Facing accusations that it issued a doctored report alleging a chemical
attack in Syria, the OPCW has released an inquiry attacking two
whistleblowers as rogue actors. Leaked documents obtained by The Grayzone
reveal serious distortions in the OPCW inquiry as well as a campaign of
intimidation against internal dissenters.
By Aaron Maté
For the past year, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) has been roiled by allegations that it manipulated an investigation
to falsely accuse the Syrian government of a chemical weapons attack. An
OPCW report released in March 2019 lent credence to claims by Islamist
militants and Western governments that the Syrian military killed around 40
civilians with toxic gas in the city of Douma in April 2018. The accusation
against Damascus led to US-led military strikes on Syrian government sites
that same month.
But leaked internal documents published by Wikileaks show that OPCW
inspectors who deployed to Douma rejected the official story, and complained
that higher-level officials excluded them from the post-mission process,
distorted key evidence, and ignored their findings.
After months of virtual silence, the OPCW has responded with an internal
inquiry that lambasts two veteran officials who raised internal objections,
attacking their credibility and qualifications. The OPCWs self-described
independent investigation describes the pair as rogue, low-level actors
who played minor roles in the Douma mission and lacked access to crucial
evidence. In a briefing to member states, OPCW Director General Fernando
Arias dismissed them as disgruntled ex-employees. The two are not
whistle-blowers, Arias said. They are individuals who could not accept
that their views were not backed by evidence.
But a leaked document calls Arias assertions into serious question. Ian
Henderson, one of the two inspectors, recently addressed a special session
of the United Nations Security Council with his concerns about the Douma
mission. Henderson submitted a supplemental written account that was
distributed among participating UN member states and obtained by The
Grayzone. It offers the most extensive and detailed account of the internal
dispute over the OPCWs Douma investigation to date.
The full leaked testimony can be read here (PDF).
Henderson provides a thorough timeline that bolsters suspicions that the
OPCW leadership covered up a staged deception in Douma. Combined with the
available record which includes other OPCW leaks, as well as Arias and
the OPCWs own statements Hendersons account firmly demonstrates that he
and a fellow dissenting colleague occupied veteran leadership roles inside
the organization, including during the Douma fact-finding mission.
Henderson also exposes key gaps in the OPCWs inquiry, which fails to
specifically address the revelations that critical evidence was kept out of
the OPCWs published reports; that key findings were manipulated and that
all of this occurred under sustained US government pressure.
In addition to Hendersons complete testimony, The Grayzone has obtained a
chilling email from a third former OPCW official. The former official, who
worked in a senior role, blamed external pressure and potential threats to
their family for their failure to speak out about the corruption of the
Douma investigation.
This official was not among the pair of dissenting inspectors targeted by
the inquiry. The email corroborates complaints by Henderson and his
colleague about senior managements suppression of evidence collected by the
team that deployed to Syria.
I fear those behind the crimes that have been perpetrated in the name of
humanity and democracy'
In his briefing about the investigation of the inspectors, Arias, the OPCW
Director-General, described the pair as stubborn actors who took matters
into their own hands and committed a breach of their obligations to the
Organization. He characterized their behavior as egregious.
But leaked documents and testimony point to an OPCW leadership that has
committed egregious acts of its own, including intimidating internal
dissenters.
In an email obtained by The Grayzone, a former senior OPCW official
described their tenure at the OPCW as the most stressful and unpleasant
ones of [their] life, and expressed deep shame about the state of the
organization they departed in disgust.
I fear those behind the crimes that have been perpetrated in the name of
humanity and democracy, the official confided, they will not hesitate to
do harm to me and my family, they have done worse, many times, even in the
UK
I dont want to expose my self and my family to their violence and
revenge, I dont want to live in fear of crossing the street!
The former OPCW senior official went on to denounce the removal of members
of the original fact-finding team to Syria from the decision making process
and management of the most critical operations
This tracks with complaints
expressed in leaked OPCW documents that superiors who had not been a part of
the investigation in Douma marginalized those who had.
