BEIJINGS DECADES-LONG POLICIES IN XINJIANG
By Shane Quinn, Orinoco Tribune.
March 13, 2021 | EDUCATE!
Above photo: CGTN.
CIA Interference, Funding Of Separatist And Terrorist Groups.
Central to Chinas rise as a global power are the attempts to increase its
influence over Xinjiang, the countrys biggest and most mineral rich region.
Xinjiang has been part of Chinese territory since the mid-18th century,
longer than the existence of the United States, and this province at just
over 640,000 square miles, is equal to two-thirds the size of continental
Europe. Unlike Europe, however, Xinjiang is sparsely populated with just
over 20 million people while it contains rare and iconic species like snow
leopards, bears and wolves.
In 2019 Beijing oversaw the production of five million tons of cotton in
Xinjiang, 85% of the national total for the year. Cotton is considered one
of the most important cash crops in China. Oil itself was first discovered
in Xinjiang during the mid-1950s, in the opening phase of the Mao Zedong
era. Drilling for oil began soon thereafter, but oil production in the whole
of China prior to 1960 was almost non-existent. Since the early 1960s,
Chinas oil figures have been greatly increasing with little respite.
Well into this century Beijings extraction of oil from Xinjiang was
booming, while production had already peaked in the early and late 1990s in
Chinas major oil fields to the east, Shengli and Daqing (1). In recent
months further significant discoveries of oil have occurred in Xinjiang,
along with the finding of new natural gas reserves. Xinjiang holds slightly
more than 25% of all known oil sources in China, and is the countrys second
biggest oil producing area (behind Heilongjiang province).
Xinjiangs terrain has proven particularly challenging, posing unique issues
relating to transportation of goods and raw materials eastward. Water
scarcity has long been a problem. Xinjiang is encompassed by imposing peaks
including the formidable K2, and it is studded with deserts like the
Gurbantünggüt and Taklamakan. The latter desert is comfortably larger in
size than Britain.
Xinjiang is the linchpin of Beijings international-scale Belt and Road
Initiative. The province has never been more firmly under the sway of
Chinas authorities thwarting the efforts of separatist US-funded groups
such as the right-wing World Uyghur Congress, an umbrella organisation
headquartered in Munich; which calls for Xinjiangs complete independence
from China, along with its affiliates such as the Uyghur American
Association, based in Washington, and funded by the National Endowment for
Democracy. (2)
To grasp the social complexities seen in Xinjiang, it is important to
examine briefly the relevant history of this increasingly vital landmass.
The Islamic religion, of which its followers are called Muslims, first
reached the western half of Xinjiang in the 9th century, when it was then
part of Central Asia. From the 17th century Islamic teachings spread to the
eastern part of Xinjiang. By this time Xinjiangs population consisted of
branches of Turkic-speaking Muslims, possessing different dialects,
lifestyles and attire. The Qing dynasty governed China from the years 1644
until 1911 and in 1759 the long-ruling Qing Emperor, Qianlong, conquered
Xinjiang by force at the expense of the Mongol Dzungar people. By the
mid-18th century, Chinas main concern in capturing Xinjiang was to secure
its mainland from the threat of Mongol invaders, an ancient fear of Chinese
leaders. In the late 18th century the Qing dynasty began promoting Chinese
migration to Xinjiang, so as to fill out the borders.
In the 1880s, the most numerous Muslim group in Xinjiang were commonly being
referred to as Uyghurs. In 1884 the Qing government officially bestowed its
north-western province with the title Xinjiang, meaning New Frontier.
With the Mongol threat dissipated, Chinas leadership aimed to place
Xinjiang out of the reach of the massive Russian Empire, which believed it
had claims to this area.
Complete chaos befell China in 1912 with the collapse of the Qing dynasty,
the last empire to rule China. It had been hindered by financial
difficulties and inner turmoil, primarily due to Western imperial
encroachment, including American and British interference. Over following
years both Xinjiang and Tibet, Chinas two largest provinces, were dislodged
from Beijings sphere of influence. Furthermore, parts of Mongolia
northwards gravitated to Russian and then Soviet control, leaving China in a
terribly diminished state during the early-to-mid 20th century. Chinas
troubles were compounded by Japanese regional expansionism, that in turn was
spurred partly by further Western intrusion into Japans own realms of
concern.
Even before Chinas independence in 1949, Beijings officials and
intellectuals argued during the 1930s of the pivotal importance not to lose
Xinjiang to outside powers (3). Yet by 1934, Xinjiang had come under the
domination of Stalins Soviet Union to the north, with Red Army soldiers
intervening in Xinjiang twice, in 1934 and 1937, to support a Soviet-backed
warlord named Sheng Shicai. By 1940 there were only around 190,000 Han
Chinese still resident in Xinjiang, barely more than the numbers living
there in the early 1800s. The Han Chinese, it can be noted, presently make
up 1.3 billion out of Chinas 1.4 billion population.
