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Dr. Richard Cordero, Esq.
Ph.D.,University of Cambridge, England
M.B.A., University of Michigan Business School
D.E.A., La Sorbonne, Paris
Judicial Discipline Reform
New York City
http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org
Dr.Richard.Cordero_Esq@xxxxxxxxxxx , DrRCordero@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
, CorderoRic@xxxxxxxxx Whyno credibility can be assigned to
either Attorney GeneralJudge Merrick Garland,
who pretends that in his DoJ’s police departmentinvestigations
“We will follow the facts and the law wherever they lead”,
for he violated the law when
he dismissed100% of complaints against fellow judges,
thus covering up their abusecomplained about; or the Biden Commission on
reforming theSupreme Court,
whose overwhelming majority of members are
former law clerks to justices andjudges,
bound by the confidentiality agreement that they signed with them; and
law professors,
whose schools compete for the prestige of having justices andjudges
accept their students as clerks,
teach as adjunct professors, and
serveon their boards and moot courts Commissioners compromisedby a conflict of
interests
will produce an inherently biased, unreliable, and theoretical report; and make
it necessary forstudents and journalists to hold
unprecedented citizens hearings Meantime, learn how to ask the Commission to
let the national public hear your story of abuse by unaccountable judges and
how to write it in up to 500 words
http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Biden_SCt_reform_Commission.pdf
Professor Michael Ramsey
Member of the Biden Commission on reforming the Supreme Court,
the other Commission members;
professors, students, journalists, and Advocates of Honest Judiciaries Dear
Prof. Ramsey, Commission members, professors, students,journalists, and
Advocates, Thank you, Prof.Ramsey, for your reply to thearticle that I emailed
to each commissioner and the public at large, whichbears the following
summarizing title: Candidate Biden had announced
the nomination of a commission to reform the court system;
President Biden has formed
a commission only to enlarge the Supreme Court and limit justices’ terms. Has
Attorney General Judge Merrick Garland prevailed
to reduce the commission’s scope so as to prevent any investigation intojudges’
conduct,
which would have exposed his unlawful 100% dismissal of complaints
againstfellow judges and
the consequent cover-up of his and their underlying abuse of power? Exposing
the connivance between the President and the Federal Judiciary
can bring down, not just a president, but rather a branch:
an unaccountable Judiciary risklessly running as a racketeering enterprise.
Pitchinga story with Pulitzer Prize potential In your reply, you pointed out
the issues of resending the article andits credibility thus: DearDr. Cordero,
thanks for submitting your comments to me as part of the Commissionon the
Supreme Court. However, this is the third time you have sent me theessentially
identical email. If you persist in this approach, I will haveto regard your
communications as spam. I might add, also, that this approach isnot one that
enhances your credibility.
Best regardsMichael Ramsey My credibility is determined, not by the number of
times that I email an article, but rather by the quality of my law research and
writing, and strategic thinking, on which depend the reliability,
understandability, and insight of its contents. I respectfully invite you to
assess them by reading the new article hereunder.
A. Introduction: aCommission that runs away to write a new constitution 1. You,
the commissioners, can follow theprecedent for ‘a Commission that runs away’
from its mandate: The Articles ofConfederation adopted in 1777 by the former 13
colonies and by then independentstates entered into effect in 1781. They proved
to be unworkable. So in 1787, thestates chose delegates to convene to propose
amendments. The delegates,including George Washington, presiding over the
amending convention, and James Madisonand Alexander Hamilton, tried
unsuccessfully. Instead of becoming stuck with adoomed mandate, the delegates
took a courageous and historic decision: Theycast the Articles of Confederation
aside and wrote a totally new constitution. Itcame into force in 1789 and has
been in effect ever since. 2. That was 232 years ago! That Constitution
waswritten by only free white landed men. They had a mentality
completelydifferent from ours, for they lived in a world completely different
from thepresent one: a pre-industrial one that had no running water,
electricity,electronic devices, cars, trains, never mind airplanes; no
universal suffrage,education, health care, employee or tenant rights, etc.
Since then, that Constitution has beendistorted to make it fit by force an
evolving world. 3. It is an anachronistic document. It represents‘the dead
man’s hand’ governing us from a world that passed away a long timeago. A dead
man, not just a dummy, his lips have been manipulated by ventriloquistson the
bench and lawyers before them to say things so repugnant to him and
hiscontemporaries born centuries ago that none of them would have said even
undertorture that what they said in writing was ever intended to mean it: There
is aright to abortion, same-sex marriage, freedom from slavery, privacy… “The
horror of it! May theLord punish you in everlasting hell. Its fire sheds light
so bright that itallows of no ‘penumbra’ where those rights could have been
hidden. Only in thedarkness of ignorance and dishonesty could disingenuously
‘enlightened’ menpretend that our Constitution contains those rights anywhere.”
4. The Commission can end this ventriloquistfarce. It can make us, We the
People,the Masters of our Words by drafting a new constitution. That willallow
us to speak for ourselvesand to our needs. 5. The commissioners should muster
the courage to run away from theirmandate, to wit, to study ways of reforming
the SupremeCourt. If they do, they will not run alone. Rather, they will take
the lead of the 34 statesthat since April 2, 2014, have petitioned Congress to
call a constitutionalconvention, as provided for by the amending provisions of
Article V of the Constitution. 6. The commissioners would be wise to run away
from their mandate because they cannot fulfill it honestly: An attempt to
fulfill it is anexercise in providing cover to a political party’s
predetermined decision to‘pack the Court’ by increasing the number of justices
and reducing their termin office in order to reestablish the balance of power
in the Court. It isfanciful to think that the commissioners could demonstrate
such wisdom in their study asto persuade that party to desist from its
decision. The commissioners will end up being thatparty’s dummy.
