swmaerske wrote:
"Cayuse" wrote:Stuart wrote:Isn't this whole discussion a contradiction in terms from your point of view? And if so, what's the point of going on about it?The point is that Nagel's use of the word consciousness has no empirical content, and is consequently unsuitable material for scientific investigation. I'm not denying the utility of distinction like subjective and objective, and like private and public. I only deny that "experience" (the "what it is like") falls into such a category. Some phenomena are classed as subjective and some are classed as objective, some are private and some are public, but experience is not a phenomenon.
<snip>
So is experience qua experience a "phenomenon"? In some sense it will be and in other senses it will only be seen to consist of phenomena.
Yes indeed, the word 'phenomena' is used in different language games and we can get into the same old argument all over again.
If you think you can entirely divorce your use of the word consciousness from Nagel's use then please go ahead.I have done so several times already. I refer you therefore to those entries.
This has been dealt with elsewhere and I eagerly await your response.
and 2) producing words about something (what?) which you have already told us no words can capture.The idea arises, but it has no application.Then how can you presume to use any word to denote it, even as an "idea"?
I'm pretty sure that the etymology of the word 'consciousness' predates anything that cognitive science has to say on the matter, but this particular idea arises and this word is recruited in order to make an attempt to communicate about that idea. That's where the problem /starts/. Our bewitchment by language leads us to nonsensical hypotheses in respect of it (like idealism, realism, dualism, what have you).
I'm not criticizing the scientific study of brains but the claim that "brains produce consciousness".If not from brains, from where? Our left pinkie toes?
You may think that, Stuart, but I couldn't possibly comment.
Neither would I criticize the claim that "brains produce behavior". And if you want to call some of that behavior consciousness then so be it, but immediately you include "subjective experience" into your definition of consciousness then you present the more interesting argument that "brains produce subjective experience".What else do you think brings it about?
The question is specious. Once that is realized, we gain relief from the drive to provide an explanatory account of consciousness (on Nagel's use of the word).
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