Xinjiang started slipping out of Soviet control from the summer of 1941, as
Stalins gaze was fixed on the murderous Nazi invasion of the western USSR.
The Soviets were never quite able again to reinstate their authority over
Xinjiang, a region which Stalin prized like the Tsar before him. In November
1944, it is true that a Soviet-supported East Turkestan Republic was
declared in Xinjiang. This comprised merely of parts of northern Xinjiang
and it was short-lived, dissolving five years later as Chinas communist
forces entered Xinjiang. They found that most of the arable land was
controlled by a small number of landlords. (4)
At the end of World War II, the Uyghur people consisted of 82% of the
approximately four million people then living in Xinjiang, with other Muslim
folk like ethnic Kazakhs and Hui filling in most of the remaining
percentage. When Chinas communists came to power in October 1949 their
leader Mao Zedong, recognising the importance of safeguarding his
boundaries, sought to swiftly integrate Xinjiang and other vast provinces
like Tibet.
In state-sponsored moves, Mao encouraged Han Chinese to migrate in large
numbers to Xinjiang; this process was quickened from the late 1950s with the
Sino-Soviet split, as Mao became worried and suspicious of Russian
intentions close by. He was moreover keen to erode Xinjiangs centuries-long
cultural links to neighbouring Central Asia, which is heavily populated by
Muslim groups. In the decades after 1949 Xinjiang therefore shifted steadily
towards Beijings command, a strategy which continues. (5)
Maos financial injections into Xinjiang led to a raising of the living
standards for the majority of people there, including Muslims, which peaked
at least in GDP terms in 1960 before gradually dropping off in the ensuing
15 years. During the latter stages of Maos reign, by 1967 two million Han
Chinese had relocated westwards to Xinjiang (6). The arrival of Han Chinese,
whose culture is notably different to the indigenous groups, inevitably
resulted in varying levels of tension and dissatisfaction among Xinjiangs
Muslim people. This includes principally the Uyghur communities, many of
whose roots in the province date back centuries.
In 1945 Han Chinese amounted to just 6% of people living in Xinjiang, and by
1982 this figure had risen to 40%. The percentages have stabilised through
to this century, with Muslim groups having a majority of about 60% to the
40% of Hans. Most of the Han Chinese dwell in cities along Xinjiangs more
industrialised north, such as the capital Urumqi and oil metropolis Karamay.
The Uyghur people, many of whom are farmers, tend to lead simple lives and
the prospect of city existence can be repellent. Uyghurs generally have a
strong connection to the soil. For the bulk of Uyghurs, it is worth
stressing that their deepest concern is a potential loss of their ethnic and
religious identities (7). Nevertheless in Xinjiang there are 24,400 mosques
in operation, equating on average to one mosque for every 530 Muslims.
From 1978 until today, the rate of reform enacted by Chinas governments has
risen substantially, bringing with it rapid economic development to
Xinjiang. There have been commendable social benefits too. The average life
expectancy of a Xinjiang native in 1949 was very low at 31 years. Six
decades later it had more than doubled to 72 years. The huge increase in
life expectancy can be attributed to Beijings implementation of health care
programs, which have accelerated since the 1990s. These policies are
highlighted in independent studies published four years ago showing that, by
2001, there were just over 7,300 health care facilities in Xinjiang,
including 1,357 hospitals. (8)
By 2008, the number of hospitals in Xinjiang rose further to 1,629 whereas
when the communists first came to power, 54 medical centres existed
throughout Xinjiang. Seventy years ago just 10% of people in Xinjiang could
read or write, but by 2017 this figure had climbed to a well over 90%
literacy rate (9). These figures receive scant mention in the major Western
media, despite their significance. Prior to 1949 a minority of children
attended primary school, mainly because of a shortage of such schools.
Beijings development of educational initiatives has led to the construction
of many hundreds of schools in Xinjiang, both first and second level. In
November 2017, the Chinese government outlined a 15 year free education
program for all of Xinjiangs high school students (10). Extra subsidies
were reportedly provided to children from poorer backgrounds.
Through the decades, Beijing has poured the equivalent of over a quarter of
a trillion dollars into Xinjiang, most of which was forthcoming after 1978.
Under Chinas president Xi Jinping, since 2017 the average income of a rural
Xinjiang resident has increased by nearly 10%, with the majority of Uyghurs
residing in rural areas (11). Those living in Xinjiangs cities still enjoy
a considerably higher income overall, as it is easier to generate more
wealth in a city environment where opportunities are usually greater;
although, with urban life comes certain disadvantages such as a detachment
from nature and the land, health problems due to pollution, etc.