7. What is more, the commissioners cannot fulfill their mandate because the
overwhelming majority of them were law clerks tojudges, even to Supreme Court
justices, and are law professors. As discussedbelow, to be allowed to clerk for
them, they had to sign the judges' confidentialityagreements; and to obtain
from them the glowing letters of recommendation thatwould make or break their
careers they did anything and everything that thejudges and justices asked them
to do. 8. As law professors they are under pressure fromtheir schools never
ever to speak ill of federal judges, who have alife-appointment; the long
memory to hold grudges that goes along with it; andcrushing power of
retaliation as individuals and as a class; e.g.:
a. Federal District Judge Gonzalo Curiel was presiding over the Trump
University case. In June 2016, Candidate Trump did not like one of his
decisions and referred to him disparagingly as "the so-called judge of Mexican
heritage", who could not be impartial because Trump wanted to build a wall
between the U.S. and Mexico. He kept campaigning on issuing a ban on Muslim
immigration travel. Upon receiving the votes of more than 62.5million voters
and becoming president, he issued that ban as one of his first executive orders
in 2017.
b. Yet, Federal DistrictJudge James Robart of Seattle, Washington State,
suspended President Trump's Muslim travel ban nationwide and a panel of three
circuit judges –although twowould have sufficed– sustained the suspension
nationwide. As then-Judge, now-Justice Neil Gorsuch put it: "An attack on one
of our brothers and sisters of the robe is an attack on all of us". What an
unambiguous, unabashed expression of judges' gang mentality!
b. Subsequently, federal judges and even justices together with their state
counterparts ruled against or dismissed at least 86 cases filed by Trump and
his allies challenging the 2020 presidential election results. 9. It follows
that the commissioners have a conflict of interests: To propose ways of
reforming the Supreme Court, they would have to apply the practical model used
by Congress: It investigates theissue claimed to need legislation, e.g., by
holding public hearings thereon;makes findings of facts; and relies on them as
the justification for writing abill of law. 10. The commissioners cannot
expose the conductin practice, rather than in theory, of judges without
revealing that the judges for whom they clerked committed illegal andunethical
acts and improprieties(Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 2, which enjoins
judges 'to avoid impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety'). The
judges engaged in such conduct under cover of theirconfidentiality agreement
with the clerks and their dismissal of 100% of complaints againstthem,
discussed below. Judges’ abuse of power is riskless. By contrast, for the
commissioners to expose it isfraught with risk. They are compromised. 11. The
commissioners can honestly resolvetheir conflict of interests by ‘running away’
from a mandate that is adishonest attempt at political manipulation rather than
an honest means ofjustice reform. They can write a new constitution. Therein
they can enable the People tostrip their judicial public servants of
self-ensured unaccountability and holdthem to the same equaltreatment of
compensation for being abusive or incompetent as judges do police officers,
priests, lawyers, doctors, and everybody else...except themselves. 12. If you,
the commissioners, do so, you willnot continue to be former clerks and
professors among thousands of them, butwill become the ‘parents’ of a historic
constitution that brings abouttransformative change in the system of justice:
the system that goes in comesout a different one appropriate for those living
today. That will earn you recognitionhere and abroad as the Peoples’Champions
of Justice. B. Resending an email to overcome the interception by judges
ofpeople’s emails and mail to detect and suppress those that are critical
ofjudges 13. We all suffer from informationoverload. Nobody can read all the
emails that they receive. That is why senders,including me, resend their
emails: to increase the odds that recipients willread their emails. Publishers
too ‘resend’their articles when they publish them, not in dailies, but rather
in weeklies,monthlies, or periodicals on display in the stands for two, three,
or fourmonths, as professional journals are. TV operators‘resend’ reruns to
distribute and lower their cost per broadcast. Similarly, Iresend my emails to
distribute the enormous investment of time andeffort needed to research, write,
and self-edit them. 14 The very first words of my articles make upa note
encouraging recipients to acknowledge receipt of the article thereunder.If I do
not receive such acknowledgment, I resend them the article. 15. By far the
most important reason for myresending my articles is the factual and
statistical probable cause to believethat federal judges intercept the emails
and mail ofpeople to detect and suppress those of their critics. 16. The
judges’ motive is to prevent criticism oftheir abuseof power from so outraging
the public as to force both law enforcement authorities, e.g., the FBIand its
state counterparts, to investigate judges; and Congress to conduct hearingsthat
can lead to legislation holding judges accountable. 17. The judges’ means to
intercept is their vast,nationwide computer network and expertise, which handle
daily hundreds ofthousands of filings and retrievals of pleadings, motions,
records, petitions, etc.;updatings of dockets; issuance of orders and
decisions; etc., whether enteredor requested by court clerks, lawyers, or
parties with access to their CaseManagement/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) or
Public Access to Case Electronic Records (PACER) systems. 18. The judges’
opportunity to interceptpresents itself, for instance, when under the Foreign
Intelligence SurveillanceAct (Title 50 of the U.S. Code of federal laws,
sections 1801 et seq. (50USC §§1801 et seq.), the National Security Agency
(NSA)and other intelligence agencies secretly request judges to issue secret
ordersof secret surveillance. Judges grant up to 100% of thoserequests(>Ln:
212, 263, 269). Judges andthose agencies do what since the first impeachment of
President Trump officersat the highest level of government are known to do or
suspected of doing: enterinto quid pro quos. 19. Their willingness to break
the law if theythink that they can get away with it was indisputably
illustrated by the NSA: It secretly and illegally recorded the metadata of
scores of millions ofphone calls, as revealed by the documents leaked by Edward
Snowden in 2013. 20. In this context, note that the United States Postal
Service handles 429.9million letters and packages every day andserves 161.4
million addresses in the country. Yet, it has the means of offering the
Informed Delivery service, whereby it sends each of its 33 million registered
customersevery day an email with the photo of the address side of every letter
and packageto be delivered to their address that day. X-ray technology enables
the readingof letters without opening their envelopes. 21. Federal judges havea
strong motive to take advantage of their means and opportunity to break thelaw
because thereby they can increase their gain and convenience. Indeed, apublic
officer as knowledgeable about financial matters as Sen. ElizabethWarren has
daredenounce in her "Ihave aplan for the Federal Judiciary too”how federal
judges fail to recuse themselves from cases in which they own stockin a company
that is a party to the case before them in order to resolve theensuing conflict
of interests in their favor to protect or increase theirstock’s value. Sen.
