Gaza Between Occupation, Division & COVID-19: Confronting Total Collapse
February 12, 2021
Palestinians in Gaza are haunted by social misery, violence and wars every
second of their lives, writes Ali Abdel-Wahab.
Man in front of mural at the Nusseirat refugee camp in the central Gaza
Strip, November 2020. (Ashraf Amra)
By Ali Abdel-Wahab
Al-Shabaka
Gaza sits on 360 square kilometers, or 1.3 percent of the total area of
historic Palestine. With a population of around 2.05 million as of 2020, 1.4
million males and 1.01 million females, Gaza is the world's most populated
territory with 9,373 inhabitants per square kilometer.
Palestinians in Gaza continue to live under catastrophic conditions due to
the Israeli siege now in its 14th, three bloody wars in 2008, 2012 and 2014
in which 3,800 Palestinians were killed, as well as intermittent and
devastating Israeli military assaults. In addition, Gaza's economic and
living conditions are at their worst, with unemployment exceeding 70 percent
during the Covid-19 crisis.
The Palestinian Authority's (PA) sanctions against Gaza, the increased
taxation by the de-facto government in Gaza, the electricity and water
crises, in addition to food insecurity, have all led to a decline in
investments and buying power in Gaza as the poverty rate exceeded 53
percent. These indicators reflect the damage caused by the Israeli
occupation and the division between Hamas and the PA that has hampered
sociopolitical development. This reality suggests bleak prospects for the
future of Gaza, a future of continued peril and disintegration.
Map of the tightly cordoned-off Gaza Strip. (Wikipedia)
In 2012, UNICEF and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
(UNRWA) published a report "Gaza in 2020, A livable place?" in which they
projected the population in Gaza to grow from 1.6 million to 2.1 million by
2020, with a concentration of 5,800 inhabitants per square kilometer. This
figure has been exceeded by a high margin.
The report indicated that the fundamental infrastructure for electricity,
water and sanitation, and municipal and social services, was struggling to
keep pace with the needs of the growing population. However, the report
neither factored in natural disasters and pandemics like Covid-19, nor
predicted the savage war of 2014. One can thus undoubtedly conclude that
Gaza has already been absolutely unlivable for some time now, and is
arguably in a state of post-collapse.
The Israeli regime has managed to not only besiege Palestinians in Gaza, but
to also project their image internationally as a hostile people. Indeed,
Israel has killed hundreds of peaceful Palestinian demonstrators during the
Great March of Return.
To this day, it controls and restricts the import of vital medical equipment
and other materials of importance to a variety of sectors in Gaza. It
imposes strict restrictions on the movement of goods, and with ongoing
military bombardments, it has managed to destroy vital infrastructure.
Beyond material restrictions, the Israeli regime restricts Gazans' freedom
of movement, effectively trapping them in a territory it continues to
actively destroy.
August 2016: During a visit to southern Israel, U.S. State Department
official Thomas Shannon visited the Kerem Shalom crossing point to see how
goods enter and leave the Gaza Strip. (U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, CC BY 2.0,
Wikimedia Commons)
The ongoing division in Palestinian leadership between Hamas and the PA has
also had serious implications for Gaza's inhabitants. One result of this
power struggle has been the complete separation between governing
institutions in Gaza and the West Bank with the establishment of two
completely distinct authorities and governments. Within this framework, the
division has formally institutionalized factional politics and has
effectively devastated the Palestinian national project. In effect, this has
destroyed the credibility of liberation leadership, and has diminished the
trust of Palestinians - and especially of Palestinians in Gaza - in the
effectiveness and usefulness of the struggle. Finally, the division of
leadership into two authoritarian camps has eroded public freedoms and the
political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights of Palestinians in
Gaza.
Covid-19
On March 22, 2020, the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza recorded the
first cases of Covid-19 in two travelers returning from Pakistan.