The atmosphere of intimidation was confirmed by a second member of the
OPCWs original fact-finding mission to Douma. The whistleblower, identified
by the pseudonym Alex, spoke to the journalist Jonathan Steele and to a
panel convened by the Courage Foundation in October 2019. Alex revealed that
a delegation of three US officials visited the OPCW at The Hague on July
5th, 2018. They implored the dissenting inspectors to accept the view that
the Syrian government carried out a gas attack in Douma and chided them for
failing to reach that conclusion. According to Steele, Alex and the other
inspectors saw the meeting as unacceptable pressure. In his statement to
the UN Security Council, Henderson confirmed that he attended the meeting.
The US intervention at the OPCW could possibly violate the chemical weapons
convention, which forbids state parties from attempting to influence
investigations. It would not be the first time Washington has attempted to
bully the OPCW into submission. During the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in
2002, the George W. Bush administration engineered the ouster of the OPCWs
First Director-General, Jose Bustani. The Bush administration was concerned
that Bustanis negotiations with Iraq about allowing international
inspectors could undermine its plans for war.
Bustani later revealed that John Bolton, then an under secretary of state,
had personally threatened him and his family with violent retaliation. The
US pressure on the OPCW over Douma also took place under Boltons watch.
When the US bombed Syria in April 2018 and pressured OPCW officials just
three months later, Bolton was in the midst of his first months as President
Donald Trumps National Security Advisor. (Bustani, meanwhile, was among a
group of panelists who heard direct testimony from Alex at a gathering
convened by the Courage Foundation in October 2019.)
OPCWs inconsistent story on Inspector A
The OPCWs internal inquiry goes to great lengths to denigrate and discredit
the two former staffers that challenged the official story on Douma. It
refers to its two targets as Inspector A and Inspector B. The latters
identity has not been publicly confirmed. A is Ian Henderson, a South
African engineer and veteran OPCW official with extensive military
experience.
Hendersons written testimony to the United Nations, obtained by The
Grayzone, undercuts the negative portrayal of his former managers, and
offers a window into the pressure campaign and cover-up that he and his
colleagues faced.
A suppressed internal study by Henderson first brought the OPCW scandal to
public attention. In May 2018, an engineering assessment bearing Hendersons
name was leaked to a group of British academics, the Working Group on Syria,
Propaganda and Media. The document is a detailed engineering analysis of two
gas cylinders found at the scene of the alleged attacks in Douma. Whereas
the OPCWs final March 2019 report concluded that the cylinders were likely
dropped from the air, Henderson found that there is a higher probability
that both cylinders were manually placed
rather than being delivered from
aircraft. The OPCWs final report made no mention of this conclusion.
The inference of Hendersons study is that the attack was staged by the
armed opposition. At the time, Douma was under the control of the extremist
Saudi-backed militia, Jaysh Al-Islam, and was on the brink of being re-taken
by Syrian government forces.
From a political and military standpoint, a chemical weapons attack was the
most self-destructive and unnecessary action the Syrian military could
possibly take. From the standpoint of a foreign-backed militia on the verge
of defeat, however, staging a chemical attack was a desperate Hail Mary
operation that offered the hope of US military invention in accordance with
Washingtons red line policy. The suspected gambit by Jaysh Al-Islam
appeared to have paid off when the Trump administration accepted its claims
that a chemical attack had killed dozens of civilians in Douma, and
initiated cruise missile strikes in response. Yet the US-led attacks failed
to prevent the Syrian government from retaking Douma and the whole of
eastern Damascus. Within days, Western reporters had entered the area and
were able to access local eyewitnesses who claimed that the chemical attack
was a staged deception.
Henderson was among the first OPCW staffers to visit the site of the alleged
attack in Douma. However, the OPCW inquiry dismissed Hendersons role in the
Douma probe, characterizing his engineering study as a personal, rogue
operation. Henderson, the inquiry said, was not a member of the FFM [Fact
Finding Mission] that deployed to Douma, and only played a minor
supporting role.