Warren refers to such practice throughout the FederalJudiciary as judges’
abusive self-enrichment. She attributes it to their unaccountability..22. The
evidence of judges’ unaccountability ispresented and discussed in:
a. my three-volume study*†♣ of judges and their judiciaries, which is based on
professional lawresearch and writing, and strategic thinking. The study is
titled anddownloadable thus: Exposing Judges' Unaccountability
andConsequent Riskless Abuse of Power:
Pioneering the news and publishing field of
judicial unaccountability and abuse reporting* † ♣ * Volume 1, >all prefixes:#
up to OL:393 † Volume2, >from OL2:394-1143 ♣ Volume3, >from OL3:1144
http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL3/DrRCordero-Honest_Jud_Advocates3.pdf ;
i. Open the downloaded files using AdobeAcrobat Reader, which is available for
free. b. the articles that I have written and posted to my website
JudicialDiscipline Reform at http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org. They ;
haveattracted so many webvisitors and the latter have reacted to them so
positivelythat 38,448+ have become subscribers to it(Appendix3).
1) How manylaw firms, never mind lawyers, do you know who have a website with
so manysubscribers?
2) You can join the subscribers thus:
go to http://www.Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org ;<left panel ↓Register
or
+ New or Users >Add New.
1. Judges intercept and self-enrich because they ensure
theirunaccountability.23. Federal judges break the law because it isriskless
for them to abuse their power for their protection and self-enrichment.Indeed,
under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (28USC §§351-364), any
person can file a complaint against a federal judge in the courtof appeals of
the circuit, or the national court, where the judge sits. 24. The
officialstatistics on complaints against federal judgesare collected and
submitted to Congress(28 USC §604(a)(3-4); id.) as a publicdocument in the
AnnualReport of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
The director is appointed by the Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court(§601)..25.
Each complaint is first reviewed by thechief circuit judge. To protect their
fellow judges, chief judges systematically dismiss 100% of complaints and deny,
together with the other judges on the judicial council(28USC §§332) of their
respective circuit, 100%of petitions to review dismissals. .26. This is what
President Biden’s AttorneyGeneral, Judge Merrick Garland, did during his
2013-2020 7-year term as chiefjudge of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit inWashington, DC. Thereby ChiefJudge Garland covered up his
fellow judges’abuse of power complained about and collected IOUs to ensure that
whenever hewas the target of a complaint, he too would be protected.
27. By so doing, he knowingly advanced his personaland judicial class interest
while leaving complainants uncompensated and the rest oflitigants and the
public at the mercy of judges held unaccountable and free torisklessly continue
abusing their power..28. He did so while Then-Judge, Now-JusticeBrett
Kavanaugh, who served on that Court for the 2006-2017 11-year period kept
silentabout such illegal abrogation in practice of that Act of Congress. So
didThen-Judge, Now JusticeSonia Sotomayor while on the Court of Appealsfor the
Second Circuit; Then-Judge, Now-JusticeNeil Gorsuch while on the Court of
Appeals forthe Tenth Circuit; and Then-Judge, Now-JusticeAmy Coney Barrett
while on the Court of Appealsfor the Seventh Circuit. ChiefJustice John G.
Roberts, Jr., has known aboutjudges’ institutionalizedpolicy of complaint
dismissal and reviewpetition denial, and has covered it up..29. Now as Attorney
General, Judge Garland cannotexpose his fellow judges and justices as abusers
of power without risking exposure for his abuse of power. His credibility is
compromised. That is why he will not investigate judges' interception of
people’s emails and mail to detect and suppress those oftheir critics. .30.
Critics can only keep resending their emailsin an attempt to overcome such
interception. They must also denounce this mostoutrageous abuse of power, for
it infringes on Americans’ most cherishedrights, namely, those under the U.S.
