If it is a stale and outdated view of the divine then what is the accurate
view? Who is Jesus in your view? Was all that was written about him made up
whole cloth, or is there another way to interpret what all of those people were
writing about?
On Jul 10, 2021, at 5:54 PM, J_B <tf4624@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
IRS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
The IRS lacks territorial jurisdiction. Yes, YOU HEARD THAT CORRECTLY!
The current system of enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A
and C is repugnant to and violative of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the
Constitution and its implementing statute, 40 U.S.C. 255.
The Constitution is unambiguous about defining WHAT Congress is authorized to
do and WHERE they can do it. The IRS cannot tax where the US cannot legislate.
Specifically with respect to "where" Congress enjoys legislative, i.e.,
police/taxing jurisdiction, the Constitution reads:
"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular
states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of
the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased
by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be,
for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings;"
Constitution: Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17
The Department of Justice's own Criminal Resource Manual documents the true
limits of the DOJ's police authority:
664 Territorial Jurisdiction
Of the several categories listed in 18 U.S.C. § 7, Section 7(3) is the most
significant, and provides:
The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States," as used in this title, includes: . . . (3) Any lands reserved or
acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired
by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the
same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or
other needful building.
As is readily apparent, this subsection, and particularly its second clause,
bears a striking resemblance to the 17th Clause of Article I, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution.
This clause provides:
"The Congress shall have power. . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may,
by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the
Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings." (Emphasis added.)
The constitutional phrase "exclusive legislation" is the equivalent of the
statutory expression "exclusive jurisdiction."
See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141 (1937), citing, Surplus
Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652 (1930).
Until the decision in Dravo, it had been generally accepted that when the
United States acquired property with the consent of the state for any of the
enumerated purposes, it acquired exclusive jurisdiction by operation of law,
and any reservation of authority by the state, other than the right to serve
civil and criminal process, was inoperable. See Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook,
281 U.S. at 652-56. When Dravo held that a state might reserve legislative
authority, e.g., the right to levy certain taxes, so long as that did not
interfere with the United States' governmental functions, it became necessary
for Congress to amend 18 U.S.C. § 7(3), by adding the words "so as," to
restore criminal jurisdiction over those places previously believed to be
under exclusive Federal legislative jurisdiction.
See H.R. Rep. No. 1623, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); S. Rep. No. 1788, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
Dravo also settled that the phrase "other needful buildings" was not to be
strictly construed to include only military and naval structures, but was to
be construed as "embracing whatever structures are found to be necessary in
the performance of the function of the Federal Government." See James v.
Dravo Contracting Co. , 302 U.S. at 142-43 . It therefore properly embraces
courthouses, customs houses, post offices and locks and dams for navigation
purposes.
The "structures" limitation does not, however, prevent the United States from
holding or acquiring and having jurisdiction over land acquired for other
valid purposes, such as parks and irrigation projects since Clause 17 is not
the exclusive method of obtaining jurisdiction.
The United States may also obtain jurisdiction by reserving it when sovereign
title is transferred to the state upon its entry into the Union or by cession
of jurisdiction after the United States has otherwise acquired the property.
See Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1938); James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 142; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. at
650-52; Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526-27, 538, 539
(1885).
The United States may hold or acquire property within the borders of a state
without acquiring jurisdiction. It may acquire title to land necessary for
the performance of its functions by purchase or eminent domain without the
state's consent. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371, 372 (1976). But
it does not thereby acquire legislative jurisdiction by virtue of its
proprietorship. The acquisition of jurisdiction is dependent on the consent
of or cession of jurisdiction by the state.
See Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 97 (1937); James v. Dravo
Contracting Co ., 302 U.S. at 141-42.
State consent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction may be evidenced by a
specific enactment or by general constitutional or statutory provision.
Cession of jurisdiction by the state also requires acceptance by the United
States.
See Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (1943); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook,
281 U.S. at 651-52.
Whether or not the United States has jurisdiction is a Federal question.
See Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. at 197.
Prior to February 1, 1940, it was presumed that the United States accepted
jurisdiction whenever the state offered it because the donation was deemed a
benefit. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 528. This
presumption was reversed by enactment of the Act of February 1, 1940,
codified at 40 U.S.C. § 255. This statute requires the head or authorized
officer of the agency acquiring or holding property to file with the state a
formal acceptance of such "jurisdiction, exclusive or partial as he may deem
desirable," and further provides that in the absence of such filing "it shall
be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been acquired." See
Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312 (district court is without jurisdiction
to prosecute soldiers for rape committed on an army base prior to filing of
acceptance prescribed by statute). The requirement of 40 U.S.C. § 255 can
also be fulfilled by any filing satisfying state law. United States v.
Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 984-86 (2d Cir. 1993). The enactment of 40 U.S.C. §
255 did not retroactively affect jurisdiction previously acquired. See
Markham v. United States, 215 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 939
(1954); United States v. Heard, 270 F. Supp. 198, 200 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
In summary, the United States may exercise plenary criminal jurisdiction over
lands within state borders:
A. Where it reserved such jurisdiction upon entry of the state into the union;
B. Where, prior to February 1, 1940, it acquired property for a purpose
enumerated in the Constitution with the consent of the state;
C. Where it acquired property whether by purchase, gift or eminent domain,
and thereafter, but prior to February 1, 1940, received a cession of
jurisdiction from the state; and
D. Where it acquired the property, and/or received the state's consent or
cession of jurisdiction after February 1, 1940, and has filed the requisite
acceptance.