Subsequently, the government closed popular markets, halls, mosques,
restaurants, cafes, and most shops. Nearly two months later, it permitted
the reopening of all commercial establishments provided that they undertake
preventive measures and enforce social distancing. In late August 2020, the
ministry discovered four domestic cases of Covid-19 infections, the sources
of which they could not trace, and later announced further infections.
In response to domestic infections, the Ministry of the Interior declared a
state of emergency and a two-day curfew in Gaza, quarantining all
governorates and enforcing full closures. These were later eased in light of
an escalation in Israeli military attacks, and a sharp decline in
electricity supplies. The de-facto government failed to learn from the
ramifications of the previous closure, especially on day laborers, or to
propose measures to assist them financially. In addition, the Israeli regime
restricted the import of medical test kits into Palestinian territories.
Since the detection of Covid-19 in early 2020, the number of infections has
exceeded 45,000. According to Mahmoud Abdul-Hadi, an expert on civil society
institutions, Covid-19 relief efforts in Gaza mostly concentrated on
quarantine centers in the early months of the pandemic, despite many
humanitarian relief initiatives, including decentralized community
campaigns, civil society institutions, international organizations, Hamas
ministries, and the Waqfat Ezz (stand with dignity) Fund.
He added that aid has markedly decreased compared to its levels in March,
further aggravating the crisis as infection cases rise and overwhelm medical
capacity and crisis management efforts, which had led to further closures
that continue to adversely impact Palestinians in Gaza.
The Ramifications of Collapse
Aug. 24, 2014: Palestinians in Gaza City collect their belongings from under
the rubble of a residential tower, which witnesses said was destroyed by an
Israeli air strike. (UN Photo/Shareef Sarhan)
The reality in Gaza has shifted from open resistance to one of civil
disobedience, as Gazans' attempts to survive have boiled down to three
behavioral options: withdrawal, surrender, or confrontation. A person
withdraws when they fail to change their reality and reclaim their rights,
and their only option becomes to escape after their means of action have
been usurped. Withdrawal in Gaza means to travel, which is particularly
common among youth.
To surrender means to reluctantly acclimate with one's reality, a behavior
that engenders a feeling of defeat, failure and self-condemnation. Judging
from their transformations following their failed innovative attempts, one
may say that many young Palestinians in Gaza have lost their sense of
purpose and desire to live.
Those who choose confrontation continue to confront the status quo with all
means available, be they peaceful or armed, and with a great deal of effort
placed in educational, community service and relief activities. They thereby
alternate between moments of temporary inability to continuous action.
The Covid-19 pandemic has complicated Gaza's economic, political, and social
conditions, and has exposed the fragility of society. Individualist
tendencies have increased amongst Gaza's Palestinians, along with anxiety,
confusion, and uncertainty. Their political and social participation has
decreased, and social values have decayed. The pandemic has also created a
political vacuum and lack of transparency at the level of decision-making.
Nowadays, Gaza is overpowered and shows little signs of life, lacking the
basic foundations that would enable resilience and steadfastness, whether in
the context of the liberation movement or otherwise. The result has been a
continuing downward spiral towards social and individual isolation.
Simply put, Palestinians in Gaza are haunted by social misery, violence and
wars every second of their lives. Social inequalities have increased, while
the marginalized and disadvantaged in society no longer have rights and live
in limbo.
The Great March of Return
Near Gaza's border with Israel in 2018. (Fars News Agency via Wikimedia
Commons)
Residents of Gaza take pride in the Great March of Return that began in
2018, as some consider it a new form of struggle against the occupation. And
although the organizing body in charge of the Great March of Return decided
to limit the rallies to national occasions on December 26, 2019, the large
and ongoing demonstrations have represented a popular activity that engages
individuals and families, and its effects on Gaza's society are palpable.
Routinely on Fridays, thousands of Palestinians in Gaza headed eastwards to
the borders with the part of Palestine occupied in 1948, setting their right
of return in motion and fantasizing about returning to the homeland. After
all, roughly 70 percent of Gaza's population is internally displaced
refugees from lands occupied by Israel in 1948. In effect, on Fridays,
Gazans marched to return to their homes.