Constitution, First Amendment,guaranteeing their "freedomof speech, of the
press, the right of the people peaceably to assemble [throughthe Internet and
on social media too], and to petition the Government [of whichjudges are the
third branch] for a redress of grievances [includingcompensation for waste and
fraud]". C. Attorney General Judge Garland has no credibility to investigate
policedepartments 31. Attorney General Judge MerrickGarland gave his first and
exclusive interview since taking office as AG to ABCNews Chief Justice
Correspondent Pierre Thomas on Monday, April 19, 2021. Inhis report on it on
the PBS WashingtonWeek episode of Friday, April 23, 2021, he includeda clip
where AG Judge Garland says, “Racism is an American problem. We do not yet
haveequal justice under law and as I said, I think this is an important part of
therole of the Justice Department” (DoJ). Accordingly, he hasopened a
wide-ranging DoJ investigation of police departments. 32. On Monday, April 26,
CBSEvening News anchor Norah O’Donnell introduced areport by correspondent Jeff
Pegues containing a clip where AG Judge Garland saysthat ‘the Department of
Justice’s “investigation will include a comprehensive reviewof the Louisville
[, Kentucky] police department’s policies and training” in the wake of its
police officers’ botched execution of a warrant, which resulted in the killing
of Breonna Taylor in her own bed. “Wewill follow the facts and the law wherever
they lead”, he added. .33. It is reasonable to assume that among thethousands
of complaints filed with chief circuit judges, such as AG JudgeGarland himself
was at the Court of Appeals for the District of ColumbiaCircuit until February
11, 2020, there have been, are, and will be complaintsagainst judges whom
complainants have charged and will charge with biastoward police officers and
departments accused of abusing their power.
34. It is reasonable to expect that just as Judge Garlanddismissed 100% of
complaints against fellow judges without referring them forinvestigation to the
special committees provided for under the Judicial Conductand Disability Act(28
USC §353), he will now as AttorneyGeneral continue to protect his own, whether
it be himself, his fellow judges, the Federal Judiciary, his Department of
Justice, or his boss,i.e., President Biden, by covering up those complaints
through their exclusion from his DoJ investigationof police departments. .35.
AG Judge Garland has shown that it is in hischaracter to show recklessdisregard
for “thefacts and the law” by systematically steering allcomplaints into
dismissal from 'wherever they would have led' in order to ensure for his
fellowjudges ‘unequal justice under law” to the detriment of abusees. 36. It
follows that AG Judge Garland has nocredibility to lead fairly and impartially
any “importantpart of the role of the Justice Department”, especiallyany
investigative part intended to ensure “equal justice under law”. D. A
Commission composed of former law clerks and current lawprofessors
has no credibility to study how to reform the Supreme Court.37. For the
Commission to be credible it mustnot only discuss the theory of constitutional
law, but also investigate the runningin practice of the Supreme Court and the
conduct of its justices as well as thoseof the lower courts and their judges,
whom they supervise. Otherwise, the Commission will only be athinly disguised
device for one political party to “pack the Court” by increasing the number of
justices from 9 to 15 in the expectationthat by nominating and confirming the
new justices, the party will give itself a majorityin the Court for one or two
generations..38. However, an investigation of the Court andits justices cannot
be fair and impartial if it is undertaken by commissionerswho were law clerks
to judges and justices so that they have an interest in notexposing the abuse
of power of these judicial officers, including their peersand colleagues,
because by so doing the commissioners would implicatethemselves in the
enforcement of these officers’ abuse or its cover-up. 39. The clerks became
accessories before andafter the illegal and unethical conduct and improprieties
in which judges and justices engaged asprincipals or as their masterminds. .40.
Nor can a fair and impartial investigationbe conducted by law professors who
have an interest in not compromising theirstanding in their schools by exposing
the abuse by judges, who would inretaliation diminish the schools’ prestige by
not teaching there as adjunctprofessors, not serving on their boards and moot
courts, and neither referringnor accepting their students for law clerkships.
When those schools and theirmembers appeared in their courts, it would be
payback time for judges, who would unmistakablyscream through their rulings
“Don’tyou ever mess with us!” 1. Commissioners are compromised by the
confidentiality agreementwith,
and the letter of recommendation from, judges.41. Judges have two effective
means of compelling law clerks to act as enforcers of their abuse, whether by
committing it upon their order or covering it up, which includes keeping quiet
about it: theconfidentiality agreement that clerks must sign before they begin
theirclerkship; and the letter of recommendation that they need from the judge
atthe end of it in support of their application for their next job. .42. Law
clerks are recently graduated lawstudents -unless they are summer clerks after
their first or second law school year-, most are young, and practically all are
saddled with a crushing studentloan. They clerk for a judge for one year before
getting their first regularlaw job. So they are professionally and financially
vulnerable..43. It is prestigious to clerk for a judgebecause judges can choose
the best candidate –a Supreme Court justice hiresthree– among the many who
apply. .44. So, prospective clerks are not in a position to bargain with judges
over thecontents of the confidentiality agreement that judges require them to
sign. Itis an adhesion contract: take it or leave it. 45.While the contents of
such agreements are not standard, they require basically thesame: ‘whatever you
learn during your clerkship that if disclosed can harm thejudge or his peers,
colleagues, or third parties, you keep it to yourself; andif you disclose it,
you consent to paying the judge a liquidated amount of X;three times the value
of any benefit that you receive for disclosing it; andwhatever is necessary to
compensate the judge for any harm, includingloss of reputation’. .46. Fellow
judges have similar confidentiality agreements withtheir own clerks and the
same interest in having them upheld fortheir benefit. If a judge goes against
another judge sued by his clerks, e.g., by invalidating their agreement,
shebecomes branded as treasonous and unreliable. The other judges do not want
totake the risk of being ‘betrayed’ by her, whatever the matter may be. So
shebecomes a pariah among them. It is socially, professionally, and emotionally
wearingto be so branded among peers and colleagues, especially if they have a
life-appointment. .47. It follows that clerks stand no chance ofwinning against
a judge if they challenge the agreement. So they keep quiet. Butthat does not
mean that judges allow them to become passive bystanders. 48. On the contrary,
the clerks must do whatjudges tell them to do: The clerks become the enforcers
of judges’ abuse. Theybecome compromised by their confidentiality agreement and
theirown crass personal interest. .49. In fact, clerks are paid a modest
salarybecause a complement comes in the form of a glowing letter of
recommendation atthe end of the clerkship. It can earn a clerk a sign-up bonus
from her new employer worth scoresof $1,000s -a clerk to a justice commands a
bonus worth around $250,000-. 50. Thebonus is paid to acquire something
valuable from the clerk: precious knowledge of the workings of, and sources of
informationin, a court, where decision-making judges interact with each other,
lawyers,and third parties. The salary that a clerk earns in her first job after
her clerkshipestablishes the floor for future salaries. .51. A lacklusterletter
of recommendation has a profound and long-term injurious impact on the career
of the clerk, branding him a persona nongrata in that court, or any other court
for that matter, or incompetent as alawyer. That is what a clerk gets if she
dare complain about any abuse by the hiringjudge or even any other judge.