U.S. DOJ Criminal Resource Manual, October 1997 Section 664
The police power is vested in the States and not the federal government. See
Wilkerson v. Rarer, 140 U.S. 545, 554, 11 S.Ct. 865, 866 (1891) (the police
power "is a power originally and always belonging to the States, not
surrendered to them by the general government, nor directly restrained by the
constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive"); Union
National Bank v. Brown, 101 Ky. 354, 41 S.W. 273 (1897); John Woods &Sons v.
Carl, 75 Ark. 328, 87 S.W. 621, 623 (1905); Southern Express Co. v. Whittle,
194 Ala. 406, 69 So.2d 652, 655 (1915); Shealey v. Southern Ry. Co., 127 S.C.
15, 120 S.E. 561, 562 (1924) ("The police power under the American
constitutional system has been left to the states. It has always belonged to
them and was not surrendered by them to the general government, nor directly
restrained by the constitution of the United States … Congress has no general
power to enact police regulations operative within the territorial limits of
a state"); and McInerney v. Ervin, 46 So.2d 458, 463 (Fla. 1950)
"No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction." Standard v Olson,
74 S.Ct. 768. "It has also been held that jurisdiction must be affirmatively
shown and will not be presumed." Special Indem. Fund v Prewitt, 205 F2d 306,
201 OK. 308 Even the IRS's own CID manual shows it does not have jurisdiction
inside the fifty states:
"The Criminal Investigative Division enforces the criminal statutes
applicable to income, estate, gift, employment, and excise tax laws involving
United States citizens residing in foreign countries and non-resident aliens
subject to federal income tax filing requirements."
IRS Criminal Investigation Division
The Supreme Court says the government has an obligation to ascertain bona
fide authority:
"Anyone entering into an arrangement with the government takes the risk of
having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the government
stays within the bounds of this authority." Federal Crop Insurance v.
Merrill, 33 U.S. 380 at 384 (1947).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even states there is no jurisdiction
inside the States:
" 'Act of Congress' includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in
force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an
insular possession." See 18 USC, Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Note: There is NO reference to the 50 "states."
The IRS must establish jurisdiction or it will be sanctioning FRAUD: "Silence
is a species of conduct, and constitutes an implied representation of the
existence of facts in question. When silence is of such character and under
such circumstances that it would become a fraud, it will operate as an
Estoppel."
Carmine v. Bowen, 64 U.S. 932
"Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty
to speak or where an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally
misleading. ... We cannot condone this shocking conduct by the IRS. Our
revenue system is based upon the good faith of the taxpayers and the
taxpayers should be able to expect the same from government in its
enforcement and collection activities .... This sort of deception will not be
tolerated and if this is the 'routine' it should be corrected immediately."
[U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (1977)][quoting U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021, 1032 (1970)]
The U.S.C. codifies the Constitutional requirement at Article I, Section 8,
Clause 17 and proscribes the procedure and required documentation for the
federal government to successfully assert jurisdiction inside one of the
fifty states. To wit: 40 USCS § 255 (now 3111 and 3112) clearly and
specifically requires that a "notice of acceptance" is to be filed "with the
Governor of such State or in such manner as may be prescribed by the laws of
the State where such lands are situated." "Such lands," of course, referring
to those lands that the federal government, through its agents, is claiming
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over the people living thereon. The text
of § 255 concludes with the statement "Unless and until the United States has
accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it
shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted."
[Emphasis added]
Obviously, if the requirements of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 of the
Constitution of the United States are not complied with, and/or if the
procedural requirements of 40 U.S.C. § 255 are not complied with, then no
public servant who is acting as an agent of the United States, i.e. the
federal government, has any bona fide authority whatsoever to attempt to
force compliance with any federal law, rule, code, statute, etc. on anyone
living in such an area that is not subject to any bona fide jurisdiction of
the federal government.
In support of this rather an obvious conclusion, the second paragraph of
interpretive note 14 of 40 U.S.C. § 255 says: "In view of 40 U.S.C. § 255, no
jurisdiction exists in United States to enforce federal criminal laws, unless
and until consent to accept jurisdiction over lands acquired by United States
has been filed in behalf of United States as provided in said section, and
fact that state has authorized government to take jurisdiction is immaterial.
Adams v. United States (1943) 319 US 312, 87 L Ed 1421, 63 S Ct 1122."
(plaintiff's emphasis). [Federal jurisdiction] " ...must be considered in the
light of our dual system of government and may not be extended. . .in view of
our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between
what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct.1624 (1995).
The IRS lacks territorial jurisdiction. The current system of enforcement of
the Internal Revenue Code, Subtitle A and C is repugnant to and violative of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution and its implementing
statute, 40 U.S.C. 255.
