(Han) ... my sense is twofold. (1) to the extent that these things appear different, they constitute senses of "think," each of which bear family resemblance to one another. (2) Science finds information about the matter that introduces technical grammar into the the language game, for whatever purposes those grammars serve. To understand "think," one must understand its uses in the language game and the information that arrives about it from science (or whomever). And if a way of speaking comes along to say that X "thinks," no matter what it purportedly said, it would seem to be confined to its sense and dependent upon the information it was conveying. Imagine you say to yourself: "I'm not thinking today." Or, "my thoughts aren't working." And someone else says: "My parrot thinks." Neither of these ideas could be said to be contradictory; they all say something meaningful. So I guess when you ask "what is think," we must ask back: what do you want to know? What neurological grammar says about it? What psychological grammar does? (I don't know these answers). Think how silly it would be for science to say "the parrot doesn't 'think,'" when so much capital is exchanged in the language marketplace with such an expression. I guess the real question is this: how do technical senses of "think" differ from ordinary senses, if at all? (Cf., "motion." -- the lay sense versus that of particles and so forth). Regards and thanks. Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs ; _______________________________________________ Wittrs mailing list Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://undergroundwiki.org/mailman/listinfo/wittrs_undergroundwiki.org