[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "blroadies" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2009 19:32:21 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
> Who's talking about studying indvidual brain cells alone? Neither
Edelman nor Hawkins are doing that.
I agree. They are studying brain areas and are defining the area from
"mind to brain." For example: We find the brain area for pain by
pinching the skin surface and seeing what part of the brain "lights up."
But we call it the brain area because the subject reports hurting.
This is how they work. Show me where they say "the brain part caused
pain."
It is the sharp that caused pain. True, if the brain part wasn't
activated, then the person wouldn't feel pain. He needs the brain part.
Just as I need my fingers to play the piano. When I do, there are brain
events which are identical with playing the piano. They are not causing
piano playing, there an aspect of piano playing. Closer to you two sides
of the coin, which stand in no causal relation.
> we can conceive of consciousness as a process-based system
And we can do so without any reference to brain. The trick is relating
the brain process to the mental process. Chalmers sees it as impossible,
given the conceptual tools at our disposal.
Where we seem to differ. I see our concepts as tools, not a reflection
of how the world "really is." We conceive brain along one line, and
minds along another. Perhaps someone will come along and provide a
unitary model. In the mean time, it is senseless to insist that, whether
we like it or not, you are in a position to know, that...
> Brains still cause minds, any way you cut this...
but say "how" by talking about complex computers which miraculously
spout minds.
> Minds are real phenomena in the universe.
meaning that we have a concept of mind, not that there is an object out
there that is mind. Right?
> Minds appear to be existentially dependent on brains and what they do.
Our concept of mind is inextricably tied to our concept of brain. Tied
conceptually, not materially. The brain doesn't connect to the mind the
way the shin bone connects to the thigh bone.
> are minds ontologically separate and co-existent with brains?
There you go with you question of substance. One or many. I'll leave it
you. Doubt that your research friends would be concerned.
> Are minds the real cause of everything physical including brains,
etc.?
Given your liberal use of "cause", why not? If we didn't have a mind,
nothing would exist because "existence" is a concept. Of course, you
hold that the ontological question, what exists, can be answered apart
from the epistemological one, "how do we know." That allows some folks
to say "mind comes first", and others say "matter." And since, in every
instance, we have both, this chicken and egg game can go on forever.
But wait. The zygote has no mind. It is only material. Mind comes
latter. So the material makes the mind. Or, the zygote has a primitive
mind and it emerges latter. How does one decide and what difference
would it make to developmental theory.
bruce
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