[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 18:45:11 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kirby urner <kirby.urner@...> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 10:28 AM, swmaerske<SWMirsky@...> wrote:
> >
> >
> > --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, kirby urner <kirby.urner@> wrote:
> >>
> >> > So you think he would have said that there is no point in ever using a
> >> > term
> >> > like "subjective experience" to differentiate experiences we have that
> >> > can
> >> > be shared from those that can't?
> >> >
> >>
> >> Careful: subjective experience is easily shared so I'm not sure who's
> >> being sloppy here, maybe one of the other interlocutors.
> >>
> >
> > I guess I should ask you the same question then, Kirby:
> >
> > So you think Wittgenstein would have said there is no point in using a term
> > like "subjective experience" to differentiate experiences we have that can
> > be shared from those that can't?
> >
>
> That may be too specific a question to merit getting out my
> Wittgenstein sock puppet and intoning and answer, but the logic does
> seem a bit skew.
>
> First of all, "experience" already implies a subject as the grammar is
> of "having" experiences i.e. the subject has them. So "subjective
> experience" has a redundant ring.
>
It does. All experience is subjective in an important sense. However,
"subjective experience" is used in at least two cases and understandable in
both.
1) It refers to experience that is private (either in principle or in fact) and
thus not shared (our pains, our thoughts, our mental images, etc.) as opposed
to experiences we can share (seeing a cat, etc.).
2) For some in the AI field, as I have learned, it refers to the dimension of
mind which involves experiencing itself and the word "subjective" plays a
reinforcing role rather than a distinguishing role, making clear we are
speaking of subjectness (being a subject) rather than of just having an
experience as in having an adventure, a great time, etc.
I suspect Cayuse is getting confused by the two distinct uses and so trying to
explain it all by reference to something that he has already stipulated is
inarticulable (which I take to be a contradiction in terms -- though I have not
yet managed to get Cayuse to see that as he continues to believe he CAN talk
about what he tells us we can't talk about!).
> On the other hand, we do have "you had to be there" type experiences
> that are difficult to share, especially with people who weren't there.
>
> Experiences are all over the map in terms of their sharability.
>
> But in terms of boiling it all down to: public = sharable, private =
> not sharable and then making private = subject, I'd say, no that's a
> house of cards, wouldn't last 30 seconds in a real debating situation.
>
As opposed to the faux debates here? Anyway, no one is arguing that there are
fixed meanings here. In keeping with Wittgenstein's later self, I am quite
comfortable with the notion that words are all over the map. Part of what we
aim to do, following Wittgenstein's footsteps, is some of that mapping.
> >> > Can you offer something in support of WHY you think as you do, either
> >> > some
> >> > argument or some direct quotes from him where he said as much?
> >> >
> >>
> >> Very clearly, without my finding that one obscure quote I mentioned
> >> (just bought Philosophical Grammar in hopes of finding it), we can say
> >> this: there is no pattern or profile in the brain, of neuronic
> >> events, corresponding to what we'd call "understanding how to continue
> >> a number series".
> >>
> >
> > I don't see how that has much to do with the argument with Cayuse. He is
> > maintaining that Wittgenstein would have denied that the idea of "subjective
> > experience" had any traction on the grounds that he (Wittgenstein) spoke in
> > the PI of a "visual room" (everything we see or are aware of in whatever
> > room we're in) vs. any actual room in which we happen to be find ourselves.
> >
>
> True, maybe not much relevance. Cayuse seems to have taken the TLP to
> heart in some way (as many do), then done what he could to continue
> that experience (of revelation, of enlightenment) in the PI. I don't
> think it's a gross misreading to Wittgenstein to do that i.e. he was
> aware of and loyal to his early interpreters, at least to some of
> them, as was more saying: if you appreciated the TLP, then you're
> *really* going to like where I go in the PI. And he was right.
>
He disavowed the TLP while he is nowhere on record as saying that "if you
appreciated the TLP, then you're really going to like where I go in the PI".
This last is just your sock-puppet talking and I don't think the puppet is
adequately channeling Wittgenstein.
> > I don't see how referencing patterns or brain profiles or neuronic events
> > gets to that.
> >
>
> Me neither. I'm hearkening back to Hawkins maybe. If there's
> supposed to be signature brain process associated with "understanding"
> and if that word "understanding" is to follow our current grammatical
> usage patterns even a little... well, I'd say you can't have it both
> ways.
>
Different discussion, different points.
> >> Why I'd say this is clear is LW goes out of his way, many times, to
> >> disabuse us of any notion that "understanding" is any singular mental
> >> process, and I'm talking about ordinary usage of the word, not some
> >> "special meaning". When I understand what to do, I need not have some
> >> specific experience.
> >
> > Well I think it's fair to say Wittgenstein didn't see it as necessarily
> > relating to any mental process but I doubt he would have drawn any
> > neuroscientific conclusions about how brains work from that. Two different
> > kinds of inquiry are underway here; two different subjects are being
> > inquired about.
> >
>
> Neuroscientific conclusions about how brains work wouldn't necessarily
> have anything to do with an "understanding process" though.