The rallies were peaceful, inclusive, non-partisan and decentralized, and
were founded on Palestinians' desire to reclaim their rights without
clashing directly with the occupation army.
However, the occupation regime did not see it this way. Over the course of
2018 and 2019, 214 Palestinians were killed, including 46 children, with
over 36,000 injuries, including 8,800 children. Many of those injured remain
in dire need of rehabilitative care.
From another perspective, the rallies changed from a tool of struggle to a
tool of political bargaining with the advent of the "breaking the siege"
slogan, which gave the Israeli government the excuse to attack
demonstrators. Additionally, it prompted certain political forces including
Fatah and the Democratic Front to withdraw from the rallies because their
objectives changed.
Politically, Hamas benefited from the rallies by entering into unannounced
talks with Israel in order to promote de-escalation between Israel and the
Palestinian factions. In addition, the Qatari ambassador, Mohammad Al-Emadi,
visited the marchers' camps in eastern Gaza on Nov. 9, 2018 and, with
Israel's approval, brought along a Qatari grant of $15 million in order to
pay the salaries of Hamas employees. The next day, fuel supplies were
resumed to Gaza's power plant.
Palestinians in Gaza counted on their leadership to seek political
reconciliation and end the division, to abstain from bargaining with the
occupation, and to adopt the Great March of Return as a means to reclaim the
right of return. But they were soon disappointed. Hamas's actions towards
the demonstrating masses represented a loss of the sense of national
identity, and of the values underpinning the right of return.
'We Want to Live' Movement
Palestinians in Gaza grew tired of their living conditions and the status
quo, and thus shifted from resistance to civil disobedience and rebellion.
It was in this context that the "We Want to Live" Movement (bidna n'eesh)
emerged on March 14, 2019, urging Gaza's inhabitants to take to the streets
in protest. The movement called on its followers to come out with kitchen
cookware and utensils as a symbol, but they were surprised by the violent
reaction of Hamas security forces who arrested families, journalists and
human rights defenders. They also orchestrated simultaneous demonstrations
under the pretext of suffering from the salary crisis and the PA sanctions
against Gaza.
The activists involved in the movement said they were shocked during
interrogations as Hamas security forces invoked "treason" in their questions
and purported that the "We Want to Live" demonstrators "worked against the
resistance." However, the activists protested issues of unemployment, and
rising prices and taxes. They did not protest against Hamas or side with the
PA; rather, they were standing for themselves.
Longtime Hamas leader, Khaled Meshaal in 2009. (Trango, CC BY 3.0, Wikimedia
Commons)
Hamas' reaction to this movement gives a clear indication of the amount of
repression targeting public freedoms in Gaza, and the ways the political
authorities have treated, and defamed, those agitating for basic
improvements in living conditions as "collaborators against the resistance."
In fact, such a charge of treason is so profound that it provides sufficient
grounds to refer the case to the Military Court in Gaza, where the accused
faces a bleak and unknown fate.
The repercussions point to the crisis of the security apparatus in Gaza, and
Hamas's totalitarian rule which it justifies on grounds that it protects the
citizens. This has, in fact, eroded steadfastness in Gaza, as it politicizes
the resistance and works to render it the monopoly of a particular group.
Taking to Social Media
Like the rest of the world, Palestinians in Gaza circulate information on
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, including satires of
political news in the form of jokes and memes. Indeed, we can think of the
virtual space as one that some have adopted as a field for spontaneous
critique, away from factional allegiance, and amounting to its own kind of
social mobilization.
Given the increasing oppression of their right to freedom of expression,
social media platforms have also become a means for Palestinians in Gaza to
publicly shame authorities from across the political spectrum. In this way,
public shaming has become a digital weapon that Gazans frequently use to
express their anger and raise awareness about critical issues, such as in
cases where families use violence against their female members, and in cases
of political and social extortion against ordinary citizens.