A large proportion of Uyghurs practice a moderate form of Islam called
Sufism, which promotes an ascetic lifestyle and shuns material wants. Sufism
is incompatible with radical Islamic fundamentalism and Wahhabism, extremist
beliefs which are prevalent in states like Saudi Arabia, a country which has
fanned the flames of terrorism in recent decades along with its Washington
sponsor; whose endless wars in the Middle East have been a boon to
terrorists past and present. Beijing is understandably anxious about
extremism afflicting some disgruntled Uyghurs, which has been the case; but
it should be stated that the overwhelming majority of Uyghurs are not
militant or extremist in outlook.
Beijings reforms in Xinjiang, such as relating to agriculture, have allowed
many Han Chinese to prosper and some Uyghurs. Over the past generation
especially, Beijing has undertaken large-scale infrastructural projects in
Xinjiang, overcoming serious logistical problems. This is borne out by the
construction of sprawling railroads, airports and highways, including
recently a 1,600 mile long road, completed in July 2017, linking Xinjiangs
most populace city Urumqi to Beijing. The Chinese governments oil and gas
pipelines criss-cross Xinjiang, like the enormous West-East gas pipelines,
which transport natural gas from Xinjiang to eastern China. These industries
have tied Xinjiang closer to mainland China, and has also helped to push
Central Asia in Beijings direction where Chinas infrastructure extends to.
In 2010 Beijing established a pairing assistance system, in which some
cities in China are required to aid Xinjiang by providing human resources,
technology, management and funds. In recent years Beijing has directly
furnished south-western Xinjiang, almost entirely populated by Uyghurs, with
$1.1 billion worth of earthquake-resistant housing construction, low-income
housing renovation, and sanitation (12). Chinese leaders have continued to
bankroll projects in Xinjiang, despite the disturbing number of terrorist
attacks in the province following the Soviet Unions collapse.
There have reportedly been different degrees of discrimination against
Xinjiangs Muslim communities, along with the human rights abuses which the
Western media have devoted such huge attention to; mainly relating to
extensive internment of Uyghurs and other Muslims in detention camps (13).
However, the press have failed to cover the above positive aspects of
Beijings policies in Xinjiang over the decades, which by a large measure
outweigh negative factors.
The media in the West, who have a history of supporting US and British wars,
also betray a long established tendency to overlook the more severe human
rights violations perpetrated by Western allies, like the Gulf oil dictator
countries. Perhaps the leading newspaper in the Western hemisphere, the New
York Times, strongly endorsed the US-led invasions of Iraq and Libya this
century and the Times previously backed the brutal attack on Vietnam
launched in early 1962 by the Kennedy administration; with the newspaper
continuing its support for the war as it escalated and expanded across
Indochina from the mid-1960s, by the Johnson and Nixon administrations.
Various New York Times journalists championed the US military assault on
Vietnam. They erroneously described the free worlds fight to contain
aggressive Communism, while defending the southern half of Vietnam against
proxy armies of Soviet Russia as the US Army sought to resist the
Vietcong (14).
Relating to Xinjiang, over the past generation Washington and the CIA has
provided consistent support to Uyghur separatist organisations, and
terrorist groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). Since 2003 the
TIP has been led by the now 48-year-old extremist Uyghur militant, Abdul Haq
al-Turkistani, who was born in southern Xinjiang. The TIP, originally going
by the name the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, received direct CIA funding
and sponsorship (15). From 1990 until 2016 scores of terrorist attacks were
perpetrated in Xinjiang. Many of these rampages were subsequently traced
back to the TIP, which has close connections to Al Qaeda. The TIP leader
Abdul Haq has, for example, served on Al Qaedas executive leadership
council, and he is a firm believer in waging jihad (holy war) against China
to attain the TIPs separatist goals.
Contrary to numerous US intelligence reports and media accounts at the time,
Abdul Haq was not in fact killed in an American drone strike on 15 February
2010, in north-western Pakistan. On 5 June 2015 he was seen alive and
kicking, as he spoke in a video interview about how he had been heavily
injured in 2010 but duly recovered. He also appeared in later videos
providing undeniable evidence of his apparent reincarnation. Abdul Haq was
well acquainted with former Al Qaeda boss Osama bin Laden, who was not so
fortunate, having been killed by US Special Forces in northern Pakistan on 2
May 2011. The Americans took the extreme risk of violating Pakistans
sovereignty, and sparking a possible war with a nuclear power, in order to
eliminate bin Laden who once had ties to the CIA. (16)
In the months prior to the summer 2008 Olympic Games held in China, Abdul
Haq ordered the TIP to unleash terrorist attacks against a number of cities
in mainland China particularly those hosting sporting activities in
order to disrupt and overshadow Beijings hosting of the Olympics (17).
Almost all of the terrorist plots were foiled. Following Chinas clampdown
in Xinjiang starting in 2017, including increased surveillance, it can be
acknowledged that no terrorist acts have since taken place in the province.