Judges do not reward ‘whiners’, never mindwhistleblowers. .52. If aclerk
complains in a way that the hiring judge alleges to be in breach of
theconfidentiality agreement, the judge can bring suit, mostlikely under seal,
before his fellow judges. They decide any motion by theclerk for their own
recusal...and then find for the hiring judge without evenreading his brief. The
clerk loses as a result of the judges’ implicit or explicit mutualprotection
agreement. .53. It took some 700 hundred letters sent toChief Justice Roberts
by former and current law clerks complaining aboutjudges’ abuse and their use
of confidentiality agreements and letters ofrecommendation as means of forcing
clerks into submission for the Chief to setup a commission to study the matter.
54. The commission went through the motions; the judges have kept dismissing
100% of complaints and denying 100% of dismissal review petitions.
55. It does not take a suit for judges’ to havetheir peremptory warning bounce
between their clerks’ ears and render them totally submissive: .Weare judges;
we have all the power!...youare nothing.
2. Commissioners that are law professors have
an interest in not exposing judges’ abuse.56. Law professors have every
interest in not telling their students about their illegalor unethical conduct
and improprieties as law clerks: They run the risk of breaching
theirconfidentiality agreement with judges (arguably void or voidable for lack
ofmeeting of the minds since they could not reasonably have expected to
berequired to conceal or engage in illegal and unethical conduct; and
judges’breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). .57.
They also risk incriminating themselves andrendering themselves liable to third
parties. They need not confess what theydid as enforcers of judges’ abuse. If
they exposed what happens in judges’chambers and among judges, third parties
could put together what might have happenedto them while those professors were
clerking for judges. The third partieswould subpoena the professors as
witnesses or even name them as defendants..58. But the professors need not be
former lawclerks to realize that it is not in their professional interest to
exposejudges’ abuse. Law professors are employees and even officers of their
lawschools. So the latter and the former are bound by a principal-agent
relation. 59. Professors also stand in a position ofpower over their students
and are a source of trusted advice because of theirsuperior knowledge,
experience, and connections. So they are bound by a fiduciary dutyto their
students..60. Professors’ failure to warn students abouthow judges would compel
them upon becoming their clerks to act as enforcers of their abuse provides
current and former students withthe predicate for suing both the professors and
the schools.
61. This gives schoolsa motive to pressure their professors into not exposing
abuse by judges or anyabusive judge. The schools could fire them for concealing
material information about their clerkship, that is, information that would
have led the schools, acting as reasonable persons in the best interest of
their institution and their students, to reach a different or adverse decision
on employing them.
62. Accordingly, by law professors keepingsilent, they derive the benefit of
avoiding the adverse consequences ofembarrassing their schools and making them
the target of judges’ devastating power of retaliation. 63. By speaking up to
place students as clerksin prestigious judgeships and justiceships they benefit
from becoming morevaluable to their schools by enhancing the latter’s
reputation. Professors doso to the knowing detriment of students. 64. This
satisfies the general notion of fraud:The making of a known misrepresentation
to obtain a benefit to the knowndetriment of the target of the
misrepresentation. This gives students causes ofaction against professors for
fraud and breach of their fiduciary duty; andsupports a claim for compensation
for the harm thus suffered. Schools could sue professors for fraud in the
inducement to being hired.
.
3. The Biden Commission will be a prop for
political manipulation with no substantive reform 65. The public
is atthe mercy of abusive judges and those who cover for them. The latter
include, as shown above, law clerks and professors. They are compromised. Thus,
the public should know whether they are nevertheless the very ones who make up
the overwhelming majority of the Biden Commission. If so, the public is
justified in asking:
a. In what way can the public reasonably expect to benefit from the Commission
if it is composed of people who have an interest adverse to the public's,
namely, to protect abusive judges and conceal the fact that they are their
protectors?
Source: Announcementof the Biden Commission on the U.S. Supreme Court; April
9,2021
| 1. | Name of Commissioner | Current status | Former law clerk to: |
| 2. | Bob Bauer, co-chair | Professor of Practice, New York University
(NYU) School of Law | |
| 3. | Cristina Rodriguez, co-chair | Professor of Law, Yale Law School
| Judge David S. Tatel, Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit; Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor |
| 4. | Michelle Adams | Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law | Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV in the Southern District of NY
|
| 5. | Kate Andrias | Professor of Law, University of Michigan |
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg; J. Stephen Reinhardt, Court of Appeals 9th Cir. |
| 6. | Jack M. Balkin | Professor of Law, Yale Law School | |
| 7. | William Baude | Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School | Judge Michael McConnell and Chief Justice John Roberts |
| 8. | Elise Boddie | Professor of Law, Rutgers University | Judge
Robert L. Carter, Southern District of NY |
| 9. | Guy-Uriel E. Charles | Professor of Law, Duke Law School |
Judge Damon J. Keith, 6th Circuit |
| 10. | Andrew Manuel Crespo | Professor of Law, Harvard University |
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Court of Appeals, 9th Cir.; Justice Stephen Breyer and
Justice Elena Kagan |
| 11. | Walter Dellinger | Emeritus Professor of Law, Duke University
| Justice Hugo Black; has argued 25 cases before the Supreme Court |
| 12. | Justin Driver | Professor of Law, Yale Law School | Judge
Merrick Garland, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Ret.), and Justice Stephen Breyer
|
| 13. | Richard H. Fallon, Jr. | Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
| Judge J. Skelly Wright; Justice Lewis F. Powell |
| 14. | Caroline Fredrickson | Professor of Law, Georgetown Law | J.
