[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2009 17:33:45 +0100
Stuart wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> Stuart wrote:
>>> Cayuse wrote:
>>>> 425: In numberless cases we exert ourselves to find a picture and once
>>>> it is found the application as it were comes about of itself. In this case
>>>> we already have a picture which forces itself on us at every turn, - but
>>>> does not help us out of the difficulty, which only begins there. [...]
>>>
>>> Which "difficulty" do you think he is referring to?
>>
>> The difficulty of placing that picture into a bigger picture in order to
>> give the (false) impression of providing an explanatory account of it.
>
> Wittgenstein wanted to move us away from the idea that it is the
> role of philosophy to explain all things. We explain within contexts
> and philosophy's job is to understand the contexts and offer explanatory
> clarifications within these. As you correctly note, he had no interest in
> developing vast metaphysical canvasses to explain everything. He
> wanted to get us to attend to the details and to forget about trying to
> paint such canvasses. But none of this has a lot of relevance to the
> question with which we began, namely can we say of brains that they
> are the source of minds and, if we can, what does it mean to say that?
See my post entitled "The gulf between consciousness and brain processes".
> Do you really think that Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy and,
> of course, to language, leads to a conclusion that scientists can't
> study brains for the purpose of understanding minds?
>
> If this is not what you are arguing (since you keep saying it's about
> subjectivity, not minds per se), then what is it that you want to claim?
>
> The Wittgenstein quotes are interesting to see but what do you
> think their bearing is upon the questions we have been discussing?
> Do you think they imply that Wittgenstein did not think we can use
> language to talk of minds or that, because of them, we cannot speak
> of "being a subject" as integral to what it means to have a mind?
I think that his approach leads to a conclusion that the idea of "subjective
experience" has no application.
Other related posts:
