first time in his meeting with Putin that Russia was indeed
combatting ISIS, according to a White House official. In fact, the Russians
had been hitting ISIS targets regularly during October, including what it
said was a command centre in the ISIS capital, Raqqa. The Obama
administration had refused to acknowledge that fact in October and instead
focused on the Russian targeting of non-ISIS groups. But the White House
press leak about the Obama-Putin conversation did not repeat that complaint.
The issue of whether Assad must go as part of a settlement has been a
fixture of US Syria policy ever since 2011, although it has now been
modified to allow the Syrian president to stay in power for a period of six
months as part of a settlement. But the Paris attacks may well be sparking
new debate within the Obama administration on whether that demand makes
sense. In an interview with CBS News on 15 November, the former deputy
director of the CIA, Michael Morell, suggested that the exclusion of Assad
may need to be revised. "I do think the question of whether President Assad
needs to go or whether he is part of the solution here, we need to look at
it again," Morell said. "Clearly he's part of the problem. But he may also
be part of the solution."
It is not likely that Morell, was acting CIA director twice in 2011 and
again from 2012 to 2013, was merely reflecting a personal view on the
matter. Statements by US intelligence officials since 2012 have emphasised
the importance of the Syrian administration and military as the primary
buttress against both ISIS and al-Qaeda and its jihadist allies seizing
power in the country - a point that the Obama and Kerry chose not to make.
Since the "moderate" forces have all but disappeared in late 2014 and early
2015, and al-Qaeda and it jihadist allies have become the only rivals to
Islamic State, that point became even more critical.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said this week, "I cannot agree with
the logic that Assad is the cause of everything" in Syria. That contrasts
with John Kerry's argument that unless Assad leaves Syria, "this war will
not end."
But Kerry's position is based on the assumption that the major forces
fighting against the regime would end the war and enter into peaceful
competition if Assad could be induced to leave. In reality, of course, those
forces are committed to using force to achieve the destruction of the old
"secular" political order in Syria and establish an extremist conservative
Islamic State.
The issue of whether to continue to demand Assad's departure arises just as
the UN peace negotiations process on Syria - meaning negotiations among the
outside powers intervening in the conflict - begin a new and highly
political phase. British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond has revealed that
the next phase will turn on bargaining among the international sponsors of
anti-Assad groups about who would be allowed to join a new government. Those
decisions, in turn, would depend on which of the groups are deemed by the
foreign sponsors of those very groups to be "terrorists" and which are
deemed acceptable.
As Hammond acknowledges, the Saudis are certainly not going to agree to call
Ahrar al-Sham or other extremist jihadist groups allied with it and al-Nusra
"terrorists". They may have to give up al-Nusra Front, which has expressed
support for the Islamic State terrorist assault on Paris.
Unless Obama is prepared to face a rupture in the US alliance with the Sunni
Gulf Sheikdoms over the issue, the result will be that the very groups
committed to overthrowing the remnants of the old order by force will be
invited by the United States and its Gulf allies to take key positions in
the post-Assad government. It's the right time for Obama to rethink the
administration's policy toward both Assad and his jihadist foes.
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http://e-max.it/posizionamento-siti-web/socialize




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