>
Depends what you're looking at as the "process". If the issue is what your
brain does when you understand something then it is extremely relevant. How
does your brain's behavior become your subjective experience of understanding
something. Think back to my anecdote about the drive up from the Carolinas. In
that I wondered about what mental events might be occurring. The question then
would be to relate them to whatever physical evnts were happening in that
brain.
> It's like you can dissect a pineal gland and study its chemistry, but
> the minute you impute a continuing cogito process or cog-sci theory to
> the thing, you've gone over the line from science to scientism, to
> Cartesianism in particular, a corner in philosophy where you'll find
> precious few loyal fans these days, whereas in his heyday you could
> probably sound like Mr. Sophisticated at cocktail parties, yakking
> about that silly gland.
>
There's more to neuroscience these days than Cartesianism and pineal glands.
> Today, it's more the whole brain that's important, not specifics of
> neuroanatomy (not like bug brains).
Whether the whole brain or some part it's still a physical thing doing
something. The question is what?
> You don't have to know much brain
> anatomy to join the talking circle, plus we have computer lingo to
> boot and just about everyone knows some of that (maybe dabbled in
> BASIC), so there's a huge beach area, a sandbox, for a throng a happy
> campers and their meaningless fun in the sun (talking about "the
> understanding process in the brain" -- a kind of booby prize if they
> ever *do* find one, as that'll be proof positive we've become monkeys
> at long last, surrendered our minds back to the angels & demons or
> whomever).
>
> >> Maybe I do, maybe I don't, but it's not integral
> >> to the meaning of understanding that some feeling or occult movement
> >> be present or in the works. That's simply grammatically true. Read a
> >> bunch of English novels if you don't believe me.
> >>
> >
> > I don't know what you're arguing against by your reference to some "feeling
> > or occult movement" equating to "understanding". Who has proposed or argued
> > for anything like that?
>
> I got the impression we were supposed to find an understanding process
> through introspection and then map that to events in the brain
> somehow. Just noting that's bankrupt from the start, never got out of
> the starting gate. But if no one is trying to go down that road, then
> my staking this sign post ("dead end") should trouble no one here.
>
> >
> >> Conclusion: anyone going looking in the brain for "that firing
> >> pattern characteristic of the 'understanding' process" has no
> >> appreciation for Wittgenstein's contribution whatsoever.
> >>
> >> Kirby
> >>
> >
> > Again, I'm not sure where you're coming from on this. Perhaps it's the
> > header to this thread which has remained the same since it was first
> > introduced. In fact, of course, Cayuse and I have been arguing for quite a
> > while in this thread about whether one can speak of consciousness in any way
> > other than as "the microcosm" or "all" that he thinks Wittgenstein equated
> > this concept to in the TLP (and carried on with, albeit more indirectly, in
> > the PI) and whether, if one can, my own refusal to do so offers a different
> > realm of understanding consciousness, one that is amenable to exploring the
> > relation of minds to the organs in our heads called "brains".
>
> Yes, I've got Cayuse pegged as a TLP fan.
>
> The "microcosm" thing is important as per 'The Art of Memory' by Yates
> i.e. that "memory palace" or "memory theater" that Gilbert Ryle makes
> fun of, as our mental picture of the mind, actually has strong
> historic roots in the hermetic tradition. Life imitates art in that
> architects would build actual theaters with allusions to the mnemonic
> versions used by clerics, public speakers, rhetoricians, orators, to
> organize their own heads. Even royalty would commission to have
> microcosms built, like bureaus with many little drawers, each with the
> thing they were supposed to remember if planning to keep daddy's
> estate from falling into the wrong hands or whatever.
>
> In other words, the Microcosm versus Macrocosm lingo (shoptalk) is
> still important, and as I was explaining to Josh, we're moving towards
> using Theater as more of the core metaphor in computer science, with
> scripts driving agents in some event driven object oriented model (of
> reality, of knowledge domains -- then mapping back to computer
> languages).
>
> > Note that Cayuse's argument hinges on the importance of "subjective
> > experience", a dimension of what both he and I call "consciousness" which,
> > Cayuse thinks, is totally beyond any ability to reference, describe or
> > explain. I deny that that is the case and that the only possible use of the
> > term "subjective experience" places it beyond language, while he holds that
> > Wittgenstein thought it did.
> >
> > SWM
>
> I think "subjective experience" is too redundant in most writings. If
> an editor, I'd get out my red pen. Just say "experience" if you want
> that subjective tinge, that's work already done. "Subjective
> experience" sounds lazy to me. What's "objective experience" pray
> tell?
>
> Kirby
>
One man's editor may be another's fool. I once had a job as a fairly low level
analyst. I had to draft a letter. I'm a pretty good writer and was even then
though I was probably a bit more wordy in those days. My boss wanted to see it
before it went out so I sent it into him. Later he emerged from his office and
proudly plopped it on my desk. It was redmarked everywhere. When I read it I
could see he had robustly cut away everything he took to be excessive. He stood
there grinning triumphantly at me. I explained to him that not only had he
edited it down, he had changed the meaning in significant areas, undermining
the intent of the letter. He didn't get it. I ended up refusing to use his
version and sent out my own. Editing isn't always what it's cracked up to be.
Sometimes a little verbosity is needed to add emphasis, clarity, etc.
SWM
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