[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2009 14:26:01 +0100
Stuart wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> I don't dispute that "subjective experience" is imputed to others on grounds
>> of structural and behavioral criteria.
>> I only dispute that "subjective experience" is empirical (and therefore a
>> suitable matter for scientific investigation).
>
> And as I've said before, your use of "subjective experience" simply is not
> mine as I do not equate it with the "microcosm" or the "all".
> Indeed, as you yourself have said, such a use as yours has no grammar, no
> referent. So it is outside of language. Obviously, agreeing
> with that as I do, I cannot be using it in any discussion here of what it
> means to have subjective experience, to be a subject. So there's no
> point in imputing it to me in order to argue against my claim about it being
> possible to examine its occurrence and manifestations empirically.
And as I've said before, I'm speaking of consciousness on Nagel's use of the
word -- that is what many want to call "subjective experience".
You have stated clearly that your use of the word consciousness entails a
number of different issues, of which "subjective experience" is one.
If you think you can divorce your use of the word "subjective experience" from
Nagel's use of the word consciousness, then please show how.
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