James L. Oakes, Ct. of Appeals 2nd Cir. |
| 15. | Heather Gerken | Dean and Professor, Yale Law School | |
| 16. | Nancy Gertner | Professor of Law, Harvard Law School |
Former US District Court Judge (D. Mass.); Justice Luther Swygert, Chief Judge,
7th Circuit |
| 17. | Jack Goldsmith | Professor of Law, Harvard Law School | |
| 18. | Thomas B. Griffith | Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School |
Former Judge at the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit; served on the Code
of Conduct Committee of the Judicial Conference |
| 19. | Tara Leigh Grove | Professor of Law, Alabama School of Law |
Judge Emilio Garza of the Court of Appeals 5th Cir. |
| 20. | Bert I. Huang | Professor of Law, Columbia University |
Justice David H. Souter; Judge Michael Boudin, Court of Appeals 1st Circuit |
| 21. | Sherrilyn Ifill | Former Professor of Law, U. of Maryland School
of Law; President & Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, Inc. (LDF) | |
| 22. | Michael S. Kang | Research Professor, Northwestern School of
Law | Judge Kanne, Court of Appeals 7th Circuit |
| 23. | Olatunde Johnson | Professor of Law, Columbia Law School |
Judge David Tatel, Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit; Justice John Paul Stevens |
| 24. | Alison L. LaCroix | Professor of Law, Chicago Law School |
|
| 25. | Maggie Lemos | Professor of Law, Senior Associate Dean for
Faculty and Research, and faculty co-advisor for the Bolch Judicial Institute
at Duke Law School | Judge Kermit V. Lipez, Court of Appeals 1st Circuit;
Justice John Paul Stevens |
| 26. | David F. Levi | Professor of Law and Judicial Studies, and
Director of the Bolch Judicial Institute, Duke Law School; President of the
American Law Institute | |
| 27. | Trevor Morrison | Dean and Professor of Law, NYU School of Law
| Judge Betty Fletcher, Court of Appeals 9th Circuit; Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg |
| 28. | Caleb Nelson | Professor of Law, University of Virginia School
of Law | Judge Stephen F. Williams, Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit; Justice
Clarence Thomas |
| 29. | Richard H. Pildes | Professor of Law, New York University
School of Law | Justice Thurgood Marshall; Judge Abner J. Mikva, Court of
Appeals D.C. Circuit; has represented numerous clients before the Supreme Court
|
| 30. | Michael D. Ramsey | Professor of Law, University of San Diego
School of Law | Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Court of Appeals 9th Cir.; Justice
Antonin Scalia |
| 31. | Kermit Roosevelt | Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
Carey Law School | Judge Stephen F. Williams, Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit;
Justice David H. Souter |
| 32. | Bertrall Ross | Professor of Law, University of California,
Berkeley School of Law | Judge Dorothy Nelson, Court of Appeals 9th Ninth
Cir.; Judge Myron Thompson, District Court Middle District, Alabama |
| 33. | David Strauss | Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the
Supreme Court and Appellate Clinic, University of Chicago | argued 19 cases
before the U.S. Supreme Court |
| 34. | Laurence Tribe | Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard University
| clerked for the California and U.S. Supreme Courts; argued 35 cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court |
| 35. | Adam White | Assistant professor of law, George Mason
University’s Law School | clerked for the Court of Appeals D.C. Circuit |
| 36. | Keith E. Whittington | Professor of Politics, Princeton
University | |
| 37. | Michael Waldman | President of the Brennan Center for Justice
at NYU School of Law | |
66. Thanks to their experience as law clerks and their superior knowledge as
professors, the commissioners have actual and imputed knowledge of judges'
abuse.
67. For instance, law clerks know –and all the more so those who were members
of the justices’ 'pool of clerks' that recommend the grant ofpetitions to
review on appeal lower court decisions–, that the justices grant onaverage only
1 out of every 93 petitions given that their jurisdiction is discretionary: In
their discretion, the justices grant certiorari...while in their exercise of
unaccountable power they grant themselves an annual three months vacation,
unheard of whether in the public or the private sector.
68. As a result, circuit judges know that the chances of their appealed
decisions being taken up for review by the justices are minimal. But even if
review were granted, the justices did the same when they were circuit judges so
that they are not going to implicitly criticize themselves by sustaining the
charges in the review petition.
69. This allows circuit judges to havetheir clerks use 5¢ dumpingforms to
dispose, according to the official statistics, of 93%of appeals(>OL2:457§D) in
decisions “onprocedural grounds [mostly the catchall pretext of “lack of
jurisdiction”],unsigned, unpublished, by consolidation, without comment”. 70.
They are unresearched, reasonless, ad-hoc,arbitrary, fiat-like orders. They are
unappealable in practice, for there is barely anything to appeal other than
their only operative words: "affirmed" or "denied".
