--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
>
>

> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:

>
> > responding to http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/6250

>
> > SWM:
> > I was making the point that if you define consciousness as
> > needing intentionality and intentionality as what's needed to have
> > consciousness you haven't taken us to any new understanding of the
> > issue or given us a conclusion that was not already evident. For
> > the argument to be of use, we need to learn something we didn't
> > explicitly know before.
>

> I surely don't know what you think you are replying to. It seems that
> you must have completely misunderstood my post.
>

In my response I was asking you what you meant by "intentionality" in the context of your statement that "intentionality" was missing from your B category (in your opinion what AI researchers and thinkers like Dennett had in mind) while it was to be found in your A category, which you asserted they were ignoring.

I suggested that the distinction you were making seemed artificial to me and not really reflective of the distinction between what you called the "computational"/"mental" ("B" category stuff) and the perception processes you proposed were to be found in your A "category" in terms of either AI research or Dennett's model.

(I also noted that your designating this dichotomy as dualist seemed to get the usual meaning of "dualism" wrong and asked for further clarification there but we seem to be off that issue for now.)

I agreed that perhaps you had something different in mind than I did and asked you, in that context, to elucidate what you thought "intentionality" (an apparently missing link in your thesis) actually was.

You then responded by defining it in terms of what was needed to have consciousness which I then suggested was a circular claim since the issue wasn't whether it was needed or not (presumably it is and everyone knows it because intentionality, by definition, is one of the features we recognize as part of what we mean by "consciousness").

Since you had claimed that intentionality was to be found in the A group but not the B group, I asked you what you meant by the term "intentionality", itself, since it seems perfectly feasible to me to locate it in the B group (as I understand "intentionality").

So I was seeking to see if we were talking about the same thing! (Intentionality is a rarified enough term, as we have seen, that such divergences between interlocutors are not all that rare.)

When I suggested that circularity was a problem in your argument, you responded by noting that giving definitions, as seen in dictionaries, is often a circular process.

I did not disagree with that but noted that I was not asking for a dictionary type definition but for one which would clarify the term in the context of YOUR argument that what is in the B category is not sufficient to have consciousness because "intentionality" is not to be found among the B's.

In order to determine if you are correct in that, we need to know precisely what it is you think is missing from the B's, not just an unelucidated name for an indeterminate referent.

If "intentionality" is just what is needed to have consciousness, then we know nothing more about what it is you think is missing than the fact that consciousness is missing and that doesn't help your case that B's are missing what A's have (even setting aside for the moment the possibility that your dichotomous categories may not even fairly reflect the distinction you think exists between AI and the position you hold).

>
> > SWM:
> > What "critical" elements are left out and can you say why these
> > ARE critical?
>
> I already gave details in a previous post - the one that you seem to
> have completely misunderstood.
>
> I guess I'll stop posting in this thread to avoid further confusing the
> issues.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
> =========================================

Well there's no stopping such a decision. I admit that I wasn't going to respond to this based on the fact that you have been pretty clear here that you don't want to go on. That, of course, is always an option. But after considering your claim that you don't know what I was responding to, I thought that, perhaps, a brief restatement (above) would at least clarify that.

As to your disinclination to provide further elucidation as to your position, it seems to me that your position must suffer from that move.

You are on record as saying that AI cannot work because it leaves something essential out (as, you say, do all philosophical efforts along these lines). Declining to be more specific about what you think is left out, you fall back on pointing to past, equally unclear posts you have placed here.

Of course, if they had been clear to me I would not have asked for further explanation now. So it is hardly an answer to tell me that what I found unclear before should be sufficient for clarity now.

Perhaps, as I've said in the past, you really do have some new and unique understanding which I am unable to grasp. Certainly this is one possibility. And yet your persistent refusal to elucidate when very specific questions are posed leaves me wondering.

What I know so far of your position is that you hold that AI, Dennett and all philosophy leave something critical out of the mix but you will only say that what is left out is what is required for intentionality which is only to be found in your A group of things, not in your B group. But you are unwilling to tell us what you mean by "intentionality" except to say that it means whatever is left out when consciousness isn't present.

In the past your position has gone something like this:

What is needed to have consciousness is something which is found in living things and which, you have said, may not be found in non-living things.

You have defined that something in these terms:

1) The HOMEOSTATIC (closed-state-in-equilibrium) condition which characterizes life and which leads to

2) PRAGMATIC (as in purposeful) processes (they occur as part of the homeostatic entity's need to preserve itself) which lead to

3) PERCEPTION (functions that are based in the entity's larger apparatus, beyond its brain, or information processing component [the B category], which counts, apparently, in your A category) and which pick up and capture information about the world and then which lead to

4) INTENTIONALITY (which you have refused to define beyond saying that it's what's needed for an entity to be conscious -- note that I would say, rather, that it is part of what we mean by being "consciousness" but perhaps this is a mere quibble).

At the least what is needed now are:

1) Clarification of what YOU mean by "intentionality" so we can see why it cannot be found in your B group (perhaps it can, after all, when properly understood); and

2) Some explanation as to how we get from item 1 to item 4 and why the occurrence of item 4 is, finally, dependent on the occurrence of the earlier items and cannot occur as a result of any other sequence of events.

As I said from the first, Neil, I have long been interested in why you think that AI leaves out something that is to be found in life forms.

So far the above reflects what I believe you have said on the subject. But I admit to thinking a lot of it is unclear. I cannot, however, elucidate your positions. All I can do is rephrase and restate them until we are in agreement that I have got them right (which seems to be something you are resistant to).

If you think my restatements are wrong, all you have to do is point out where, precisely, offering whatever definitions are needed to ensure we are understanding each other.

But, yes, you can always end the discussion.

If you choose to do that, I will regret it and be left with only the above points that I have culled from your posts. Either they accord with your actual positions or they are wrong. But if they are wrong, it is up to you to say why. If you don't, then I must assume they are right or that you cannot say why they are wrong and, if the latter, I would suggest you might want to rethink your position because any thesis ought to be able to stand up to this kind of scrutiny.

If it can't then perhaps there are some problems with it.

Thanks.

SWM

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