Recently, Palestinian activists in Gaza launched an online campaign, "Down
with Jawwal," against the Palestine Cellular Communications Company, Jawwal,
to protest its high prices, particularly in light of the difficult
conditions in besieged Gaza. Online activism ensures social rather than
formal immunity, speaks the mind of the public, and constitutes a true
expression of marginalized groups. As such, it enhances the structural
balance of society, reclaiming visibility across the collective, and
minimizing individualist tendencies.
While social activism in the street ceased and moved to online platforms as
the only way to escape repression, activism on social media is hardly as
powerful or effective. It should not replace physical and material activism,
especially in the context of occupation.
The online protest movement has set a new language and form of political
expression in Gaza following the political vacuum and the loss of faith in
political change. Nevertheless, it instituted a digital mall, so to speak,
in which political discourse is mired in consumerist culture, and has become
a main mode of action for many in Gaza. This new mode of expression has
resulted in indolence and lack of creativity. Indeed, consumerist values
have started to replace social and voluntary work, as well as productivity
in society, in turn compounding the ways in which the existing political
division continues to foster an environment hostile to creativity and
productivity.
Projections on Gaza's Future
In a brainstorming session held on Nov. 27, 2020, for a group of young men
and women born after the turn of the millennium to discuss the
transformations in Palestinian social and political values, one participant
said: "the homeland is too narrow, and we are out of luck." That is, this
group represented the generation that spent its childhood in brutal wars,
and came of age as the division in Palestinian leadership solidified. This
is the generation that saw what few freedoms they enjoyed as children taken
away. Their present is chaotic and their future unclear, as they see a world
saturated with frustration, dangers, and loss.
Gaza's Palestinians face the systematic discrimination of the occupation
regime, as well as the discriminatory practices of the PA and Hamas. The
pandemic has reinforced the Zionist principle of "divide and rule," while
the division in Palestinian leadership has further entrenched fragmentation,
the state of anomie, and social fragility. The repercussions of Covid-19
exposed the role of the three variables (occupation, division, pandemic) in
forging the duality felt by the Palestinian people in Gaza between what they
experience in a society with historical memory and national identity, and
what they have created within the permanent uncertainty they experience in
order to live in momentary peace.
One cannot think of Gaza as going through a transitional phase brimming with
turmoil and ambiguity since it has been in this state for more than a
decade. One can only predict that Gaza will turn from a political to a
humanitarian cause and its people will grow concerned with their individual
interests, neglecting issues of collective importance. In such a future, the
struggle will change into a struggle for survival between the victims
themselves, tearing apart their shared humanity.
Palestinians in Gaza continue to fantasize about returning to their homeland
and homes, especially after the Great March of Return, and even if the
current generations - like many of their parents and grandparents - do not
have actual memories of the homeland.
As prominent Palestinian author Ghassan Kanafani once said: "I search for
the Palestine of reality, the Palestine that is more than a memory."
Nonetheless, with ongoing collapse and traumatization in Gaza, Palestinians
here have become anxious and fearful of tomorrow as they are unable to
sustain their livelihoods and work. The right of return for them has become
a mere fantasy.
To read this piece in Greek or French, please click here or here. Al-Shabaka
is grateful for the efforts by human rights advocates to translate its
pieces, but is not responsible for any change in meaning.
Al-Shabaka member Ali Abdel-Wahab works as a data analyst and evaluation and
follow-up assistant at the Tamer Institute for Community Education in Gaza.
He holds a Bachelor's degree in Computer Science, and is interested in the
world of data, big data, and computer social sciences. He has worked as a
research assistant in several Palestinian and European institutes and has
written several articles and scientific papers. He is also a member of the
political youth forum in Gaza's Masarat Center. His research focuses on
issues of political economy, digital transformation, and the social network,
with particular focus on Palestine.
This article is from Al-Shabaka.
The views expressed are solely those of the author and may or may not
reflect those of Consortium News.