There is ample evidence that contradicts this characterization. In his
written UN testimony, Henderson revealed that he served in five Douma
deployments as part of the FFM. This includes three instances as a sub-team
leader for critical operations: visiting a suspected chemical weapons
production site in Douma; conducting interviews and taking chemical samples
at the Douma hospital; taking detailed measurements at one of the sites; and
inspecting, itemizing, and securing the two cylinders that were removed from
the sites of the alleged gas attack. The notion that he was not a member
of the mission that he played such an active role in strains credulity.
A leaked email shows that at least one of Hendersons colleagues protested a
previous instance in which the OPCW leadership attempted to minimize his
role. The falsehood
that Ian did not form part of the Douma FFM team, the
colleague complained, was patently untrue and pivotal in discrediting him
and his work.
The inquiry also falsely insinuated that Henderson was a low-level official.
While acknowledging that Henderson served as an OPCW team leader during his
first tenure with the OPCW from 1997 to 2005, the inquiry said that he was
rehired at a lower level when he returned in 2016, and remained there
until his departure in May 2019. Yet the OPCWs own documents from that
latter period showed that Henderson was described as an OPCW Inspection
Team Leader as late as February 2018, just two months before his deployment
to Douma as part of the OPCWs Fact-Finding Mission (FFM). According to his
UN testimony, Henderson served as an inspection team leader for multiple
inspections of Syrian laboratory facilities at Barzaeh and Jamrayah in
November 2017 and in November 2018, after the US bombed Barzeh on dubious
grounds.
After casting doubt on Hendersons status within the organization, the OPCW
inquiry dismissed his engineering report as a personal document created
with incomplete information and without authorisation. Henderson, the
investigators said, defied higher-level officials orders and conducted a
study on his own with outside contractors.
In his briefing to member states on the inquirys findings, OPCW Director
General Fernando Arias echoed this conclusion, describing Hendersons report
as a purported document disseminated outside the Organisation.
But Arias statements today contradict his own words from less than a year
ago. Just days after Hendersons report was leaked in May 2019, Arias
delivered an extensive briefing and announced that an inquiry into the
disclosure was underway. Arias made no claims of Henderson going rogue, and
described his report as an internal document
produced by a staff member.
It is unclear how Hendersons report went from an internal document by an
OPCW staffer in May 2019 to a purported document disseminated outside the
Organisation in February 2020. Arias has not explained this discrepancy.
In his latest missive, Arias has offered a completely new rationale for
keeping Hendersons report from the public. In May 2019, Arias stated that
because Hendersons report pointed at possible attribution, it was
therefore outside of the mandate of the FFM [Fact-Finding Mission] with
regard to the formulation of its findings. The FFM is prevented from
assigning blame to parties involved in chemical attacks. However, the OPCWs
published conclusion suggested the Syrian government was to blame for the
attack an act of attribution since the Syrian military (or its Russian
ally) was the only warring party in Douma with aircraft. Even more
curiously, by accusing Henderson of freebooting and subterfuge, Arias and
his organizations independent inquiry has now offered a completely
different explanation than it previously had for the omission of Hendersons
report.
Why was critical evidence excluded?
In yet another highly dubious assertion, the OPCW inquiry claimed Henderson
did not have access to all of the information gathered by the FFM team,
including witness interviews, laboratory results, and assessments by
independent experts regarding the two cylindersall of which became known to
the team after [Henderson] had stopped providing support to the FFM
investigation.
But an important piece of context is missing from this salvo: by the time
Henderson carried through on his study in summer 2018, he and other members
of the FFM had already complained to the OPCW leadership that their findings
were being manipulated and suppressed.
According to Hendersons testimony, a draft interim report circulated in
June 2018 was subjected to last-minute unexpected modifications that were
contrary to the consensus that had been reached within the team. This
included a change to reflect a conclusion that chlorine had been released
from cylinders, which was not consistent with the findings at that stage.
