[aodvv2-discuss] Fwd: Re: [manet] draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00

  • From: Charlie Perkins <charles.perkins@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "aodvv2-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <aodvv2-discuss@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2016 06:09:21 -0800

Hello folks,

Integration with saodv should be counted as a separate project, a new requirement not identified in the manet charter.

It would have the effect of delaying last call, I am pretty sure.

Regards,
Charlie P.



-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject:        Re: [manet] draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00
Date:   Sat, 5 Mar 2016 12:59:50 +0100
From:   Anders Nilsson Plymoth <lanilsson@xxxxxxxxx>
To:     Charlie Perkins <charles.perkins@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC:     Mobile Ad Hoc Networks mailing list <manet@xxxxxxxx>



Hi Charlie,

I understand you are mainly addressing E2E protection here, with regards to RREQ and RREP, but I am of the strong opinion that AODVv2 should have a more integrated security model, rather than ad hoc.

The use of HMACs for message authentication is a well known and well used approach. However, the use of HMAC implies the use of symmetric keys, and the question is how this key distribution should take place. I have seen hints of the usage of a single shared key, but this seems a little naive to me.

I would instead argue for a signature based approach, i.e. the use of public keys and certificates. This is the approach that was proposed for the SAODV draft, and although that draft is clearly outdated, I think the general idea there is good.

Regarding RFC 7182 instead of RFC 4868? Yes, definitely. You already rely on RFC 7182 for the security considerations of the AODVv2 draft. However, in the AODVv2 draft you mainly consider integrity protection, and less that of authentication. Also, this draft, draft-perkins-manet-aodv-e2esec-00 seems to address integrity more than authentication.

In summary, what I personally would like to see is a stronger integration of RFC 7182 and its concepts into the AODVv2 protocol specification, that also addresses authentication and key management considerations. As it is, it would be very hard to read the AODVv2 and its security considerations and build an implementation that incorporates RFC 7182, and have different implementations inter-operable.

Thanks,
Anders





On Thu, Mar 3, 2016 at 11:24 PM, Charlie Perkins <charles.perkins@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:charles.perkins@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:


   Hello folks,

   In order to promote useful discussion about the security model for
   AODVv2, I have submitted a new draft with an idea to enable the
   source and destination of a Route Discovery to verify that they were
   indeed the source and destination of the route that was discovered.
   This is not a guarantee of a useful route, because intermediate
   routers are not authenticated, only the endpoints.  Nevertheless the
   idea seems like a useful adjunct to the existing hop-by-hop security
   as currently specified in AODVv2.

   It can use more work:
   - Should RFC 7182 be specified instead of RFC 4868?  If so, what is
   the simplest way to make the conversion?
   - Should other message types be covered as well?  This would be
   pretty simple; I just need to reword the section specifying the
   input data.

   I only used RFC 4868 because it seemed very straightforward for me
   to understand.

   Comments are solicited and welcome.  The content of the document may
   well belong in the upcoming revision of AODVv2 that will be provide
   resolutions for the many recent comments.

   Regards,
   Charlie P.

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