71. The $1Ks and even $10Ksthat each party to an appeal to a court of appeals
must spend to research, write, print, bind, serve, file, andargue its case goto
waste. Only the remaining 7% get a writtenopinion from circuit judges with a
semblance of disposition on the merits.
72. The merits are of no concern when it comes to cases filed by parties
without the assistance of lawyers, that is, pro se. The Annual Report to
Congress of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts states
that they are weighed as a third of a case(>OL2:455§B). This means that judges
are not only authorized to give it only one third of the attention and time
that they give a regular case, but also are expected not to waste any more than
that on a pro se case regardless of the nature and gravity of the matter that
it deals with. Yet, a pro se party must pay the same filing fee as a rich party
that can afford the most expensive law firm.
73. These are concrete examples of how judges with the help of clerks commit
unequal treatment under law.
74. The justices know about this inequality and abuse, not only because most
werelower court judges, but also because under 28 U.S.C. §42 they have been
allotted as circuit justices with supervisoryduties to one or more circuits. In
fact, “Thecircuit justice...shall have precedence over all the circuit judges
and shallpreside at any session which he attends”(§45(b)). 75. Since circuit
justices are duty-bound to supervise the judges in their circuits, they have
imputedknowledge of their abuse; and would have actual knowledge thereof if
they had proceeded with duediligence to do so.
76. This shows that neither justices nor judges care about the theoretical
constraints that dueprocess, equal protection, and the First Amendment are
supposed to impose onthem. ‘Possession of riskless power is 95% of judges’
conduct’.
77. Their former law clerks and now law professors know and should know that
pro ses and 93% of all parties in the courts of appeals will get, not justice,
but ratherdumped out of court by the judge-ordered and clerk-enforced
perfunctory process and unequal treatment. However, they keep quiet about it
and pretend when teaching students, dealing with their clients, and addressing
the public that it makes sense to go to court because the judges, supervised by
the Supreme Court, will administer to the parties justice.
78. The commissioners cannotreveal that the judges' official statistics and
reports themselves show that this is not so. If they did, they would implicate
themselves in having enforced the judges' and justices' abuse and
misrepresented them as honest public servantsand private persons. One can
assume that they remember with fear what judges have tattooed on their
foreheads to give each other and their clerks a constant warning of their
complicity:
If you let anybody take me down, I'll bring you with me!
79. This generates a conflict of interests that deprives the commissioners of
thecapacity to meaningfully contribute to reforming the Supreme Court
byinvestigating justices’ conduct in practice, rather than merely discussing it
in theory. 80. Compromised, the Biden commissioners will neither directly nor
indirectly investigate judges’ abuse of power. If they hold public hearings at
all, they will demand that prospectivewitnesses submit in advance a statement
of their intended testimony and use itto exclude from the hearings –and from
the documents supporting their report-those who would tell a negative story of
judges’ conduct, not in theory, but inpractice. .81. It follows that the
commissioners' activities will be pro forma andtheir report a whitewash of the
Court and themselves. Through them thecommissioners will commit fraud on the
public: benefiting from being praisedfor their work while knowingly harming the
public by keeping it subject to judges’unaccountability and consequent riskless
abuse of power. The credibility atstake is their own.
E. Unprecedented citizens hearings to do what the commissioners willnot do:
expose judges, force their resignation, and bring down theirjudiciaries
82. Lawstudents together with students of journalismare among the best and the
brightest. They can join forces among themselves andwith journalists and media
outlets to expose judges' abuse of power by holding unprecedentedcitizens
hearings(>§F).
83. Studentsand journalists can hold citizens hearings viavideo conference, a
means with which Covid and Zoom have familiarized the whole world. Thereby they
can afford everybody an inexpensive opportunity to telltheir stories of abuse
by judges that they have suffered or witnessed untilsomething emerges: patterns
of judges’ abuse and abuse articulated in complex forms, that is, schemes.
84. They can reveal judges’ abuse to be so systematic as to be their modus
operandi; and so coordinated as to be their means of running their judiciaries
for their abusive self-enrichment and convenience as racketeeringenterprises.
.85. So revealing abuse will have fateful consequences: It will launch a
generalized investigation of judges abuse. On professional and commercial
grounds, other students and journalists, including
citizens journalists as well as other members of academic communities, will
want to jump on the investigative bandwagon. Its direction can be guided by an
incisive question:
What did you know aboutjudges’ abuse and when did you know it? .86. That
question is an adaptation of the oneasked from 1973 on by Sen. Howard Baker,
co-chairman of the Senate WatergateCommittee. It had a damning effect, forcing
the resignation of PresidentNixon on August 8, 1974; and leading to the
imprisonment of all his White Houseaides. This is described by WashingtonPost
reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in their bestseller All the
President’s Men and thehomonymous blockbuster movie.
87. Today, that question can bring down, not just men, but rather a branch of
government: the unaccountable and abusive Federal Judiciary. It is the model
for its state counterparts. They would follow suit.
.
