[Wittrs] Re: On Wittgenstein and Originality
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 22:12:01 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- On Sun, 9/20/09, SWM <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
>
>
> From: SWM <SWMirsky@...>
> Subject: [Wittrs] Re: On Wittgenstein and Originality
> To: wittrs@...
> Date: Sunday, September 20, 2009, 10:49 PM
>
>
> <snip>
>
> Mirsky: . . . I, at least, have Wittgenstein's own words on the matter
> (posted earlier in an exchange with Cayuse) about how his claim is not
> behaviorism.
>
> GS: Wittgenstein's claims are beside the point.
>
> Mirsky: My main beef with Glen (aside from his rather thin skin when anyone
> disagrees with him about his theses re: behaviorism) is in his argument that
> mental phenomena (thoughts, mental images, ideas, memories, etc.) are
> properly referred to as behavior, too, and thus we save behaviorism! While it
> is certainly possible to expand the meaning of "behavior" as Glen and Gerardo
> do, I have argued that the end result is simply to call something behaviorism
> that isn't.
>
> GS: So...you are claiming that Skinner is not a "behaviorist"?
It's possible that Skinner did the same thing you and Gerardo do: expand the
notion of "behavior" to a lot more than what we would recognize, via ordinary
language, as behavior. But I'm no expert in Behaviorism or Skinner so I don't
know.
I have said here before that I find it hard to credit claims by some that
Behaviorism completely disregards mental phenomena. I tend to see the
Behaviorist thesis as a prescriptive one for researchers rather than a
theoretical claim about what is going on inside our heads. But I could be wrong
about that since this is a fairly fuzzy area. However, if Skinner espoused the
expansive view as you and Gerardo have claimed, then he would have been guilty
of the same mistake you guys have made in my opinion (which is as flawed as
your so-called merelogical fallacy).
If it's all behavior, on a theoretical level, then there isn't a lot to be
gained by way of explaining what's going on vis a vis our subjective experience
because a rose by any other name . . . etc.
As to your point about ascribing to brains what we sometimes (and usually)
ascribe to persons, I think you are also mistaken and that Sean has it right
(whether he's right about "brain scripts" is a different question). There is no
reason not to speak of brains as agential in certain contexts anymore than
there is not to speak of limbs (his left arm suddenly extended) or muscles (the
muscles in the arm contracted on one side and expanded on the other, thereby
extending his left arm), etc.
Brains produce minds and whatever we mean by minds. As I understand it, we mean
by "minds" the mental aspect of our experience, our mental lives, which
includes mental events like thoughts, memories, images, feelings, sensations,
perceptions, ideas, etc. You and Gerardo want to call these covert behaviors
but my view is that that adds nothing while confusing the issue. We do have
mental lives, private experiences, and that's just how things are. Insofar as
minds are the product of certain things certain kinds of brains do, it makes
perfect sense to speak of brains thinking as opposed to the muscles in our left
arms, our stomachs or our kidneys, say.
There are contexts when we want to speak of brains doing things and ways to
speak of that. Blanket, across the board disavowals of such usages don't work
and aren't consistent with the open-ended approach of Wittgenstein.
Did Wittgenstein's work have some affinities with Behaviorism? Yes. Did he
consider himself one? No. Does that matter? No, but the work he did does and
there is plenty in his work that is NOT consistent with the kind of radical
Behaviorist approach you seem to support.
SWM
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