[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 17:03:16 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart wrote:
> > Cayuse wrote:
> >> Stuart wrote:
> >>> Cayuse wrote:
> >>>> 425: In numberless cases we exert ourselves to find a picture and once
> >>>> it is found the application as it were comes about of itself. In this
> >>>> case
> >>>> we already have a picture which forces itself on us at every turn, - but
> >>>> does not help us out of the difficulty, which only begins there. [...]
> >>>
> >>> Which "difficulty" do you think he is referring to?
> >>
> >> The difficulty of placing that picture into a bigger picture in order to
> >> give the (false) impression of providing an explanatory account of it.
> >
> > Wittgenstein wanted to move us away from the idea that it is the
> > role of philosophy to explain all things. We explain within contexts
> > and philosophy's job is to understand the contexts and offer explanatory
> > clarifications within these. As you correctly note, he had no interest in
> > developing vast metaphysical canvasses to explain everything. He
> > wanted to get us to attend to the details and to forget about trying to
> > paint such canvasses. But none of this has a lot of relevance to the
> > question with which we began, namely can we say of brains that they
> > are the source of minds and, if we can, what does it mean to say that?
>
> See my post entitled "The gulf between consciousness and brain processes".
>
>
> > Do you really think that Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy and,
> > of course, to language, leads to a conclusion that scientists can't
> > study brains for the purpose of understanding minds?
> >
> > If this is not what you are arguing (since you keep saying it's about
> > subjectivity, not minds per se), then what is it that you want to claim?
> >
> > The Wittgenstein quotes are interesting to see but what do you
> > think their bearing is upon the questions we have been discussing?
> > Do you think they imply that Wittgenstein did not think we can use
> > language to talk of minds or that, because of them, we cannot speak
> > of "being a subject" as integral to what it means to have a mind?
>
> I think that his approach leads to a conclusion that the idea of "subjective
> experience" has no application.
>
So you think he would have said that there is no point in ever using a term
like "subjective experience" to differentiate experiences we have that can be
shared from those that can't?
Can you offer something in support of WHY you think as you do, either some
argument or some direct quotes from him where he said as much?
SWM
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