An intervention by one of the FFM team members, possibly Inspector B, forced
FFM team leader Sami Barrek to revise the interim report before its eventual
release on July 6 2018.
Despite agreeing to hear his teams objections, Barrek personally blocked
critical evidence that conflicted with the official story of Syrian
government responsibility. One email chain revealed that Barrek resisted
pleas from an inspector to include the relatively low levels of chemicals
found in Douma. Alex, the anonymous second OPCW whistleblower, told
journalist Jonathan Steele that chlorinated organic chemicals at the scene
were no higher than you would expect in any household environment.
Another leaked document showed the OPCW had consulted with toxicologists in
June 2018 to determine whether symptoms observed in victims were consistent
with exposure to chlorine. According to minutes of that meeting, the
experts were conclusive in their statements that there was no correlation
between symptoms and chlorine exposure. But these critical findings, which
dramatically undercut the official narrative, were inexplicably omitted from
both the interim and final report.
The core cover-up team
One day after US officials attempted to bully OPCW staff into submission on
July 5 2018, an interim report on Douma was published that reflected some of
the inspectors key objections, albeit with watered-down language and
significant omissions. A critical change then took place. OPCW officials
announced that the ensuing final report would be drafted by a core team
that was separate from the one which deployed to Douma. That left the core
team without any of the FFM members who had been on the ground at the site
of the supposed attack, with the exception of one paramedic. Henderson told
the UN that the move deprived the core team of anyone qualified to conduct
the needed engineering assessments on the chlorine cylinders that were said
to have been dropped in Douma.
With superiors omitting critical information, Douma inspectors excluded from
the so-called core team, and US officials applying direct pressure,
Henderson attempted to carry on with his report. Despite the inquirys
claims, Henderson presented evidence to the UN that his work was approved by
his superiors. Henderson reported that he held several meetings with top
OPCW officials beginning in late summer 2018, where he informed them of his
study and relayed concerns about the methodologies of the then-FFM team
leader. Henderson said he was told by the then-Chief of Cabinet, Sebastien
Braha: I dont see why both studies cant be done. Henderson took that as
a green light.
Henderson completed his engineering study in January 2019 and submitted a
detailed executive summary for peer review. OPCW colleagues, including
members of the Douma FFM, an unidentified former core team former
inspector, and other trusted [Technical Secretariat] staff members who had
expertise in specific areas, studied Hendersons work and offered written
feedback.
This review was considered necessary and responsible, Henderson wrote, in
that I knew (after the analysis had been completed) that these would be
unpopular findings; therefore, I wanted to make sure there were no
objections to any of the facts, observations, methodology used or findings
reported in the summary.
In its bid to portray Hendersons engineering study as the work of a
disconnected freelancer, the OPCWs inquiry strangely made no mention of
this peer review.
When he met with FFM team leader Sami Barrek the following month, Henderson
ran into more obstructions. Barrek flatly rejected Hendersons report,
stating that he had been instructed not to accept it. Alarmed by the
possibility that the OPCW would soon release a final report without a sound
engineering assessment, Henderson submitted a physical copy to the OPCWs
Documents Registry Archive, and alerted management by email.
It was then that another hostile response arrived from above. Braha, the
Chief of Cabinet, emailed back an order: Please get this document out of
DRA (Documents Registry Archive)
And please remove all traces, if any, of
its delivery/storage/whatever in DRA.
Days later, on March 1 2019, the OPCWs final report was released. Omitting
Hendersons engineering findings, it reached a conclusion that contradicted
that of its own inspectors. According to the report, the investigation found
that there were reasonable grounds that the use of a toxic chemical as a
weapon took place
This toxic chemical contained reactive chlorine. For its
analysis of the cylinders, the report claims it relied on three independent
analyses without specifying them and only directly citing one.