F. Actions requested from the commissioners and the otheraddressees 88.
Therefore, I respectfully request that: a. you, the commissioners, publicly
acknowledgethat your confidentiality agreements, the letters of recommendation,
and yourcurrent status in your schools have given rise to a conflict of
interests that impairsyour credibility as fair and impartial examiners of the
Supreme Court acting ingood faith to attain the intended purpose of reforming
it; b. each of you resign from the Commission; c. if you stay on the
Commission, you muster thepersonal and civic courage to publish jointly and
severally an Emile Zola’s I accuse!-like denunciation of
judges’unaccountability and riskless abuse of power, just as Sen. Elizabeth
Warren did (supra ¶21); d. you provide public access on your website toall
submissions, including those critical of judges, the Commission, and
itsmembers, just as the official statistics showing judges dismissing100% of
complaints, and documents filed in civil andcriminal court, including
indictments, and with the Senate Subcommittee on JudicialNominations, are
public; e. youhold public hearings where everybody has the opportunity to tell
the nationalpublic their story of the abuse of power by judges that they have
suffered orwitnessed; f. youshare this article with all students in your
schools and the rest of youruniversities and encourage them to hold the
proposed unprecedentedcitizens hearings; g. you useyour good offices to cause
the publication of this articleby a national publisher, bringing to their
attention the precedent for thetransformative change that an article can bring
about: The New York Times and TheNew Yorker published their exposés of the
abuse by Harvey Weinstein onOctober 5 and 10, 2017, respectively. Within a week
the MeToo! movement erupted worldwide.Public accountability in practice began
to changesubstantially everywhere and in every aspect of society. 1) An
articleexposing the conduct in practice of judges, before whom police brutality
cases arebrought, and given the widespread Black Lives Matter mood, can provoke
public outrage. It can set off ageneralized academic and media investigation
into judges. It can start a trend in our country and the rest of the world.
2) The findings of the investigation can leadto transformative reform, causing
one or all justices to resign, as Supreme Court Justice AbeFortas had to on May
14, 1969; former 9th Circuit Chief JudgeAlex Kozinski on December 18, 2017; and
3rd Circuit Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, the sister of President Donald Trump,
on February 11, 2019.
3) Hence, the article can be instrumental in toppling the Federal Judiciary,
exposed asa racketeeringenterprise. The whole system of justice couldbe
reformed in its substance here and abroad. h. you and all other addressees make
public your ‘1stAmendment grievance redress petition’: Let everybody with a
story of abuse by judges suffered or witnessed be heard and compensated.
i. to that end, you all share both your petition and this article with your
friends andrelatives, and post them to social media, such as: Facebook,
Youtube,
WhatsApp,
LinkedIn,
Instagram,
Google plus,
Pinterest,
Reddit,
Snapchat, and Twitter: Join the petition that the Biden Commission on Supreme
Court reform hear publiclyall stories of abuse by judges and report on how to
hold them &judiciaries accountable & liable to compensation;
http://Judicial-Discipline-Reform.org/OL2/DrRCordero-Biden_SCt_reform_Commission.pdf
j. addressees take advantage of thetwo-phase method(>§G) for writing
theirstory in up to 500 words; and submit it together with their petition and
thisarticle to the commissioners by pasting in the To: box of their email this
blocof their email addresses: cristina.rodriguez@xxxxxxxx,
robert.bauer@xxxxxxx, kandrias@xxxxxxxxx, jack.balkin@xxxxxxxx,
RBauer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, baude@xxxxxxxxxxxx, madams@xxxxxx,
charles@xxxxxxxxxxxx, acrespo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, wdellinger@xxxxxxx,
ecb95@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,justin.driver@xxxxxxxx, rfallon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
heather.k.gerken@xxxxxxxx, ngertner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
jgoldsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, tgriffith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, tgrove@xxxxxxxxxx,
bhuang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, mkang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, ojohns@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
lacroix@xxxxxxxxxxxx, lemos@xxxxxxxxxxxx, levi@xxxxxxxxxxxx,
trevor.morrison@xxxxxxx, cnelson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, rick.pildes@xxxxxxx,
mramsey@xxxxxxxxxxxx,krooseve@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, bross@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,
d-strauss@xxxxxxxxxxxx, tribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, awhite36@xxxxxxx,
kewhitt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, michael.waldman@xxxxxxx,
caroline.fredrickson@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, development@xxxxxxxxxxxx, k. After having
heardus, the Masters of our Living World, you, the commissioners, run away
fromyour mandate and draft a new constitution that sets forth our current
notions of rightsand duties, and power to hold our judicial public servants
accountable fortheir performance and liable to compensate the victims of their
abuse.
G. My offer to present this article to you and your guests 89. I offer to make
a presentation of thisarticle to the commissioners, professors, students,
journalists, and Advocatesvia video conference or, if here in New York City, in
person.
90. You may assess mycapacity to make such presentation by watching my video
and following it on its slides. H. Every meaningful cause needs resources for
its advancement;
none can be continued, let alone advanced, without money Put your money
where your outrage at abuse and
passion for justice are. DONATE
to
Judicial Discipline Reform
to support its professionalresearch and writing, strategic thinking, and
sending and resending itsarticles;
see also its businessplan guided by the motto “MakingMoney While Doing Justice”,
by making a deposit or an online transfer to Citi Bank,
routing number 021 000 089, account 4977 59 2001 through
Paypal,https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_s-xclick&hosted_button_id=HBFP5252TB5YJ
or by mailing a check to the addressbelow. Dare trigger history!...and you may
enterit. I look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, Dr.Richard Cordero,
Esq.
JudicialDiscipline Reform
2165 Bruckner Blvd.
Bronx, NY 10472-6506
tel. (718)827-9521
Dr.Richard.Cordero_Esq@xxxxxxxxxxx ,DrRCordero@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ,
CorderoRic@xxxxxxxxx
https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-richard-cordero-esq-0508ba4b NOTE: Given the ;
interference with Dr.Cordero’s email and e-cloud storage accounts described at
*>ggl:1 et seq. and †>OL2:1114§G,when emailing him, copy the above bloc of his
email addresses and paste it inthe To: line of your email so as to enhance the
chances of your email reachinghim at least at one of those
addresses.**********************************
