federal rules of civil procedure rule 17(a)(2), rule 17(a)(1)(G). 42 usc
1983, 42 usc 1988. honorable mention, pub law 92-500.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973): Judge Reynolds
permitted the discovery. He found that the argument for confidentiality was
outweighed by two policies favoring disclosure. First was ‘ the broad
federal mandate for discovery in all civil actions,’ that is, the federal
policy of liberal pretrial discovery as a basis principle of the modern
federal procedural scheme. The second reason inheres in the civil rights
laws themselves:
[I]t is the manner of enforcement which gives § 1983 its unique
importance, for enforcement is placed in the hands of the people. Each
citizen ‘ acts as a private attorney general who ‘ takes on the mantel of
the sovereign,’ ' guarding for all of us the individual liberties
enunciated in the Constitution. Section 1983 represents a balancing feature
in our governmental structure whereby individual citizens are encouraged to
police those who are charged with policing us all. Thus, it is of special
import that suits brought under this statute be resolved by a determination
of the truth rather than by a determination that the truth shall remain
hidden.
Coralyn Hill vs. The State of Arizona DUNS number 072459266:
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
According to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted April 9,
1866, (and sometimes referred to as The Private Attorney General Act), 39th
Congress, Session 1, Ch 31 (1866), CHAP. XXXL, (Formally titled): An Act to
“Protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and
Furnish the Means of their Vindication,” April 9, 1866; Public Law 104-317,
Oct 19, 1996, 110 Stat 3853; 93 stat 1284; Public Law 96-170, 96th
Congress, Dec 9th 1979.4:
“Private attorney general is an informal term usually used today in the
United States to refer to a private party who brings a lawsuit considered
to be in the public interest, i.e., benefiting the gene
ral public and not just the plaintiff [it can be, if its used to protect
you and your rights]. The person considered “private attorney general” is
entitled to recover attorney’s fees if he or she prevails. The rationale
behind this principle is to provide extra incentive to private citizens to
pursue suits that may be of benefit to society at large.”
The private attorney general, made its first appearance in the legal
literature in a 1943 decision, by Judge Jerome Frank, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Assoc. Indus. of New York v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). Judge Frank concluded that Congress could
authorize a private citizen to file suit even if the sole purpose of the
case were tou vindicate the public interest as opposed to some private
interest of the litigant: “Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak,
private Attorney Generals.”
In drawing this conclusion, Judge Frank analogized this citizen suit to a
qui tam action. Id. at 704-705 discussing U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537 (1942)); and also Colorado Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 118 F.2d 24, 28
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (Edgerton, J.,concurring).
The plaintiff holds the position as a private Attorney General, under the
1866 Vindication and Civil Rights of the 39th Congress. This Congressional
Act gives the Plaintiff the authority to step in, when the states fail or
the government fails to uphold and protect the rights of the citizens. It
allows the plaintiff to act as a prosecutor, and enable him to bring
charges on those who hold public office and hold them accountable for their
misdeeds and misconduct, in breach of their trustee duties as fiduciaries;
as is written in the Lieber Code, Under General Orders No. 100. This
includes insurrection and rebellion, and misuses of their/that public
office in order to abuse and to incite riot among the peaceful inhabitants,
as well as endanger the lives and health of United States Citizens.
Justice KENNEDY (Supreme Court of the
United States) delivered the opinion of the Court: Although the
Constitution begins with the principle that sovereignty rests with the
people, it does not follow that the National Government becomes the
ultimate, preferred mechanism for expressing the people's will. ALDEN v.
MAINE, 527 U.S. 706
Justice GINSBURG, dissenting: In the system established by the Federal
Constitution, however, "ultimate sovereignty" resides in the governed.
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n, 576
U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2675, 192 L.Ed.2d 704 (2015); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 324-325, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816); Braun, supra, at
26-30. Insofar as a crime offends the "peace and dignity" of a sovereign,
Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382, 43 S.Ct. 141, that "sovereign" is the people, the
"original fountain of all legitimate authority," The Federalist No. 22, at
152 (A. Hamilton); see Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal
Governments: Another *1991 Exercise in Federalism, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1538,
1542 (1967). gamble v us (2019).
Article IV sec 4 The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence.
Justice O’Connor, raised without deciding the possibility that the
Guarantee Clause is justiciable and is a constraint upon Congress’s power
to regulate the activities of the states. New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 183–85 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) .
The opinions draw support from a powerful argument for using the Guarantee
Clause as a judicially enforceable limit on federal power. Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
Separate opinion of Justice McREYNOLDS (Supreme Court of the United
States): In Texas v. White (1869) 7 Wall.
700, 725, a cause of momentous importance, this Court, through Chief
Justice Chase, declared-- 'But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the
Union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence,
or of the right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of
Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly
delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though the powers
of the States were much restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the
United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people. And we have already had occasion to remark
at this term, that 'the people of each State compose a State, having its
own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate
and independent existence,' and that 'without the States in union, there
could be no such political body as the United States.' (Lane County v.
Oregon, 7 Wall. 71). Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate
and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the
Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of
the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within
the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union
and the maintenance of the National Government. The Constitution, in all
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States.' STEWARD MACH CO. v. DAVIS, 301 U.S. 548
