Here is another response from Stuart to Bruce that was sent to the old addy. (As messages get sufficiently old, this extra step won't be necessary). Anyway, I give you Stuart and Bruce .... --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: Seems like some stuff is coming directly to my e-mail address though I prefer to deal on-line with posts and responses. Anyway, Bruce sent this so I am responding by posting here: --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@> wrote: > And how does it get "embodied"? (the mind) Bruce: In our earliest language games we learn to speak and think of minds as embodied. We also learn to think of them as disembodied, especially in some cultures. This are basic building blocks. My response: This doesn't answer my question of how embodiment happens. I didn't ask about language games but about the facts behind how minds relate to brains. I already grant that we have language games and that we use words in different ways re: different things we deal with in the world. But one of the ways is the empirical/descriptive/scientific mode in which science as well as much of ordinary experience is dealt with. So again, Bruce, how does the mind get embodied in the brain as you put it? Remember, I am arguing that minds are existentially dependent on brains and what they do. I take this to be a causal relation which you deny. Instead you assert that minds are "embodied". I am not interested in ways we talk. We talk of souls and spirits, too. Rather I'm interested in how claiming minds are "embodied" is different, on your view, from my claim that minds are existentially dependent on brains? Bruce: LW wrote somewhere it is important to start at the beginning but not try to start before the beginning. Asking your "how", is "before the beginning." Me: Oh no, you don't get out of it that easily! If scientists can study brains (and they manifestly can) and show that brains are essential to the occurrence of minds (we don't get minds without a brain or its equivalent in good working order, etc.), you cannot simply pretend this is "before the beginning". THAT means nothing here because it does, as Wittgenstein might have said, no work! Or, as some of our old buddies on Analytic would have said, it's just "HANDWAVING", etc., etc. Bruce: Anyway, this is an alternative to thinking of mind and brain as two substances or really one or imagining them in a causal relationship. I'm arguing that this alternative informs developmental psych, not the reductionism of physicalism or your favorite question of whether mind is an ontological basic. Me: Having skipped over my key question of how you differentiate being "embodied" from being caused/produce/engendered, you now change the subject to claiming you're talking about "an alternative" way to think about mind. But, of course, you haven't given any details as to what it means to think about mind this way. What is the "alternative" here besides different phraseology than I have selected? In its simplest meaning being embodied seems to mean somehow stuck into or attached to a physical mass. But THAT is surely dualist because it presumes that mind and bodies (qua brains) somehow get jammed together. Of course, I'm sure you don't want to say THAT. But what is left if you don't? What's your alternative? If something is "embodied" then we can only understand that concept if we could conceive of it as not being embodied as well. But that makes no sense unless we believe minds are souls or spirits or monads or some such. Even though you have once likened mind to spirit, I can't imagine you REALLY want to go there! Do you? Is a smile "embodied"? Is it "enfaced"? > Your persistent insistence on describing this in terms of a mental-material dichotomy Bruce: Just what is your dichotomy. Without two things, there can be no one thing causing the other. Me: Two aspects of a thing, as in two sides of a coin, but still just the one thing, where "thing" does not merely denote a physical thing (something observable in the world as an object or group of objects with features like shape, color, texture, mass, extension, etc., etc.) but any kind of object of reference including relations, situation, actions, decisions, theories, words, etc. > Which tells us you aren't engaged in studying how brains produce the features Bruce: because I don't conceive of "brains producing." When we evaluate different pain medications, we evaluate how these "brain changes" are lived by the client. No causation! Me: Looks like you are still hung up on the uses of "causation". Well I doubt I can change that after three (or is it four) lists and untold hours of on-line conversation like this! Apparently you still have the same problem with "produce" too. But you have not yet explicated your own alternative formulation ("being embodied"). If you can explain that in a way that demonstrates a clearly different concept than what I have offered for characterizing the existentially dependent relationship of minds on brains, then maybe you have something. If you can't, well then you don't and all the verbiage in the world about unintelligibility, etc., etc. will be -- what was that again that people sometimes do with their hands? > But it's clear he's experiencing a really horrible deterioration. Bruce: Yes, a terrible experience. And experiences aren't caused, not in X/Y sense that must be at the basis of reductionism if it is to mean anything more than a metaphor. I'll stop here for the time being. bruce Me: Ah, you mean I should inform his neurologist that his collapsing memory and conceptual functions aren't caused by anything happening in and to his brain? What should I tell the neurologist instead then? Have you a better explanation? Is the embodiment just somehow coming unstuck? Any suggestions as to how to reattach his mind to whatever it is about his body that is its carrier? 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