This raises an ineluctable question: why did the OPCW rely on three
unspecified independent analyses from outside experts who never set foot
in Douma, rather than on the evidence-based reports of a veteran OPCW
staffer and his colleagues who investigated the site of the supposed attack?
The OPCW has yet to offer an explanation.
I was shocked by the decision to release the report without having taken
into account the engineering report, as all the FFM management knew it had
been submitted, Henderson recounted in his UN testimony. I had expected
the report to reflect the situation that had been the consensus of the Douma
FFM team after the deployments, and for the assessment of the cylinders to
be consistent with the findings of the engineering assessment, but found the
complete opposite. I saw what I considered to be superficial and flawed
analysis in the section on the cylinders.
Henderson tried to resolve his concerns internally. He met with at least six
high-level officials, and sought a meeting with Arias. A senior manager
angrily rebuffed that request, telling Henderson that you will never get to
the Director-General, and if you try and go around me to get to him, there
will be consequences. Henderson also submitted a detailed dossier outlining
his concerns to the Acting Director of the Office of Internal Oversight,
which was later rejected.
Perhaps most critically, Henderson sought a meeting where the drafters of
the FFM report the so-called core team that had excluded all but one
member of the team that visited Douma would explain what new information
had been provided or new analysis conducted, that had turned around the
situation from what had appeared to be clear at the end of deployments to
Douma.
Henderson also requested an opportunity to hear from the three experts who
had conducted the engineering studies cited by the FFMs final report. This
would be a technical discussion, comparing the information and inputs used
and methodology applied, and interpretation of results, and would very
quickly identify any flawed approaches and would help clarify the
situation, Henderson recalled.
Throughout this period, I acknowledged there was a possibility that I could
be wrong, but stressed that I was not the only one with concerns, he added.
Investigating the situation would bring things to light and potentially
defuse the situation.
But Hendersons requests were denied. Whilst many in management were
shocked and concerned, and all expressed sympathy with my concerns,
Henderson told the UN, the responses I received included this is too big;
its too late now; this would not be good for the [Technical
Sectrariats] reputation; dont make yourself a martyr; and but this
would play into the Russian narrative.
A leaked memo written by Henderson to Arias, the OPCW Director General, in
March 2019, captures his contemporaneous objections. The final report,
Henderson wrote, does not reflect the views of all the team members that
deployed to Douma, a view he said was shared by about 20 inspectors. (Alex
relayed a similar account to Jonathan Steele: Most of the Douma team felt
the two reports on the incident, the Interim Report and the Final Report,
were scientifically impoverished, procedurally irregular and possibly
fraudulent.) On top of the fact the report was written by a core team
that excluded all but one Douma inspector, Henderson complained that its
authors had only operated in Country X believed to be Turkey.
Arias instructed Henderson to submit his report to the newly formed
Investigation and Identification Team, which had been mandated to further
investigate the Douma attack. The IIT met with Henderson in March 2019 and
accepted a copy of his report. But two months later, Henderson was suspended
and removed from the OPCW building after a leaked copy of his engineering
assessment was published on the internet. The OPCWs inquiry does not accuse
Henderson of responsibility for the leak.
Conspicuous claims about Inspector B
Less is known about Inspector B, the second OPCW inspector targeted by the
inquiry. It is possible, though unconfirmed, that B is the same person as
Alex, the aforementioned Douma team member turned whistleblower. Like
Henderson, B has been with the OPCW since its formation. The inquiry notes
that B initially served from July 1998 to December 2011, including as Team
Leader, and then again from September 2015 until August 2018.
As with Henderson, the inquiry attempted to portray Inspector B as a
marginal figure in the Douma inquiry who went rogue after he had left the
OPCW. While acknowledging that he was a member of the FFM team that deployed
to Syria in April 2018, the report said that B never left the command post
in Damascus, and therefore did not visit Douma.
By the OPCWs own standards, however, that was hardly disqualifying: Sami
Barrek, the FFM team leader, was only in Damascus for three days and
departed before his team members including Henderson first reached
Douma. Yet Barrek was tasked with drafting the final report, and, as leaked
emails show, faced internal complaints that he excluded critical evidence.
According to the Working Group, the British academic collective that
received and published Hendersons leaked report, Barrek subsequently
visited Turkey where he met with members of the White Helmets. The White
Helmets are a Western government-funded organization known for carrying out
rescue operations in areas under the control of foreign-backed
anti-government militias. As The Grayzone has reported, the US and UK-funded
White Helmets have operated alongside extremist militants during Syrias
proxy war, and been used for propaganda efforts to promote U.S. military
intervention and sanctions on Syria. In the case of Douma, the White Helmets
participated in a staged video to create the appearance that a local
hospital was treating victims of a chemical attack.
Conspicuously, the inquiry offered no specifics on what Inspector B did in
Damascus or his role in the FFM. This omission could be seen as an
indication that an accurate description of his role would reveal that he
played a significant one. The inquiry noted that he was involved in the
drafting of the interim report on the Douma incident but did not offer
further details. It seems unlikely that someone with a limited role in the
investigation would have been entrusted to participate in drafting the
public report on its findings.
As with its portrayal of Henderson, the inquiry claimed that the FFM
undertook the bulk of its analytical work, examined a large number of
witness interviews, and received the results of sampling and analysis, in
the months after Inspector B was no longer involved. But it had nothing to
say about Inspector B departing only after raising concerns that the Douma
teams analytical work was manipulated and excluded, including on vital
chemical samples. Accordingly, the fact that more work was done after Bs
ouster did not resolve his concerns; if anything, it only raised further
questions about the OPCWs faulty final product.
Western media outlets complicit in cover-up
The OPCWs unprecedented rebuke of two career officials has received a warm
reception in mainstream media outlets that have carefully ignored the OPCW
scandal to date, turning a blind eye as one explosive internal document
after another appeared on Wikileaks.
Though the scandal was itself a product of disclosures by the OPCWs own
staff, The Guardian bizarrely described it instead as a Russia-led
campaign that has now been dealt a blow by the OPCWs inquiry. The New
York Times published reports by Reuters and the Associated Press that also
aired the inquirys conclusions without a scintilla of critical scrutiny.
At a time when whistleblowing is supposed to be held in high esteem, the
Western political and media establishments flagrant disinterest and
disregard for the two dissenting inspectors and the explosive leaked
documents is glaring. This carries significant dangers.
As the email by a former senior official at the OPCW someone who was not
among the pair of dissenting inspectors made clear, fear within the
organization is almost as profound as the pressure to self-censor and
conform to the dominant narrative.
The experience of the OPCWs first director-general, Jose Bustani who was
ousted from his position after direct threats from John Bolton to him and
his family attests to the threats these new whistleblowers face. When
Bustani heard Alexs testimony, he came away from the meeting firmly
convinced that something had gone extremely wrong at the OPCW.
The convincing evidence of irregular behaviour in the OPCW investigation of
the alleged Douma chemical attack confirms doubts and suspicions I already
had, Bustani said after the session. The picture is certainly clearer now,
although very disturbing. Bustani added that he hoped the Douma revelations
will catalyse a process by which the [OPCW] can be resurrected to become
the independent and non-discriminatory body it used to be.
In his statement to the United Nations, Henderson echoed this sentiment. The
ousted expert called on the United Nations to allow for a scientific, peer
review process to weigh his report against the three independent experts
whom the OPCW claimed to rely on for its final report. The method of
scientific rigour, Henderson wrote, dictates that one side cannot profess
to be the sole owner of the truth.
Should an independent scientific panel be allowed, he concluded, I have no
doubt that this would successfully clarify what happened in Douma.
With his explosive UN testimony and the leaks that preceded it, Ian
Henderson and his colleagues have made clear that the OPCW experts who
deployed to Syria are determined to bring the cover-up of an elaborate
deception to light.
